Also known as: FRCP 19 · Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 · required joinder · necessary parties
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that identifies persons who must be joined as parties if feasible because their absence prevents complete relief or impairs their interests or subjects existing parties to inconsistent obligations.
Roberto Reyes holds a first mortgage on property owned by Rebecca Ross. When Ross defaults, Reyes commences foreclosure naming only Ross. A junior lien recorded by Raven Logistics is omitted from the action. The court refuses to extinguish the junior lien because the lienholder was a necessary party who received no notice.
Rajesh Rao sues Rita Russell for breach of a supply contract. Russell files a timely Rule 12(b)(7) motion asserting that Rocky Mountain Mining, the actual fabricator with primary warranty duties, must be joined. The court examines whether complete relief is possible without the absent fabricator.
Riley Rivera, a citizen of State A, sues Riverstone Manufacturing, a State B citizen, for $100,000. Rivera later seeks to add a State A citizen as a required plaintiff under Rule 19. The court declines supplemental jurisdiction because the addition would destroy complete diversity.
Ricardo Rojas holds a fee tail preserved for life only, limited to issue working in automotive sales. A buyer seeks court approval to sell part of the land free of the limitation. Steven, an adult son who manages a dealership, must be joined because the sale may defeat his future interest.
Rebecca Ross sues Roberto Reyes but fails to join a required co-owner. The court dismisses under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute after repeated orders to add the co-owner. Because the dismissal rests on nonjoinder under Rule 19, it does not operate as an adjudication on the merits.
A group of employees sues their employer for back wages. Former employees with identical claims are not joined. The court requires their joinder under Rule 19 rather than relying on permissive intervention because only joinder guarantees the judgment binds all interested persons.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
View caseRule 19(a) requires joinder if the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties without the absent person, or if the absent person claims an interest that may be impaired or that may subject existing parties to inconsistent obligations.
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Rule 19(b) directs the court to consider factors including prejudice to existing parties, the extent to which relief can be shaped, and whether the judgment will be adequate, then decide whether to proceed or dismiss the action.
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Section 1367(b) withholds supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against persons joined under Rule 19 when exercising jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the requirements of section 1332.
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A defendant may raise failure to join a required party by pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(7). The defense may also be raised later under Rule 12(h)(2) by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial.
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No. Rule 41(b) expressly excepts dismissals for failure to join a party under Rule 19 from the general rule that such dismissals operate as adjudications on the merits.
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…14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional…