Also known as: proper party
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A litigant who has a sufficient stake in the controversy or whose presence helps achieve complete relief, even if joinder is not strictly required for the court to proceed.
Pearl Porter sued Precision Tools for a contract breach but later discovered the correct entity was Prime Logistics. She moved to amend the complaint after the limitations period. Prime Logistics had received the original complaint and knew it was the intended defendant. The amendment relates back because the company understood the action targeted it despite the initial naming error.
Phuong Pham and other voters sued state officials over legislative district lines that diluted their votes. The defendants argued the claim raised a political question unfit for courts. The suit proceeded because the voters presented a justiciable controversy with proper parties seeking judicial relief under the Constitution.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View casePreston Pratt, a state taxpayer, challenged a federal spending program as exceeding congressional power. The suit named only federal officials and sought to restrain enforcement of the statute. The court dismissed the action because the taxpayer lacked a direct interest that made him a proper party to litigate the federal question.
These cases involve challenges to the constitutionality of the Act of November 23, 1921, c. 135, 42 Stat. 224, commonly called the Maternity Act. The statute provides for an initial appropriation and thereafter annual appropriations for a period of five years. These appropriations are to be apportioned among such of the several States as shall accept and comply with its provisions. The purpose is to cooperate with the states to reduce maternal and infant mortality and protect the health of mothers and infants. It creates a bureau to administer the act in cooperation with state agencies. State agencies are required to make reports concerning their operations and expenditures as prescribed by the federal bureau. Payments may be withheld if the bureau determines that funds have not been properly expended in respect of any State. The State of Massachusetts brought an original suit in the Supreme Court. It is asserted that these appropriations are for purposes not national but local to the States. Together with numerous similar appropriations, they constitute an effective means of inducing the States to yield a portion of their sovereign rights. It is further alleged that the burden of the appropriations falls unequally upon the several States and rests largely upon the industrial States such as Massachusetts. In the Massachusetts case it is alleged that the plaintiff’s rights and powers as a sovereign State and the rights of its citizens have been invaded and usurped by these expenditures and acts. Although the State has not accepted the act, its constitutional rights are infringed by the passage thereof and the imposition upon the State of an illegal and unconstitutional option either to yield to the Federal Government a part of its reserved rights or lose the share which it would otherwise be entitled to receive of the moneys appropriated. Harriet Frothingham brought suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. That court dismissed the bill and its decree was affirmed by the District Court of Appeals. The case was brought here by appeal. In the Frothingham case plaintiff alleges that the effect of the statute will be to take her property under the guise of taxation without due process of law. The two cases were argued and considered together. The defendants are proceeding to carry the act into operation.
View casePaige Porter filed for divorce in Iowa after living there briefly but her spouse remained in another state. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of a live controversy once the parties separated. The action continued because the plaintiff remained a proper party with an ongoing stake in the residency requirement dispute.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
View casePierce Patterson and other federal taxpayers sued to enjoin expenditures under a statute they claimed violated the Establishment Clause. The government moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The suit advanced because the plaintiffs alleged a specific injury from the challenged spending that positioned them as proper parties.
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View casePriscilla Parks and an environmental group prevailed in litigation against a pipeline company. They sought attorney fees under a private attorney general theory. The court denied the request because the group lacked the individualized stake that would make it a proper party entitled to shift fees absent congressional authorization.
A major oil field was discovered in the North Slope of Alaska in 1968. In June 1969, the oil companies constituting the Alyeska consortium submitted an application to the Department of the Interior for rights-of-way for a pipeline that would transport oil from the North Slope across land in Alaska owned by the United States. An amended application was submitted in December 1969 requesting a 54-foot right-of-way along with applications for special land use permits for additional space and a construction road. Respondents Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends of the Earth brought suit in March 1970 against the Secretary of the Interior seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the intended issuance of the permits would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and fail to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The State of Alaska and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. subsequently intervened in the action. On March 20, 1972, the Interior Department released a six-volume Environmental Impact Statement and a three-volume Economic and Security Analysis. After a period for public comment, the Secretary announced that the requested permits would be granted. The district court then dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the Mineral Leasing Act issue alone. Congress then enacted legislation amending the Mineral Leasing Act to allow the permits and declaring that no further action under NEPA was necessary. With the merits of the litigation terminated by this legislation, the Court of Appeals turned to the respondents' request for an award of attorneys' fees and granted fees against Alyeska on the private attorney general theory. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the fee award.
View caseA proper party defendant in foreclosure is one whose joinder is desirable but not essential. Senior mortgagees and those personally liable on the debt fall into this category because a senior mortgage survives foreclosure and a purchaser takes subject to it.
Relation back occurs when the new defendant knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. The focus is on what the added party understood within the Rule 4(m) period.
Either the government or the defendant may challenge a grand juror's qualification and move to dismiss the indictment. The defendant is therefore a proper party to raise the issue even if the motion ultimately fails on other grounds.
A limited partnership has the capacity to sue and be sued in the name of the partnership. This statutory power exists regardless of internal ownership disputes over specific assets so long as the claim relates to the partnership's activities.