Also known as: specific intent defense · specific-intent defences · specific intent defences · specific intent · specific-intent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal law claim asserting that the defendant lacked the capacity, often due to intoxication or mental illness, to form the specific intent required as an element of the charged offense.
Sylvia Santos urged a coworker to assault a rival at a festival after drinking heavily. She later raised the specific-intent defense, claiming intoxication prevented her from forming the purpose that the coworker actually commit the assault. The court examined whether her statements showed the required mental state despite the intoxication claim.
Sabrina Shah led meetings discussing overthrow of government structures while suffering from diagnosed mental illness. She asserted the specific-intent defense at trial, arguing her condition prevented formation of a purpose to incite imminent violence. The jury evaluated whether the evidence proved the required mental state beyond the defense claim.
Petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 11, for the period April 1945 to July 1948. A pretrial motion to quash the indictment on constitutional grounds was denied, the trial was set, and a jury returned verdicts of guilty on October 14, 1949. The trial lasted nine months, six devoted to evidence and producing a 16,000-page record. The indictment charged petitioners with knowingly and wilfully conspiring to organize the Communist Party of the United States of America as a society that teaches and advocates overthrow of the Government by force and violence. It also charged them with conspiracy knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of such overthrow. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to two questions: whether §§ 2 or 3 of the Smith Act, inherently or as construed and applied in this case, violate the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights; and whether those sections, inherently or as construed and applied, violate the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. The Court of Appeals held the record amply supported the jury's necessary finding that petitioners, as leaders of the Communist organization, intended violent revolution when circumstances were propitious. The court described the Party as highly disciplined, adept at infiltration, using aliases and double-meaning language, rigidly controlled, intolerant of dissension, and during the period in question advocating overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.
View caseSophia Singh faced charges requiring proof of purposeful conduct while intoxicated at the time of the acts. She advanced the specific-intent defense after the prosecution rested, contending her condition blocked possession of the mental state. The appellate court assessed whether any rational trier of fact could have found the element beyond the defense.
On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol. Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers. A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later. In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law. The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence. Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.
View caseSpencer Silver took equipment from a worksite and claimed the specific-intent defense based on voluntary intoxication. He argued the condition blocked formation of the purpose to permanently deprive the owner. The factfinder weighed the evidence of his actions against the asserted incapacity.
In December 1948, Morissette went hunting on a large tract of land in Michigan that the Government had used as a practice bombing range for the Air Force. Spent bomb casings from the range had been dumped into heaps and left exposed to the weather for four years or more. Morissette collected three tons of the casings, flattened them at a nearby farm, and sold them for eighty-four dollars. Morissette worked as a fruit stand operator in the summer and as a trucker and scrap iron collector in the winter. He was an honorably discharged veteran of World War II who had a good reputation among his neighbors. He loaded the casings onto his truck and transported them in broad daylight without any effort to conceal what he was doing. When authorities began an investigation, Morissette voluntarily and candidly told them the whole story, explaining that he believed the casings were abandoned and that he had no intention of stealing them. He was indicted for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly stealing and converting property of the United States valued at eighty-four dollars in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. At trial, the District Court refused to permit Morissette to show that he thought the property was abandoned or to argue that he lacked criminal intent. The court instructed the jury that if it believed the government testimony, Morissette was guilty, and the jury convicted him. The court sentenced him to two months in prison or a fine of two hundred dollars. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseSamuel Soto distributed materials criticizing government policy during wartime while intoxicated. He raised the specific-intent defense, asserting the condition prevented any formed purpose to obstruct recruitment efforts. The prosecution had to prove the mental state existed despite the defense presentation.
On a single indictment containing four counts, five defendants were charged with conspiring to violate the Espionage Act of Congress during the war with Germany. All five defendants were born in Russia. They were intelligent, had considerable schooling, and at the time of their arrest had lived in the United States for terms varying from five to ten years, but none had applied for naturalization. Four testified at trial, with three avowing they were rebels, revolutionists, or anarchists who did not believe in government in any form. The fourth described himself as a socialist who believed in a proper kind of government but classified the United States government as capitalistic. It was admitted that the defendants had united to print and distribute two circulars, one in English and one in Yiddish, with five thousand copies printed and distributed about August 22, 1918, in New York City. The group maintained a meeting place in rooms rented by one defendant under an assumed name, where the subject of printing the circulars was discussed about two weeks before arrest, and the printing outfit was purchased on July 27, 1918, and installed in a basement room for work at night. The circulars were distributed by throwing them from a window of a building where one defendant was employed and by other secret means in the city. The government introduced copies of the two circulars attached to the indictment, a sheet entitled Revolutionists Unite for Action written by one defendant and found on him when arrested, and another paper found at the headquarters for which one defendant assumed responsibility. The defendants pleaded not guilty, but the conspiracy and overt acts were largely admitted and fully established at trial in the District Court, leading to conviction and sentencing under the indictment.
View caseSelena Singh received a mandatory term after conviction on a serious offense while mentally ill at the time of the acts. She invoked the specific-intent defense at sentencing, contending her condition negated the purposeful mental state the statute presupposed. The court considered whether the defense altered the applicable penalty structure.
Ronald Harmelin was convicted in Michigan state court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Michigan law imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that quantity of the drug. Harmelin had no prior felony convictions. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and affirmed the sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The quantity of cocaine at issue had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. The sentencing court imposed the mandatory term without considering any individualized circumstances of the offense or the offender. Harmelin challenged the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing both that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime and that the mandatory nature of the penalty was unconstitutional.
View caseThe defendant must demonstrate that intoxication or mental illness prevented formation of the particular mental state required by the offense. The defense does not apply to crimes that require only general intent or negligence.
Yes. Solicitation requires proof that the defendant acted with the specific intent that the solicited person commit the crime. A successful defense negates that element even if the words of solicitation were spoken.
No. In criminal cases an expert may describe conditions and general effects on decision-making but may not state an opinion on whether the defendant actually possessed the mental state that constitutes an element of the offense or a defense.
No. Once the solicitation with the required specific intent is complete, later withdrawal or renunciation does not constitute a defense to the charge.
Factual impossibility provides no defense. The defendant's culpability is measured by the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be when the solicitation occurred.
…perhaps, Thomas Jefferson and others favoring perpetuation of an agrarian society. Moreover, if the Founders’ specific intent with respect to corporations is what matters, why does the dissent ignore the Founders’ views about other legal entities that have more in common with modern business corporations than the…