noncustodial parent

In 1892 a national magazine proposed that schoolchildren recite a pledge of allegiance to the flag. Congress first codified rules for the Pledge in a 1942 joint resolution and amended the text twelve years later to add the words "under God." California law requires every public elementary school to begin each day with appropriate patriotic exercises. The Elk Grove Unified School District satisfies the requirement by directing that each elementary class recite the Pledge once daily, while permitting students who object on religious grounds to abstain. Michael A. Newdow, an atheist whose daughter was then enrolled in kindergarten in the district, filed suit in March 2000 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against Congress, the President, the State of California, the School District, and its superintendent. The complaint sought a declaration that the 1954 amendment adding "under God" violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and an injunction against the district's daily recitation policy. The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the complaint on July 21, 2000. A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that Newdow had standing as a parent and that both the 1954 Act and the district policy violated the Establishment Clause. After that decision, Sandra Banning, the mother of Newdow's daughter, moved to intervene or dismiss, stating that she held sole legal custody and that the child was a Christian who had no objection to reciting or hearing the Pledge. On September 25, 2002, a California Superior Court enjoined Newdow from including his daughter as a party or suing as her next friend. The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that Newdow retained Article III standing as a noncustodial parent under California law. In February 2003 the court amended its opinion to omit any determination of standing to challenge the 1954 Act itself. At a September 2003 hearing the Superior Court announced that the parents now share joint legal custody but that Banning makes the final decisions if they disagree. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider both Newdow's standing and the First Amendment question.

In January 1972 a paternity action was instituted against Roger G. Redhail in Milwaukee County Court alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971. After Redhail admitted paternity the court entered an order on May 12, 1972 adjudging him the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support until the child reached age eighteen. From May 1972 until August 1974 Redhail was unemployed and indigent and consequently was unable to make any support payments. As of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. The child had been a public charge since her birth receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. In September 1974 Redhail applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki denied the application because Redhail had not obtained a court order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 245.10(1). Redhail would not have been able to satisfy either statutory prerequisite for permission to marry. After the license denial Redhail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The complaint alleged that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. The plaintiff class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). After the parties filed a stipulation of facts and briefs were submitted the three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement. Zablocki brought a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed the District Court judgment.

On November 9, 1999, Rexayne Taylor and Wes Taylor were divorced. Under the divorce decree, they agreed to share joint custody of the children, with Rexayne Taylor being the primary custodial parent. Wes Taylor agreed to pay $591 biweekly in child support. Initially, the parents shared a cordial relationship, and the joint-custody arrangement worked well. In May 2000, a friend of Rexayne Taylor’s, Kellie Tabora, who was an admitted lesbian, moved into her home and began paying her $500 a month for living expenses. On May 2, 2001, a little over a year later, Wes Taylor filed a petition to modify the divorce decree. In his petition, he alleged that there had been a change in circumstances warranting a custodial change for the two boys because his former wife’s living conditions were not in the best interest of the children. Rexayne Taylor responded and denied the allegations. On April 10 and 11, 2002, the circuit court held a hearing on Wes Taylor’s petition. Wes Taylor’s counsel called both Rexayne Taylor and Kellie Tabora to testify at the hearing, and both women acknowledged that Kellie moved into Rexayne’s home in May 2000. Rexayne testified that Kellie slept on the couch most of the time but that, on occasion, they would sleep together in Rexayne’s bed. Rexayne stated that she was not a lesbian, that she thought homosexuality was wrong, and that she and Kellie did not have a sexual relationship. She further testified that after Wes Taylor filed his petition in May 2001, Kellie slept in a separate bed in a separate room. In her testimony, Kellie Tabora stated that although she was a lesbian, her last relationship had ended at least three years ago. She testified that she had slept in Rexayne’s bed about half the time prior to the filing of Wes Taylor’s petition, but that they had had no sexual contact while sleeping in the same bed. Kellie also testified that on three or four occasions, Rexayne’s children slept with both women in the same bed. Wes Taylor presented additional witnesses who testified that he was a good father and that his boys seemed well-adjusted. Wes Taylor testified that his usual take-home pay each week was $1,104 and added that his self-employed business, Taylor Made Systems, was growing and that he now employed seven employees. He testified that he planned to marry his girlfriend, Lynelle Crotty, and that she and others would assist him in caring for the boys, should he be awarded custody. As to his ability to assist the children with their school work, he stated that he had earned a four-year degree in computer science and that his health was good. In response, Rexayne Taylor presented testimony from both boys’ elementary school teachers that they were well-adjusted and enjoyable children. Neither teacher testified to any behavioral change in the boys. Rexayne Taylor took the stand and stated that she brought home $1,000 each month plus benefits from her flower shop, All About Flowers, and that she was always supportive of her children. On April 17, 2002, the circuit court filed its letter opinion. In it, the court found that at the time of the divorce, Wes Taylor made more money than Rexayne Taylor did and was more formally educated. The court further found that Wes Taylor’s business had grown and that Rexayne Taylor’s flower shop had more or less remained the same. The court concluded that even though Wes was better off financially than Rexayne at the time of the divorce it now appears that he is much more financially secure than Rexayne. The court next considered the lifestyle and living conditions of Rexayne Taylor. The court found that both Rexayne and Kellie Tabora had testified that Kellie had lived in Rexayne’s home since May 2000, and from May 2000 until May 2001, she and Rexayne had slept in the same bed on numerous occasions. On April 18, 2002, an order was entered memorializing the letter opinion. Rexayne Taylor appealed the order to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Alta Sue Adams married Phillip William Feiock in 1968, and the couple had three children. In 1973, Feiock left the family. In January 1976, a California court entered an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage. The court awarded custody of the children to Mrs. Feiock and ordered Feiock to pay child support beginning February 1, 1976. The payments were set at $35 per child per month for the first four months and $75 per child per month starting June 1, 1976. After the final judgment, Mrs. Feiock and the children moved to Ohio. Respondent made child support payments only sporadically and stopped making any payments by December 1982. Mrs. Feiock filed a complaint in Ohio under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. The Ohio court transmitted the complaint to the Superior Court of California for the County of Orange. On June 22, 1984, after a hearing, the California court ordered Feiock to pay $150 per month on a temporary basis beginning July 1, 1984. Feiock made payments only for August and September 1984. In 1985, the Orange County District Attorney filed orders to show cause alleging nine counts of contempt. At the August 9, 1985 hearing, the petitioner established a prima facie case of contempt. Respondent testified about his ability to pay but was found in contempt on five counts. He received a suspended sentence of 25 days in jail and three years of probation. Probation conditions required $150 monthly support payments and $50 monthly payments on the $1,650 arrearage. Respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. The court annulled the contempt order, holding that section 1209.5 imposed an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In June 2003 a South Carolina family court entered an order requiring petitioner Michael Turner to pay respondent Rebecca Rogers $51.73 per week to help support their child. Rogers' father Larry Price currently has custody of the child and is also a respondent before this Court. Over the next three years Turner repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in contempt on five occasions. The first four times he was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment but ultimately paid what he owed. He paid twice without being jailed and twice after spending a few days in custody. The fifth time he did not pay but completed a six-month sentence. After his release Turner remained in arrears. On March 27, 2006 the family court clerk issued a new show cause order because Turner was $5,728.76 behind. Following an initial postponement due to Turner's failure to appear, his civil contempt hearing took place on January 3, 2008. Turner and Rogers were both present without representation by counsel. The court clerk stated the arrearage amount. The judge asked Turner if there was anything he wanted to say. Turner described getting back on drugs after release, breaking his back in September, filing for disability and SSI benefits, and hoping for another chance. The judge then asked Rogers if she had anything to say. The judge found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to twelve months in the Oconee County Detention Center. Turner could purge the contempt by reaching a zero balance. The judge completed a prewritten Order for Contempt of Court form but left blank the statement indicating whether Turner was gainfully employed and had the ability to make support payments when due. Turner served the full sentence. While serving the sentence Turner appealed with pro bono counsel claiming a federal constitutional right to counsel at the contempt hearing. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the claim after Turner completed his sentence. Turner sought certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court granted review. Within months of his release from the twelve-month imprisonment Turner was again the subject of civil contempt proceedings. He had arrears of $13,814.72 as of December 2010. Another hearing was scheduled for May 2011.