psychiatric examination

Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, Oklahoma, in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose of advising with the Court as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation. The examining psychiatrist reported that at times Ake appeared to be frankly delusional and claimed to be the sword of vengeance of the Lord. He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial. In March 1980, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his present sanity. On April 10, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a psychotic with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia chronic with exacerbation, that he was dangerous, and that he required a maximum security facility. The court found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial while receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine three times daily. At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. Counsel requested that a psychiatrist examine Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense or that the court provide funds for such an examination. The trial judge denied the motion. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase, defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined Ake at the state hospital, but none testified about his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists that Ake was dangerous to society. Ake had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce evidence in mitigation. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On December 28, 1973, Ernest Benjamin Smith was indicted in Texas for murder arising from his participation in the armed robbery of a grocery store during which a clerk was fatally shot by his accomplice. The State of Texas announced its intention to seek the death penalty under Art. 1257(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. A judge of the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County informally ordered the State’s attorney to arrange a psychiatric examination of Smith by Dr. James P. Grigson to determine Smith’s competency to stand trial. Dr. Grigson interviewed Smith in jail for approximately 90 minutes and concluded that he was competent to stand trial. In a letter to the trial judge that was filed with the court’s papers, Dr. Grigson reported that Smith was aware of the difference between right and wrong and able to aid an attorney in his defense. Smith was then tried by a jury and convicted of murder. Texas capital cases require bifurcated proceedings consisting of a guilt phase and a penalty phase before the same jury. At the penalty phase the jury must answer three questions on which the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. One of those questions asks whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. At the commencement of Smith’s sentencing hearing the State rested subject to the right to reopen. Defense counsel then presented three lay witnesses. The State called Dr. Grigson as a witness after those presentations. Defense counsel objected because Dr. Grigson’s name did not appear on the State’s witness list. In a hearing outside the jury’s presence Dr. Grigson stated that he had not obtained permission from Smith’s attorneys to examine him, that he had discussed his conclusions with the prosecutor, and that the prosecutor had requested his testimony approximately five days earlier. The trial judge denied the motion to exclude the testimony and recessed for one hour. Dr. Grigson then testified before the jury that Smith was a very severe sociopath who would continue his previous behavior, that his condition would only get worse, that he had no regard for another human being’s life or property, that no treatment would modify his behavior, that he would commit other criminal acts if given the opportunity, and that he had no remorse. This testimony rested on information derived from the 90-minute competency examination. The jury answered the three questions affirmatively, and under Texas law the death sentence was mandatory. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Smith’s conviction and death sentence. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Smith unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in Texas state courts and then petitioned for relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The District Court vacated the death sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In October 1977 respondent Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted in the Western District of Washington on fifteen counts of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. On November 18, 1977, twenty-four days before trial, Bagley filed a discovery motion requesting the names and addresses of government witnesses, their prior criminal records, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The government's response identified James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell as its two principal witnesses and stated that each had been paid $250 for information and expenses. It produced forms signed by both men entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Cash Reward" showing the $250 payments. O'Connor and Mitchell were state law-enforcement officers employed by the Milwaukee Railroad as private security guards. Between April and June 1977 they assisted the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in an undercover investigation of Bagley. At the December 1977 bench trial O'Connor and Mitchell testified that they had observed Bagley selling a handgun to a third person and test-firing several weapons. The district court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, acquitted him on the firearms charges, and sentenced him to a total of twenty years' imprisonment, all but two years of which were suspended. In mid-1980 Bagley filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and received copies of additional ATF contracts that O'Connor and Mitchell had signed on May 3, 1977. Each contract was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor." The