Also known as: reasonable beliefs
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A conviction about a fact or circumstance that an actor subjectively holds and that the surrounding facts objectively support as reasonable under the circumstances.
Officers arrested Ricardo Rojas inside his home on an outstanding warrant. While securing the scene, they heard movement in an adjacent closet and observed fresh footprints leading there. They conducted a limited sweep of the closet based on their reasonable belief that an armed accomplice might be hiding and posing an immediate danger.
Raphael Rivera faced an attacker who lunged with a broken bottle aimed at his face. Rivera swung a heavy flashlight in response. The facts supported his reasonable belief that the attacker intended serious bodily harm differing in kind from minor injury, justifying the level of force used.
An officer watched Rita Russell and two companions pace repeatedly in front of a jewelry store, conferring and peering inside. Their conduct created a reasonable belief that they were armed and about to commit a robbery, permitting a brief stop and pat-down for weapons.
On October 31, 1963, Cleveland police detective Martin McFadden, a 39-year veteran assigned to downtown Cleveland for 30 years, observed John W. Terry and Richard Chilton standing on the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue. McFadden took up a post of observation 300 to 400 feet away. He watched as the two men walked back and forth along Huron Road, pausing repeatedly to look in the window of a store before conferring with each other. This pattern repeated roughly a dozen times over ten to twelve minutes. A third man, Katz, joined them briefly before departing, after which Terry and Chilton followed the same path. By this time McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious that the men were casing the store for a robbery and feared they might be armed. McFadden approached the three men in front of Zucker's store, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. When they mumbled responses, he grabbed Terry, spun him around, patted down the outer clothing of his overcoat, and felt a pistol in the left breast pocket. He removed a .38-caliber revolver from Terry's pocket and ordered the men into the store, where he similarly frisked Chilton and discovered another revolver while finding no weapons on Katz. Terry and Chilton were arrested and charged with carrying concealed weapons. Prior to trial they moved to suppress the revolvers as the product of an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion after hearing McFadden's testimony, finding that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the defendants were acting suspiciously and that the frisk was necessary for his protection. After the denial, Terry and Chilton waived jury trial, were convicted, and sentenced to one to three years in the penitentiary. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseRosa Ruiz received repeated assurances from supervisors that her performance reviews were excellent and her position secure. These statements supported her reasonable belief that she would not be terminated without cause, forming the basis for an implied contractual term.
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm. Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position. Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983. Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
View caseRegina Robinson, an auditor, reviewed financial statements and supporting documents for a client. The materials supported her reasonable belief that no material misstatements existed, satisfying the due-diligence standard for avoiding liability.
From 1946 through 1967, Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, was retained by First Securities Company of Chicago, a small brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, to perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records. Ernst & Ernst prepared for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission the annual reports required of First Securities under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act. It also prepared responses to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock Exchange. Respondents were customers of First Securities who invested funds in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of 92% of its stock. From 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the transactions occurring in the 1950s, Nay induced respondents to invest in escrow accounts that he represented would yield a high rate of return. In fact, there were no escrow accounts, as Nay converted respondents' funds to his own use immediately upon receipt. These transactions were not in the customary form of dealings between First Securities and its customers. They were not reflected on the books and records of First Securities. They were not shown on its periodic accounting to respondents or included in First Securities' filings with the Commission or the Exchange. The fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as bankrupt and the escrow accounts as spurious. Respondents subsequently filed this action for damages against Ernst & Ernst in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. It also charged that Ernst & Ernst had aided and abetted Nay's violations by its failure to conduct proper audits of First Securities. As revealed through discovery, respondents' cause of action rested on a theory of negligent nonfeasance. The premise was that Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize appropriate auditing procedures in its audits of First Securities. This failure prevented discovery of internal practices of the firm said to prevent an effective audit. The practice principally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed to First Securities to his attention. Respondents specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. After extensive discovery the District Court granted Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a private cause of action for damages will lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of scienter.
View caseRyan Roberts's wife faced an abusive husband who had previously threatened retaliation in custody proceedings. The circumstances supported her reasonable belief that notification would trigger bodily or psychological harm, qualifying for the statutory exception.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseAn honest belief satisfies the subjective element but must also be objectively reasonable under the circumstances to fully justify deadly force. An honest yet unreasonable belief may reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter in jurisdictions recognizing imperfect self-defense.
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Specific and articulable facts indicating that the area harbors an individual posing a danger justify the sweep. The belief must be grounded in observable circumstances rather than speculation alone.
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The belief need only be reasonable under the circumstances even if the perceived danger later proves unfounded. The standard protects actors who respond to facts that would cause a reasonable person to reach the same conclusion.
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…. . . "279. The 'bodily injury' exception could not be invoked by a married woman whose husband, if notified, would, in her reasonable belief, threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have an abortion to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her in future child custody or divorce proceedings; (c) inflict…