Also known as: permissible inferences · permissive inference
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An evidentiary device by which a factfinder may but is not required to conclude that one fact exists upon proof of another fact. The device supplies no shift in the burden of proof or persuasion and leaves the trier of fact free to accept or reject the connection.
Pedro Pacheco lunged at Pablo Perez during a dispute and stabbed him repeatedly in the chest with a fixed-blade knife. The prosecution introduced evidence of the intentional stabbing. The jury was permitted to conclude from that act alone that Pedro acted with intent to kill.
Four passengers rode in a car stopped by police. Officers found a loaded handgun on the floor near the front passenger. The trial court instructed the jury that it could but need not infer each occupant knowingly possessed the weapon. The instruction left the jury free to reject the connection after weighing all the evidence.
In March 1973, three adult male respondents and a sixteen-year-old girl were traveling in a Chevrolet on the New York State Thruway when the car was stopped for speeding. Police observed two loaded handguns weighing approximately six pounds in an open handbag on the front floor or seat beside the girl, who admitted the bag belonged to her. A machinegun and heroin were discovered in the trunk after it was pried open. The four were tried together in Ulster County Court for possession of the handguns and trunk items. The trial judge instructed the jury regarding the statutory presumption that the presence of firearms in the automobile constituted evidence of possession by all occupants. The jury found the three adult males guilty of handgun possession but acquitted everyone of the trunk charges. The convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. The respondents sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of New York. The district court granted the writ on the ground that the presumption could not support the convictions on these facts. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the writ, though on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the procedural and substantive issues raised by the lower federal courts' decisions.
View casePilar Pena sued Phoenix Technologies for defamation. She offered documents and testimony that permitted an inference of actual malice. The district court denied summary judgment because a reasonable jury could draw that inference from the circumstantial proof.
In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.
View casePenelope Price filed for divorce in Iowa after living there only four months. The state invoked its one-year residency rule. The court upheld the statute in part because the residency period supported a permissible inference that the petitioner had formed genuine ties to the forum.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
View casePaige Porter was prosecuted under a statute that treated cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. The Court held the provision unconstitutional because it converted a permissible inference into a mandatory presumption that relieved the state of its burden.
Virginia Code Annotated § 18.2-423 makes it unlawful for any person, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn or cause to be burned a cross on the property of another, a highway, or other public place. The statute further provides that any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons. In 1998 three individuals were separately convicted under this statute in two incidents. Barry Black was convicted for leading a cross burning at a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property in Carroll County. Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted for burning a cross on the lawn of their African-American neighbor James Jubilee in Virginia Beach. The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions of both Elliott and O'Mara. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the appeals and held the statute unconstitutional on its face. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002 to review the decision.
View casePierce Patterson killed his wife after she taunted him about an affair. He claimed the killing occurred in the heat of passion. The trial court instructed the jury that it could infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon but remained free to find the provocation adequate and reduce the offense to manslaughter.
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court. The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing. Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance. The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder. Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision. After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.
View caseA permissible inference allows the factfinder to accept or reject the connection between the proven fact and the inferred fact. A mandatory presumption requires the factfinder to accept the connection unless rebutted and may shift the burden of proof.
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Res ipsa loquitur creates only a permissible inference. The jury may but is not required to conclude that the defendant was negligent when the event is of a type that ordinarily does not occur without negligence and other causes are sufficiently eliminated.
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The factfinder may draw a permissive inference that the person intended to kill. The inference is not required and does not relieve the prosecution of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The judge decides as a matter of law whether the evidence permits a reasonable jury to draw the inference. If the judge finds the inference available, the jury then decides whether to draw it on the facts of the case.
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…granted. The State's decision to exact a one-year residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore buttressed by a quite permissible inference that this requirement not only effectuates state substantive policy but likewise provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of bona fide…