printed portion stated that the vendor would provide information to ATF and that upon accomplishment of the objective the United States would pay a sum commensurate with services and information rendered. The typewritten description stated that each man would provide information regarding violations committed by Bagley, purchase evidence for ATF, work undercover, assist in gathering evidence, and testify against the violator in federal court. The contracts also provided for monthly payments of $300 up to a maximum of $3,000 and a $2,500 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. On the basis of the newly obtained contracts Bagley moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging that the government's failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process. After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, the district court denied the motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On April 1, 1975, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Thomas and Eunice Kersey, aged 86 and 74, were robbed and fatally shot at their farmhouse in central Florida. Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong went to the back door of the Kersey house and asked for water for an overheated car. When Mr. Kersey came out of the house, Sampson Armstrong grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, and told Jeanette Armstrong to take his money. Mr. Kersey cried for help, and his wife came out of the house with a gun and shot Jeanette Armstrong, wounding her. Sampson Armstrong, and perhaps Jeanette Armstrong, then shot and killed both of the Kerseys, dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and fled. Two witnesses testified that they drove past the Kersey house between 7:30 and 7:40 a.m. They saw a large cream- or yellow-colored car parked beside the road about 200 yards from the house. A man was sitting in the car. Another witness testified that at approximately 6:45 a.m. he saw Ida Jean Shaw, petitioner's common-law wife and Jeanette Armstrong's mother, driving a yellow Buick with a vinyl top which belonged to her and petitioner Earl Enmund. Enmund was a passenger in the car along with an unidentified woman. At about 8 a.m. the same witness saw the car return at a high rate of speed. Enmund was driving, Ida Jean Shaw was in the front seat, and one of the other two people in the car was lying down across the back seat. Enmund, Sampson Armstrong, and Jeanette Armstrong were indicted for the first-degree murder and robbery of the Kerseys. Enmund and Sampson Armstrong were tried together. The prosecutor maintained in his closing argument that Sampson Armstrong killed the old people. The judge instructed the jury on felony murder, including that the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually present and was actively aiding and abetting the robbery or attempted robbery, and that the unlawful killing occurred in the perpetration of or in the attempted perpetration of the robbery. The jury found both Enmund and Sampson Armstrong guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. A separate sentencing hearing was held and the jury recommended the death penalty for both defendants. The trial judge then sentenced Enmund to death on the two counts of first-degree murder after finding four statutory aggravating circumstances and that none of the statutory mitigating circumstances applied. The Florida Supreme Court remanded for written findings as required by statute. The trial judge reiterated the findings, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Enmund's conviction and sentences after rejecting two of the four aggravating circumstances but concluding that the remaining two outweighed the absence of mitigating circumstances. The Florida Supreme Court found that there was no direct evidence at trial that Earl Enmund was present at the back door of the Kersey home when the plan to rob the elderly couple led to their being murdered. However, the jury could have concluded he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes waiting to help the robbers escape. We granted Enmund's petition for certiorari presenting the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.

On the evening of June 4, 1968, five white United States Marine Lieutenants in formal dress uniforms and a woman named Barbara Kelly entered a hamburger shop in Washington, D.C., around 2:40 a.m. after a night out. They ordered food at the take-out counter and noticed three Black men—appellants Alexander and Murdock and Cornelius Frazier—sitting at the other end of the counter. According to prosecution witnesses, a staring contest between Lieutenant Kramer and Alexander led to Alexander tapping Kramer on the shoulder, asking him to step outside, and making a threat. After a racial epithet from Lieutenant King, Alexander drew a .38 caliber revolver. Murdock then reentered and drew his own revolver, after which shots were fired, killing Lieutenants King and Lesnick and wounding Kramer and Kelly. Alexander, Murdock, and Frazier fled in Alexander's car, with Murdock firing additional shots from the window. They were stopped by police within a few blocks, and two revolvers were recovered from the car floorboard. Defense witnesses Frazier and Murdock testified that the Marines were drunk and aggressive, and Murdock claimed he fired in self-defense fearing for his life. At a joint jury trial in February 1969, both were convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon and four counts of assault with a dangerous weapon; Murdock was also convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. Murdock's trial was bifurcated; after the guilt phase, a separate hearing on criminal responsibility was held in November 1969 before the same jury, which found him criminally responsible. Alexander received consecutive sentences totaling five to twenty-three years, and Murdock twenty years to life. Both appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard argument on December 21, 1970, and issued its decision on April 21, 1972.