Also known as: strict scrutiny · strict scrutiny standard · compelling interest · compelling governmental interest · strict scrutiny test · compelling interest test
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review under which a challenged law or classification survives only if the government proves it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The standard places the burden on the government to justify the restriction with evidence rather than speculation.
Santiago Sanchez, a Santeria priest, faces prosecution under a city ban on animal sacrifice that singles out his religion's practices. He argues the ordinance suppresses his faith without evidence that less restrictive measures would fail to protect public health. The court applies the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard and invalidates the law because the city cannot demonstrate necessity.
Sydney Santos, owner of a nonminority construction firm, sues after losing a city contract reserved for minority bidders. The program rests only on general assertions of past societal discrimination rather than specific findings of discrimination by the city. The court applies the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard and strikes down the set-aside for lack of narrow tailoring to identified past wrongs.
Seth Shapiro runs a religious foster agency that declines to certify same-sex couples on faith grounds. City officials grant individualized exemptions to secular agencies but refuse one to Shapiro's group. The court applies the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard and holds the policy unenforceable because the city cannot show narrow tailoring.
Steven Silva operates an online forum that posts material barred by a federal statute aimed at protecting minors. He challenges the law as overbroad. The court applies the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard and invalidates the statute because less speech-restrictive alternatives exist to achieve the government's goal.
In 1996 Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Immediately after the President signed the bill, twenty plaintiffs including the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Attorney General challenging the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d). A week later a second suit was filed by twenty-seven additional plaintiffs; the cases were consolidated and a three-judge district court was convened. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing based on a detailed stipulation of 356 paragraphs plus live testimony and made 410 findings of fact. Those findings described the Internet as an international network of interconnected computers that had grown from roughly 300 host computers in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of trial, with about 40 million users expected to reach 200 million by 1999. The findings detailed communication methods including e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web, noting that any person or organization with Internet access could publish information and that the content available was as diverse as human thought. The district court further found that sexually explicit material on the Internet included text, pictures, and chat extending from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core, that such material was widely available but users seldom encountered it accidentally because a series of affirmative steps was required to access specific content, and that almost all sexually explicit images were preceded by warnings. The court determined there was no effective way to determine the identity or age of a user accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms and that credit-card or adult-password verification systems were not economically feasible for most noncommercial providers and would impose significant burdens including the exclusion of adults without credit cards. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the two challenged provisions. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the CDA's special review provisions, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseSolomon Silver, a physician, seeks to enjoin a state law imposing spousal notification before an abortion. The restriction burdens a woman's decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. The court applies the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard and finds the requirement unconstitutional because it is not necessary to protect any compelling state interest.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseSebastian Santos, a developer, challenges a village zoning denial that blocks integrated housing. Evidence shows the decision was motivated by racial animus rather than neutral concerns. The court applies the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard and invalidates the action because the village cannot prove a compelling interest free of discriminatory purpose.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseA facial racial classification in a state benefit program, such as higher rebates awarded solely by race, is subject to strict scrutiny. The state must prove a compelling interest, typically remedying its own identified past discrimination, and show narrow tailoring. Absent such justification the classification violates equal protection.
Yes. The right to procreate is fundamental. A state may not condition restoration of civic rights on permanent sterilization because the scheme directly burdens a core liberty interest. The program therefore triggers strict scrutiny and fails unless narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
The program must rest on a strong basis in evidence of specific past discrimination by the governmental actor itself. General societal discrimination is insufficient. The set-aside must also be narrowly tailored to the identified discrimination in the relevant industry and jurisdiction.
…way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no compelling interest whatsoever in regulating abortion or, in any event, that it has no compelling interest until the point of viability is reached, are unpersuasive. As noted above, a State may properly assert…