Also known as: stands to sue · stood to sue · standing · locus standi
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right. In federal court a plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury caused by the challenged conduct and that the interest falls within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute or constitutional provision.
Selena Singh was charged with assault after a mental health episode. Her attorney moved to dismiss on M'Naghten grounds. The prosecutor argued that Singh lacked standing to raise the defense because her claimed loss of control did not meet the traditional test elements. The court denied the motion after finding the requisite injury and interest alignment.
Sierra Santos hired a local architect whose work fell below community standards. Santos sued for damages. The architect moved to dismiss claiming Santos lacked standing because she had not shown the required professional skill breach. The court found standing satisfied by the actual injury and protected interest.
Santiago Sanchez claimed a security interest in movable equipment. When a creditor seized the items Sanchez sued to recover them. The creditor challenged standing on the ground that the items were not goods under the UCC definition. The court upheld standing after confirming the interest and injury.
Stephen Shaw used force during an altercation and faced battery charges. He asserted self-defense. The state argued Shaw lacked standing to claim the privilege because the harm was not serious bodily harm. The court ruled that Shaw had standing given the concrete injury and protected interest.
Sophia Singh granted a security interest in crops. After default the lender sought to foreclose. Singh challenged the action claiming the lender lacked standing because the items were not farm products. The court found standing because the lender showed injury and a protected interest under the definition.
Scott Summers, a physician, faced prosecution under a state abortion law. He sued for declaratory relief. The state moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The court held that Summers had standing because he demonstrated actual injury and an interest within the protected zone.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseA plaintiff must demonstrate actual injury caused by the challenged conduct and that the interest falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue.
Yes. An intended beneficiary possesses standing to sue to enforce contractual duties owed directly to that beneficiary, including by seeking specific performance when appropriate.
No. Only holders of legal title have standing to sue for patent infringement. Equitable title holders must first convert their interest to legal title.
Yes. A class member who objects to approval of a class action settlement has standing to appeal the order even without having formally intervened.
…District Court for the Northern District of Texas, to which the action was referred, held that the Does and Hallford had no standing to sue, but that Roe did have standing, and that the Texas abortion laws were unconstitutional. The court declared the laws void but refused to issue an injunction against their enforcement.…