replevin action

The Chase & Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1983. A plan approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida then vested in respondent Nordberg, the trustee in bankruptcy, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. In 1985 respondent filed suit against petitioners Granfinanciera, S. A., and Medex, Ltda., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that petitioners had received $1.7 million from Chase & Sanborn's corporate predecessor within one year of the bankruptcy petition without receiving consideration or reasonably equivalent value. The complaint sought to avoid the transfers and recover damages under 11 U. S. C. §§ 548(a)(1) and (a)(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court referred the proceedings to the Bankruptcy Court. Over five months later respondent served a summons on petitioners in Bogota, Colombia shortly before the Colombian Government nationalized Granfinanciera. In their answer both petitioners requested a trial by jury on all issues so triable. The Bankruptcy Judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer a core action that originally, under the English common law, as I understand it, was a non-jury issue. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice respondent's actual fraud claim but entered judgment for respondent on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The District Court affirmed without discussing petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed, 835 F. 2d 1341 (1988), ruling that petitioners lacked a statutory right to a jury trial because the constructive fraud provision contains no mention of such a right and 28 U. S. C. § 1411 affords jury trials only in personal injury or wrongful death suits, and that the Seventh Amendment supplied no right because fraudulent conveyance actions are equitable in nature and bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, 486 U. S. 1054 (1988), and now reverses.

In 1971 the Indiana Legislature enacted the Dormant Mineral Interests Act. The Act provided that any severed mineral interest unused for a period of twenty years would be extinguished and its ownership would revert to the then-current surface owner unless the mineral owner filed a statement of claim in the county recorder's office. The statute took effect on September 2, 1971, and included a two-year grace period allowing owners of already unused interests to preserve them by filing claims. A mineral interest was deemed used if minerals were produced, rents or royalties were paid, or taxes were paid on the interest. Owners could also preserve interests by filing statements of claim, and an exception allowed owners of ten or more interests in the same county who inadvertently omitted some to file a supplemental claim within sixty days of receiving notice. The first of the two consolidated cases concerned fractional mineral interests severed in 1942 and 1944 from a 132-acre tract in Gibson County, Indiana. Eleven appellants claimed ownership of those interests, and a twelfth appellant held oil and gas leases executed by the others in 1976 and 1977. The appellee owned the surface of the tract. The parties stipulated that the mineral interests had not been used for twenty years and no statement of claim had been filed within the grace period, so the interests lapsed on September 2, 1973. On April 28, 1977, the surface owner published and mailed notice of the lapse. The mineral owners then filed statements of claim, and the surface owner commenced an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the interests had been extinguished. In the second case the severed mineral estate was created on March 1, 1954, when appellants Pond and Bobe conveyed land to the appellees by warranty deed that reserved the minerals. On June 17, 1976, Pond and Bobe executed a coal mining lease with appellant Consolidated Coal Co. The parties stipulated that the interest had not been used and no statement of claim had been filed during the twenty years following its creation, resulting in lapse on March 1, 1974. Notice of the lapse was given by letter and by publication in the Princeton Daily Clarion on March 4, 1977. The parties jointly filed suit on January 12, 1978, to resolve their conflicting claims to the mineral rights. In both cases the agreed statements of facts recorded that the mineral owners had neither used their interests nor filed claims within the statutory periods, and the surface owners had given notice after the periods had expired. The statements did not indicate whether any appellant had known of the Act or its possible effect before receiving notice. The state trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the appeals.

In March 1988, John F. DiGiovanni submitted an application to the Connecticut Superior Court for a prejudgment attachment in the amount of $75,000 on Brian K. Doehr's home in Meriden, Connecticut, in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute against Doehr. DiGiovanni had no pre-existing interest in Doehr's real estate, and the suit did not involve the property. Connecticut law authorized prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice or hearing upon verification by oath that there was probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim. DiGiovanni accompanied the application with an affidavit stating that the facts set forth in his complaint were true, that he had been willfully, wantonly and maliciously assaulted by Doehr resulting in a broken left wrist, an ecchymosis to his right eye, and other injuries, and that he had expended sums for medical care and treatment. The affidavit concluded that these facts were sufficient to show probable cause that judgment would be rendered for the plaintiff. On March 17, 1988, the Superior Court judge found probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim and ordered the attachment on Doehr's home to the value of $75,000. The sheriff attached the property on March 21, 1988. Doehr first learned of the attachment after it had been recorded on the land records. He had not yet been served with the complaint. The attachment notice informed Doehr of his right to a hearing to claim that no probable cause existed, to request that the attachment be vacated or modified or a bond substituted, or to claim that some portion of the property was exempt. Doehr filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut claiming that the Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment upholding the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of authority regarding the statute's constitutionality.

Margarita Fuentes, a Florida resident, purchased a gas stove and a stereophonic phonograph from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under conditional sales contracts calling for monthly payments over time, with Firestone retaining title until full payment. After making payments for more than a year, about two hundred dollars remained due. A dispute developed between Fuentes and Firestone over servicing of the stove. Firestone then instituted an action in small claims court for repossession. It obtained a writ of replevin from the court clerk by submitting form documents and posting a bond in double the value of the property. A deputy sheriff and Firestone agent seized the stove and stereo from Fuentes's home the same day. Fuentes subsequently brought an action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Florida prejudgment replevin procedures. A three-judge district court was convened and upheld the statute. In the consolidated Pennsylvania case, several residents purchased household goods such as beds, tables, and other items under similar installment contracts. After claimed defaults, sellers obtained writs of replevin from a prothonotary upon ex parte applications and posting of bonds. County sheriffs seized the goods from the buyers' homes without prior notice. This included one instance where a former deputy sheriff obtained a writ for his son's clothes, furniture, and toys. The Pennsylvania appellants filed suit in federal district court, where a three-judge court upheld the statute. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals from both district court decisions.