Princeps et respublica ex justa causa possunt rem meam auferre

The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.

Congress enacted the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, which made legislative findings regarding substandard housing and blighted areas in the District and declared the acquisition of property for redevelopment to be a public use. The Act created the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency with power to acquire property by eminent domain. It also directed the National Capital Planning Commission to develop a comprehensive plan and specific project plans subject to approval by the District Commissioners. The initial project under the Act concerned Project Area B in Southwest Washington, D.C. Surveys conducted in connection with the 1950 comprehensive plan revealed that 64.3% of dwellings in the area were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, and only 17.3% were satisfactory. Many dwellings lacked basic amenities, including outside toilets in 57.8% of units, no baths in 60.3%, no electricity in 29.3%, no wash basins or laundry tubs in 82.2%, and no central heating in 83.8%. The area had a population of 5,012 persons, 97.5% of whom were Negroes. The redevelopment plan for Area B specified land uses and required that at least one-third of new dwelling units be low-rent housing at a maximum of $17 per room per month. Following a public hearing, the District Commissioners approved the plan, and the Planning Commission certified it to the Agency for execution. The Agency began preliminary steps to redevelop the area. Appellants owned a department store at 712 Fourth Street, S.W., in Area B. Their property was commercial and not used for habitation. They brought suit in the District Court to enjoin the condemnation of their property under the Act. A three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint in Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

Anthony Palazzolo, a lifelong resident of Westerly, Rhode Island, formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) with associates in 1959 to purchase three undeveloped adjoining parcels along Atlantic Avenue bordering Winnapaug Pond to the north and the beach to the south. SGI subdivided the property into 80 lots in the 1960s and developed most into single-family homes, but left the petitioner's 20-acre parcel undeveloped. Most of the property consists of salt marsh subject to tidal flooding requiring substantial fill for structures. In 1971, Rhode Island created the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to regulate coastal development. In 1978, the CRMC promulgated regulations designating much of the property as protected coastal wetlands where filling is prohibited without a special exception. That same year SGI's corporate charter was revoked for unpaid taxes, transferring title to Palazzolo as sole shareholder. In 1983, Palazzolo applied to the CRMC to construct a bulkhead and fill the entire wetlands for a beach club, but the application was denied as vague and inadequate with significant environmental impacts. In 1985, he submitted a more specific proposal to fill 11 acres for a beach club including parking for 50 cars with trailers, dumpsters, port-a-johns, picnic tables, and barbecue pits, which the CRMC also rejected for failing to serve a compelling public purpose. Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court seeking $3,150,000 in damages based on the value of a 74-lot residential subdivision, alleging the regulations deprived him of all economically beneficial use. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against him, finding the parcel retained $200,000 in development value on an upland portion. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on multiple grounds, including lack of ripeness and that Palazzolo lacked standing to challenge pre-acquisition regulations. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision.

In 1878 the Pennsylvania Coal Company executed a deed that conveyed the surface of property but reserved in express terms the right to remove all the coal under the same. The grantee took the premises with the risk and waived all claim for damages that might arise from mining out the coal. The plaintiffs claim under this deed. On May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature approved the Kohler Act. The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used as a human habitation. The statute provides exceptions for land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any other person. The plaintiffs brought a bill in equity to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house. The Court of Common Pleas found that if not restrained the defendant would cause the damage to prevent which the bill was brought. It denied an injunction, holding that the statute if applied to this case would be unconstitutional. On appeal the Supreme Court of the State agreed that the defendant had contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States. It held that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power and directed a decree for the plaintiffs. A writ of error was granted bringing the case to this Court. As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract. The case involves a single private house. The statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. The Attorney General of the State, the City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted their contentions here. The statute purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land. The question presented concerns mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.