Also known as: presumptive malice · implied malice
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An evidentiary doctrine at common law under which certain facts permit a factfinder to presume the existence of malice aforethought in a homicide prosecution. The doctrine rested on inferences such as the intent to produce the natural and probable consequences of an act or the use of a deadly weapon.
Pedro Pacheco, a deckhand, secretly weakened the safety line assigned to captain Penelope Price before a forecasted gale while leaving other lines intact. When Price clipped in during the storm and drowned, the factfinder could presume malice from Pacheco's reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life. The prosecution therefore charged murder rather than manslaughter.
Priscilla Parks and Pierce Patterson entered a restricted hospital storage room to steal diagnostic devices. Parks injected an elderly patient with an unauthorized large dose of sedative to clear the hallway, causing respiratory arrest and death. The factfinder could presume malice from the intent to commit the underlying felony, supporting a murder charge.
Perry Pratt locked Alfred in a conference room and struck him repeatedly in the head with a heavy stapler until he lost consciousness. Alfred later died from brain hemorrhage. The factfinder could presume malice from Pratt's deliberate intent to inflict great bodily injury, allowing a murder conviction.
Pavel Petrov and Paragon Construction employees robbed a warehouse and shot a security guard who blocked their exit. The guard died from the wound. The factfinder could presume malice from the intent to commit robbery, elevating the homicide to first-degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine.
On October 26, 1965, at 10:45 a.m., Jonathan Earl Stamp and Michael John Koory, armed with a gun and a blackjack, entered the rear of the building housing the offices of General Amusement Company. They ordered the employees they found there to go to the front of the premises, where the two secretaries were working. Stamp went into the office of Carl Honeyman, the owner and manager, and Honeyman emerged looking very frightened and pale. The robbery victims were required to lie down on the floor while the robbers took the money and fled out the back door after being on the premises for 10 to 15 minutes. As the robbers were leaving, they told the victims to remain on the floor for five minutes. Honeyman, who had been lying next to the counter, had to use it to steady himself in getting up off the floor. Still pale, he was short of breath, sucking air, and pounding and rubbing his chest. As he walked down the hall in an unsteady manner, he said he was having trouble keeping the pounding down inside and that his heart was pumping too fast for him. A few minutes later, although still looking very upset, he collapsed on the floor, and at 11:25 a.m. he was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The employees noted that during the hours before the robbery Honeyman had appeared to be in normal health and good spirits. The victim was an obese, 60-year-old man with a history of heart disease who was under a great deal of pressure due to the intensely competitive nature of his business. Three doctors testified that although Honeyman had an advanced case of atherosclerosis, there must have been some immediate upset to his system which precipitated the attack, and it was their conclusion that but for the robbery there would have been no fatal seizure at that time. There was opposing expert testimony to the effect that it could not be said with reasonable medical certainty that fright could ever be fatal. Lehman, the driver of the getaway car, was apprehended a few minutes after the robbery when the car was stopped at 11:08 a.m. Several weeks later Stamp was arrested in Ohio and Koory in Nebraska. Each confessed to his part in the crime after having been advised of his right to counsel, to remain silent, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. Following jury verdicts of guilty of robbery and murder, both in the first degree, each defendant was given a life sentence on the murder charge together with the time prescribed by law on the robbery count. The defendants appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District. Acting Presiding Justice Cobey authored the opinion in which Justices Schweitzer and Allport concurred. The Supreme Court denied the petitions for hearing on January 28, 1970.
View casePremier Manufacturing worker Pierce Patterson killed a coworker during an argument and claimed sudden provocation. The prosecution introduced evidence that the killing was intentional and unlawful. The factfinder could presume malice unless Patterson proved heat of passion by a preponderance, satisfying due-process requirements for the murder charge.
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court. The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing. Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance. The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder. Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision. After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.
View casePlatinum Partners employee Priscilla Parks used a heavy metal bar to strike a rival during a workplace dispute, causing fatal head trauma. At sentencing the court treated the weapon use as an aggravating fact. The factfinder could presume malice from the intentional deadly-weapon use without violating due process.
The Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in 1982. The statute applies to persons convicted of enumerated felonies including third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping. Under the Act a sentencing judge must impose a minimum term of five years' imprisonment upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during commission of the offense. The judge considers trial evidence plus any additional evidence offered by the parties at the sentencing hearing. The Act does not increase the statutory maximum penalty for the underlying felony. Petitioner McMillan was convicted by jury of aggravated assault after shooting his victim in the right buttock during an argument over a debt. Petitioner Peterson was convicted after a bench trial of voluntary manslaughter after shooting and killing her husband. Petitioner Dennison was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated assault after shooting and seriously wounding an acquaintance. Petitioner Smalls was convicted after a bench trial of robbery after holding up a seafood store at gunpoint. In each case the Commonwealth provided notice before sentencing that it would seek application of the Act. The four sentencing judges each held the Act unconstitutional and imposed sentences below the five-year minimum. The Commonwealth appealed all four cases to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which consolidated them and upheld the statute. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional challenges.
View caseBefore defendants could testify, common law courts created presumptions to supply the malice element in homicide cases. One presumption held that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of an act. Another treated the intentional use of a deadly weapon as evidence of intent to kill.
The historical presumptions supplied the mental states now classified as implied malice, including reckless indifference to human life and intent to commit a felony. Modern courts no longer use mandatory presumptions but still permit inferences from the same facts.
No. The common law permitted a permissive inference of intent to kill from intentional deadly-weapon use, but the inference was never mandatory and could be rebutted by other evidence.
Under the felony-murder rule, any intent to commit a qualifying felony supplies the implied malice needed for murder, even if the felony itself is not inherently dangerous to life.
A mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of disproving malice to the defendant violates due process. Only permissive inferences that leave the ultimate burden on the prosecution are constitutionally permissible.