Also known as: substantial federal questions · federal question jurisdiction
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal claim or issue that is not wholly insubstantial, frivolous, or foreclosed by precedent. The claim supports federal-question jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleges a right to relief directly under the Constitution or federal law.
Samuel Soto sued federal inspectors after they entered his property without a warrant and seized equipment. He sought damages directly under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged a right to relief under the Constitution even without an express statutory remedy. The court found the claim presented a substantial federal question sufficient for jurisdiction.
Solomon Silver sued a neighbor in state court for trespass under state law. The defendant answered by claiming a federal permit authorized the conduct. The plaintiff moved to remand after removal. The court held that a federal defense raised only in the answer cannot create a substantial federal question for jurisdiction.
Scott Summers filed a state contract action alleging breach of an employment agreement. The complaint predicted the defendant would invoke federal student-aid regulations as a defense and asked the court to declare those regulations inapplicable. The defendant removed on federal-question grounds. The court held that anticipating a federal defense does not present a substantial federal question on the face of the complaint.
Sierra Santos and her partner sought a marriage license in a state that limited marriage to opposite-sex couples. They sued in federal court claiming a constitutional right to marry. The state moved to dismiss, citing an earlier summary decision that had rejected a similar claim. The court treated the earlier decision as lacking a substantial federal question and proceeded to decide the merits.
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes. The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee. Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
View caseSimon Stern, a voter, sued state officials alleging that legislative districts diluted his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants argued the claim presented only a political question. The court held that the complaint raised a substantial federal question because it alleged a concrete violation of a constitutional right.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseSamantha Stone sued a union under federal labor law for interference with her employment rights. She added a state-law claim for emotional distress arising from the same events. The court exercised jurisdiction over the state claim because the federal claim presented a substantial federal question and the claims shared a common nucleus of operative fact.
Paul Gibbs was hired in the summer of 1960 by Grundy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, to serve as mine superintendent for a new mine at Gray's Creek and to haul the coal produced there under a separate contract. This arrangement occurred amid ongoing rivalry between the United Mine Workers of America and the Southern Labor Union for representation of coal miners in the southern Appalachian fields. On August 15 and 16, 1960, armed members of UMW Local 5881 prevented the mine from opening through threats and violence, including beating an organizer for the rival union, after learning that jobs they believed had been promised to them were going to others. George Gilbert, the UMW field representative for the area, was attending an Executive Board meeting in Middlesboro, Kentucky, when the violence occurred and did not return until late on August 16. Upon his return he received instructions from international union superiors to establish a limited picket line, prevent any further violence, and ensure the strike did not spread. No further violence took place at the mine site, a picket line was maintained for nine months, and no further attempts were made to open the mine during that period. Gibbs lost his superintendent position and never performed the haulage contract. He claimed to have lost other trucking contracts and mine leases in nearby areas as a result of a concerted union plan against him. He filed suit against the international UMW only, not against Local 5881 or its members, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Jurisdiction over the federal claim rested on alleged secondary boycotts under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Jurisdiction over the state law claim for unlawful conspiracy and boycott was premised on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. At trial the district court refused to submit claims of pressure on mining firms other than Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs. The jury returned a verdict finding violations of both section 303 and state law and awarded $60,000 in damages under the employment contract, $14,500 under the haulage contract, and $100,000 in punitive damages. On post-trial motion the court set aside the haulage contract award for lack of proof of damages and sustained a remitted award on the state law claim alone. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA constitutional claim presents a substantial federal question when the plaintiff alleges a right to relief directly under the Constitution and the claim is not wholly insubstantial or frivolous. Jurisdiction exists even if the court later decides no implied cause of action should be recognized.
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No. The well-pleaded complaint rule requires the federal issue to appear on the face of the plaintiff's own claim. A federal defense or counterclaim, no matter how central, cannot supply the substantial federal question needed for jurisdiction.
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No. Pleading a state-law claim and then describing the defendant's likely federal defense does not transform the action into one arising under federal law. Jurisdiction turns on the plaintiff's cause of action, not on anticipated defenses.
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…810, a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed broader principles. See, e.g., Lawrence , supra, at 574. In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex…