Also known as:public accommodations · public facility
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A business or facility that offers lodging, food, entertainment, or other services to the public. The term covers establishments whose operations affect interstate commerce or receive state support, triggering obligations of equal access under antidiscrimination statutes.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Civic Club Membership Dispute
Patrick Phan applied for full voting membership in a large citywide technology networking club that hosts open coding workshops and pitch nights. The club rejected his application solely because he is male, citing its message promoting male leadership. City officials sued under the local public accommodations law. The court applied the statute because the club's size and nonselective practices meant the rule did not meaningfully impair its ability to communicate its views.
Waste Flow Control Ordinance
Paula Pierce owns a private waste-hauling firm that previously took construction debris to out-of-state processors. A state statute now requires all such debris to go to a county-owned recovery facility open to local businesses. Pierce challenged the law as an improper burden on commerce. The court upheld the requirement because the facility is publicly owned and performs a traditional government function.
Preston Pratt, a high-school senior, brought a handgun to school property that also housed a public cafeteria open to interstate travelers. Federal prosecutors charged him under a statute banning guns near schools. The court examined whether the cafeteria qualified as a public accommodation whose operations affected commerce, thereby supporting congressional authority.
United States v. Lopez514 U.S. 549 (1995)
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Parker Phillips was assaulted at a motel that served interstate guests. She sued the assailant and the motel under a federal civil rights provision targeting gender-motivated violence at public accommodations. The court considered whether the motel's status as a public accommodation supplied the necessary link to congressional enforcement power.
United States v. Morrison529 U.S. 598 (2000)
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women.
Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment.
In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university.
The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
Portia Price sought to convert a former restaurant into a worship space. Local officials denied the permit, citing zoning rules that treated the building as a public accommodation subject to accessibility mandates. The court analyzed whether the denial exceeded Congress's enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.
City of Boerne v. Flores521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
Paul Peterson, a transgender employee, was denied service at a company cafeteria open to the public and interstate travelers. He filed a claim alleging discrimination on the basis of sex under federal law. The court treated the cafeteria as a public accommodation whose practices fell within the statute's coverage.
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020)
The three cases consolidated before the Supreme Court arose when employers fired long-time employees shortly after the employees revealed their homosexual or transgender status.
Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare advocate whose leadership earned the county national awards. After a decade with the county, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Influential community members then made disparaging comments about his sexual orientation, and he was fired for conduct unbecoming a county employee.
Donald Zarda worked as a skydiving instructor at Altitude Express in New York for several seasons. After mentioning that he was gay, he was fired days later.
Aimee Stephens worked at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes in Michigan, presenting as male when hired. After two years she began treatment for gender dysphoria and wrote a letter stating she planned to live and work full-time as a woman. The funeral home fired her before she left for vacation.
Each employee sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. The Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay and dismissed Bostock's suit as a matter of law. The Second Circuit allowed Zarda's claim to proceed on the ground that sexual orientation discrimination violates Title VII. The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Stephens's case regarding transgender status.
Both Zarda and Stephens passed away during the proceedings, but their estates continued to press the claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals over the scope of Title VII's protections for homosexual and transgender persons.
What establishments qualify as places of public accommodation under Title II?
Title II covers inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, bars, gas stations, and other facilities whose operations affect interstate commerce or are supported by state action. Retail stores and recreational facilities can qualify when they serve the public and meet the commerce test.
Can a large civic organization be treated as a public accommodation?
A large, nonselective civic group that opens events to the public may be reached by state antidiscrimination laws even if it claims expressive purposes. The state's interest in eradicating discrimination can prevail when the regulation does not significantly impair the group's ability to advocate its views.
Does a flow-control law directing waste to a public facility implicate public accommodation rules?
Flow-control measures that steer waste to a government-owned facility receive lenient dormant commerce clause review because they favor a public provider performing a traditional function rather than private economic interests. The analysis focuses on whether the preference reflects legitimate public objectives.
When does private conduct at a public accommodation become state action?
Private operators leasing space in publicly owned facilities or sharing profits with the state may be treated as state actors under a symbiotic-relationship test. The financial interdependence and public character of the location can attribute discriminatory acts to the state for equal-protection purposes.
514 U.S. 549 (1995)
…came, however, with the challenge to congressional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, when the Court simply made explicit what the earlier cases had implied: "where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for…