Also known as: production burden · persuasion burden · burden of production · burden of persuasion · evidentiary burdens · burden of proof components
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The allocation of responsibility between parties in a legal proceeding for introducing sufficient evidence on a disputed issue and for ultimately convincing the fact-finder that the issue should be resolved in that party's favor.
Dylan files a petition seeking a declaration of intestacy after his brother Jordan dies without a witnessed will. Dylan supplies evidence of death, venue, and his status as sole heir. Peggy, named as beneficiary in an unwitnessed digital document, offers metadata and testimony to support probate. The court first requires Peggy to meet her initial production burden on due execution before shifting any persuasion questions to Dylan on capacity.
Nova Development offers five years of maintenance logs showing that leaks in comparable buildings almost always stem from neglected common pipes. Pacific Estates must then produce evidence pointing to another cause of the flooding. The ultimate persuasion burden on causation remains with Nova Development throughout the diversity action.
Plaintiffs allege parallel pricing by telecom carriers but supply no facts tending to exclude independent action. The court requires the plaintiffs to produce additional circumstantial evidence at the pleading stage before any persuasion burden on the merits can arise. Without that production, the complaint fails to state a claim.
In 1984 the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business created seven regional service monopolies known as Regional Bell Operating Companies or Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers. More than a decade later Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which restructured local telephone markets and imposed duties on the ILECs to facilitate entry by competitive local exchange carriers through resale of services at wholesale rates, leasing of unbundled network elements, or interconnection of facilities. William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a putative class of all subscribers of local telephone and high-speed internet services from February 8, 1996 to the present. They named as defendants four consolidated ILECs: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications International Inc., SBC Communications Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. The complaint alleged that these ILECs conspired to restrain trade by engaging in parallel conduct to inhibit CLECs, including unfair agreements for network access, inferior connections, overcharging, and billing practices designed to sabotage CLEC customer relations. The complaint further alleged that the ILECs agreed not to compete against one another in their respective territories. This agreement was inferred from their common failure to pursue business opportunities in contiguous markets and from a statement by Qwest CEO Richard Notebaert that competing in another ILEC's territory might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that does not make it right. The complaint asserted that in light of the absence of meaningful competition among the ILECs and their parallel course of conduct the defendants had entered into a contract combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry and to allocate customers and markets. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. It concluded that the alleged parallel behavior was fully explained by each ILEC's independent interest in defending its own territory and that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the decision to refrain from competing elsewhere was contrary to the ILECs' apparent economic interests. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that plus factors need not be pleaded and that allegations of parallel conduct suffice if they leave open the possibility of collusion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.
View caseA public-figure plaintiff offers only conclusory affidavits in response to a media defendant's motion. The defendant has already produced evidence of its reporting process. The court holds that the plaintiff failed to produce facts creating a genuine issue on actual malice, so the persuasion burden never shifts and summary judgment is proper.
In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.
View caseA prosecutor strikes all Black venire members in a case with a Black defendant. The defendant produces evidence of a pattern suggesting purposeful discrimination. The prosecutor must then articulate a race-neutral explanation for each strike, after which the defendant retains the ultimate persuasion burden on discriminatory intent.
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Jefferson Circuit Court on two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of receipt of stolen goods. On the first day of trial, the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire. He excused certain jurors for cause and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire. A jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before it was sworn. The motion claimed that the prosecutor's removal of the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to strike anybody they wanted to. The judge denied the motion. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. He was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his right to trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory challenges. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction. It relied on Swain v. Alabama and held that petitioner had failed to show that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of discrimination in the selection of jurors in a series of cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA district court orders production of White House documents in a civil suit. The Vice President produces a privilege log but must still come forward with particularized showings of harm. The plaintiffs retain the persuasion burden on overcoming the privilege once the initial production threshold is met.
In January 2001, shortly after assuming office, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum establishing the National Energy Policy Development Group. The Group was directed to develop a national energy policy designed to help promote dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound production and distribution of energy. The President assigned agency heads and assistants, all federal employees, to serve as members of the committee. He authorized the Vice President, as chairman, to invite other officers of the Federal Government to participate as appropriate. Five months later the NEPDG issued a final report and, according to the Government, terminated all operations. Following publication of the report, Judicial Watch, Inc., and the Sierra Club filed separate actions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that were later consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged that the NEPDG had failed to comply with the procedural and disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Non-federal employees including private lobbyists regularly attended and fully participated in non-public meetings. Respondents contend that the regular participation of the non-Government individuals made them de facto members of the committee. The suits named Vice President Cheney, the NEPDG, government officials who served on the committee, and the alleged de facto members as defendants. The suit seeks declaratory relief and an injunction requiring them to produce all materials allegedly subject to FACA's requirements. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. It dismissed respondents' claims against the non-Government defendants. Because the NEPDG had been dissolved, it could not be sued as a defendant, and the claims against it were dismissed as well. The District Court held that FACA's substantive requirements could be enforced against the Vice President and other Government participants on the NEPDG under the Mandamus Act and against the agency defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court allowed respondents to conduct a tightly reined discovery to ascertain the NEPDG's structure and membership. The District Court denied in part the motion to dismiss and ordered respondents to submit a discovery plan. Petitioners including the Vice President sought a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to vacate the discovery orders, direct the District Court to rule on the basis of the administrative record, and dismiss the Vice President from the suit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus and the Vice President's attempted interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe plaintiff must produce evidence showing how recipients actually understood the words and must persuade the fact-finder that the meaning was defamatory. The defendant has no initial obligation to disprove defamatory meaning.
A presumption shifts only the burden of production to the party against whom it is directed. The burden of persuasion remains on the party who originally bore it.
The proponent of the will must establish prima facie proof of due execution in all cases. The contestant then bears the burden of establishing lack of capacity or other invalidating factors, with each party retaining the ultimate persuasion burden on the matters it initially must prove.
The movant must produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute. The nonmovant must then produce facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find for it, after which the persuasion burden on the merits remains with the party who would bear it at trial.
…disturbance constitutes an affirmative defense rather than a simple defense. Consequently the defendant bears not only the burden of production on this issue; he has the burden of persuasion as well. N. Y. Penal Law § 25.00 (McKinney 1975). B Mullaney held invalid Maine's requirement that the defendant prove heat of…