Also known as: reasonable causes · reasonable grounds
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factual basis sufficient to justify a party in taking a specified legal step or holding a particular belief. The standard requires objective circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to conclude the action or belief is warranted under the governing rule.
Ruby Rivera contracted to supply materials to Raphael Rivera over six months. After Raphael defaulted on loans and lost key equipment to a lender, Ruby sent a written demand for confirmation that deliveries would continue on schedule. Raphael provided no response. Ruby suspended further shipments and later defended against a breach claim by showing the lack of assurance justified treating the contract as repudiated.
Renata Russo delivered slightly mismatched components to Rita Russell under a supply contract. Renata had previously substituted comparable parts on smaller orders and offered a price allowance. After Rita rejected the tender, Renata promptly notified her of intent to replace the goods within the remaining contract period and completed the conforming delivery.
Ralph Richardson acquired shares in Riverstone Manufacturing two weeks before demanding that the board halt a profitable operation. He then filed a derivative action alleging future regulatory risks despite internal studies showing continued viability. After the court dismissed the suit under the business judgment rule, the corporation sought recovery of its defense costs on the ground that the action lacked reasonable cause.
Rowan Russell chartered a vessel from Rocky Mountain Mining. After the vessel failed multiple safety inspections and was twice detained, Rowan sent a written request for documentation confirming completed repairs and current seaworthiness. The response stated only that repairs were ongoing. Rowan then suspended hire payments and obtained a substitute vessel.
A physician performed a procedure after determining that continuing the pregnancy would gravely impair the patient's physical health. The physician documented specific medical findings supporting that conclusion. The determination supplied the required basis for proceeding despite statutory time limits.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
After investigating a discrimination charge, the EEOC district director concluded there was reasonable cause to believe the allegations were true. The agency issued a right-to-sue letter. The charging party then filed a timely Title VII action in federal court.
Early in 1975, officials of Bessemer City, North Carolina, formed a five-member committee consisting of four men and one woman, Mrs. Auddie Boone, to hire a Recreation Director responsible for managing all city recreational facilities and developing athletic and other programs for residents. Eight persons applied for the position. Petitioner, a 39-year-old schoolteacher holding college degrees in social studies and education, was the only woman among them. After reviewing resumés and conducting brief interviews, the committee offered the job to Mr. Donald Kincaid, a 24-year-old recent college graduate with a degree in physical education; all four male members voted for Kincaid while Mrs. Boone voted for petitioner. Petitioner filed sex-discrimination charges with the Charlotte District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In July 1980 the EEOC District Director found reasonable cause to believe the charges were true, but conciliation efforts failed and petitioner received a right-to-sue letter. Petitioner then filed this Title VII action in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. After a two-day trial at which petitioner, Mr. Kincaid, and the five committee members testified, the district court issued a memorandum decision and, following submission of proposed findings by petitioner’s counsel and detailed objections by respondent, entered formal findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding petitioner $30,397 in backpay and $16,971.59 in attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding clearly erroneous the district court’s findings that petitioner was the better-qualified candidate, that she alone had been asked questions about night work, travel, and spousal approval, and that the male committee members were biased against hiring a woman.
The party must demonstrate objective circumstances creating a genuine risk that the other side will commit a total breach. Financial distress, loss of essential assets, repeated inspection failures, and vague responses to requests for confirmation each supply such grounds. Once the demand is made in writing, failure to provide adequate assurance within a reasonable time constitutes repudiation.
Supporting sources
…physician; and "(2) within [20] weeks after the commencement of the pregnancy [or after [20] weeks only if the physician has reasonable cause to believe (i) there is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the mother or would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother, (ii)…
…when too long pursued, the legislature has judged to be detrimental to the health of the employes, and, so long as there are reasonable grounds for believing that this is so, its decision upon this subject cannot be reviewed by the Federal courts." Subsequently in Gundling v. Chicago , 177 U.S. 183, 188, this court said:…
…can be met. The class there alleged a broad-based policy of employment discrimination; upon proof of that allegation there were reasonable grounds to infer that individual hiring decisions were made in pursuit of the discriminatory policy and to require the employer to come forth with evidence dispelling that…
…Commission. In July 1980 (five years after petitioner filed the charges), the EEOC’s District Director found that there was reasonable cause
…the O’Connor plurality and was reasonable under that approach. The search was justified at its inception because there were “reasonable grounds
The court may order the plaintiff to pay the corporation's expenses if the demand or the proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose. Recent share purchases solely to gain standing, statements revealing an external agenda unrelated to corporate welfare, and pursuit of claims already protected by the business judgment rule support such a finding.
Supporting sources
Yes. If the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender that the seller reasonably believed would be acceptable with or without a money allowance, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer and obtain a further reasonable time to substitute conforming goods. Prior course of dealing showing acceptance of similar substitutions supports the seller's reasonable belief.
Supporting sources
The failure itself operates as a repudiation. The demanding party may then treat the contract as terminated, suspend its own remaining performance, and pursue remedies for total breach without waiting for an actual missed performance date.
Supporting sources