particularized injury

Shortly after taking office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769 directing a review of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking entry and temporarily restricting entry from seven countries previously identified as posing terrorism risks. After courts enjoined that order, the President revoked it and issued Executive Order 13780, which again directed a worldwide review and temporarily restricted entry from six of the countries. Following completion of the review, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645 on September 24, 2017, placing entry restrictions on nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—whose systems for managing and sharing information the President deemed inadequate. The Proclamation imposed varying restrictions by country, exempted lawful permanent residents and asylees, provided for case-by-case waivers, and directed ongoing 180-day reviews; restrictions on Chad were later lifted after it improved its practices. Plaintiffs including the State of Hawaii, three U.S. citizens with foreign-national relatives from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for visas, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii challenged the Proclamation in the District of Hawaii on statutory and Establishment Clause grounds. The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on statutory grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In January 1972, Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., and eight individual plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York against the Town of Penfield and members of its Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards. The individual plaintiffs included Rochester residents who owned property and paid taxes there, as well as low and moderate income persons, some of whom were members of racial or ethnic minority groups, who sought to live in Penfield. Organizational plaintiffs included Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., a nonprofit corporation focused on housing issues for low and moderate income persons. Penfield's zoning ordinance, adopted in 1962, allocated 98 percent of the town's vacant land to single-family detached housing and imposed requirements relating to lot size, setback, floor area, and habitable space that increased the cost of such housing beyond the means of persons of low and moderate income. Only 0.3 percent of land available for residential construction was allocated to multifamily structures, and even on that limited space low density and other requirements made low and moderate income housing economically infeasible. No land was zoned for apartments or mobile homes. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance and its enforcement, including delays on proposals, denials of variances and permits, refusals to allow tax abatements, and failures to provide support services, had the purpose and effect of excluding low and moderate income persons and members of minority groups from residing in Penfield. Low and moderate income plaintiffs claimed they had attempted to locate suitable housing in Penfield but could not due to the restrictions, resulting in higher commuting costs, substandard living conditions, and fewer municipal services. Rochester taxpayer plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's practices forced Rochester to provide more low and moderate income housing than it otherwise would, requiring tax abatements that increased their own tax burdens. The record referenced two specific development efforts: Penfield Better Homes Corp. applied in late 1969 for rezoning to build subsidized cooperative townhouses for moderate income persons but was denied a variance, and O'Brien Homes, Inc. proposed a project in late 1971 that was also denied or remained under consideration. Affidavits from individual plaintiffs detailed their income levels, family sizes, maximum affordable housing payments, and unsuccessful searches for housing in Penfield through newspaper ads and other means. On May 2, 1972, Rochester Home Builders Association moved to intervene as a plaintiff, alleging that its member firms had been prevented from building low and moderate income housing in Penfield and had lost profits. On June 7, 1972, the original plaintiffs moved to add Housing Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc., as a plaintiff; an accompanying affidavit stated that one of its members, Penfield Better Homes Corp., had been actively attempting to develop moderate income housing in Penfield but had been unable to secure approvals. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, denied the motions to add parties, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Adarand Constructors, Inc., a Colorado-based firm specializing in guardrail work, submitted the low bid for a subcontract on a federal highway construction project. Despite submitting the lowest bid, Adarand lost the subcontract to another firm that had been certified as a small business controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. The prime contractor received a financial incentive from the federal government for awarding the subcontract to the certified firm. This incident prompted Adarand to challenge the government's practice of providing such incentives based on race-based presumptions. The federal subcontracting program derives from the Small Business Act and the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987. The Small Business Administration administers programs that presume members of specified racial groups are socially disadvantaged, though the presumption is rebuttable and allows for individualized showings of disadvantage. Department of Transportation regulations require federal agencies to set goals for participation by disadvantaged businesses and establish certification procedures that can be performed by the SBA, state highway agencies, or other acceptable authorities. Prime contractors receive monetary compensation under subcontracting compensation clauses when they use certified disadvantaged business enterprises as subcontractors. Adarand sued federal officials in federal district court, alleging that the race-based presumptions violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. Adarand then petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Adarand sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future use of the subcontractor compensation clauses in government contracts. To establish standing for this forward-looking relief, Adarand presented evidence that it was very likely to bid on additional government contracts offering similar financial incentives in the near future. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional challenge.

Laidlaw Environmental Services acquired a hazardous waste incinerator facility in Roebuck, South Carolina in 1986 that included a wastewater treatment plant. Shortly thereafter, it obtained an NPDES permit effective January 1, 1987 authorizing limited discharges of pollutants including mercury into the North Tyger River. Laidlaw repeatedly exceeded the permit limits, violating the mercury discharge limit on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995. On April 10, 1992, Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental Action Network sent Laidlaw a 60-day notice letter of their intent to file a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. On June 9, 1992, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control reached a settlement with Laidlaw requiring payment of a $100,000 civil penalty. On June 12, 1992, FOE filed its federal citizen suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief plus civil penalties. After a bench trial the District Court found the violations, imposed a $405,800 penalty, awarded litigation costs to FOE, and denied injunctive relief because Laidlaw had achieved substantial compliance since August 1992. The Fourth Circuit assumed without deciding that FOE initially had standing but held that the case had become moot because civil penalties payable to the government would not redress any injury FOE had suffered. The Supreme Court granted certiorari; after the Fourth Circuit decision but before argument the entire Roebuck facility was permanently closed, dismantled, and placed for sale with all discharges permanently ceased.

In April 1996 Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act, which took effect on January 1, 1997, and authorized the President to cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit. On August 5, 1997, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which included section 4722(c) deeming certain New York health-care-provider taxes permissible and in compliance with federal Medicaid requirements. On the same day Congress passed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which included section 968 granting a limited tax benefit allowing owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer recognition of gain when selling stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. On August 11, 1997, President Clinton transmitted notices canceling section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act and section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act. The City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health-care employees filed suit challenging the cancellation of section 4722(c). Snake River Potato Growers, Inc., a farmers' cooperative formed in May 1997 to acquire potato-processing facilities, and one of its members filed a separate action challenging the cancellation of section 968. The District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated the two actions and held that at least one plaintiff in each case had Article III standing. It ruled on the merits that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws. Earlier, six Members of Congress who had voted against the Line Item Veto Act had brought a separate challenge; the District Court had held the Act unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed that action for lack of standing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). After the President exercised the cancellation authority, the present appellees filed suit challenging the two cancellations, and the District Court again held the statute invalid.