Also known as: temporary custodies · temp custody · temporary physical custody
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A provisional court order that awards custody of a child to one parent during the pendency of a custody proceeding or dissolution action. The order is entered on motion supported by affidavit and is decided under the best-interests standard after a hearing when the opposing party objects.
Timothy Tang files for legal separation and immediately moves for temporary custody of the couple's two children. His motion is accompanied by an affidavit detailing his daily involvement in school and medical matters. His spouse files a timely opposing affidavit. Because an objection exists, the court schedules a prompt hearing and applies the best-interests factors before entering the temporary order.
Tyrone Tran, a high-school principal, receives reports that a student athlete may be using drugs. The school places the student in temporary custody of administrators for the limited purpose of conducting a urine test under the district's policy. The arrangement lasts only for the duration of the school day and the testing procedure.
Vernonia School District 47J operates one high school and three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon. In the mid-to-late 1980s, teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use among students. Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980's. A Vernonia high school football coach had observed suspicious steroid use by his athletes. The District's wrestling coach had witnessed students sharing steroids and had discovered steroids in a school locker. The District had a drug testing policy for student athletes since before 1989, but it had not been enforced for lack of funding. In the fall of 1989, the District received funds for a drug testing program and approved a Student Athlete Drug Policy. The Policy authorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who participated in the District's athletic programs. The Policy applied to all students participating in interscholastic athletics. It required students and their parents to sign a consent form agreeing to drug testing as a condition of participation. Athletes were tested at the beginning of the season and then randomly throughout the season. The testing procedure required students to provide a urine sample in a bathroom stall with an adult monitor of the same sex standing outside the stall. The monitor listened for normal sounds of urination. The samples were sent to a laboratory for analysis. A positive test result led to a meeting with the student and his or her parents. The student was given the option of participating in a drug assistance program or being suspended from athletics for the remainder of the season and the next season. In the fall of 1991, respondent James Acton, who was then a seventh grader, signed up to play football at the District's middle school. He was denied participation because he and his parents refused to sign the consent form for drug testing. They then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution. After a bench trial, the District Court dismissed the suit on the merits. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseTanner Thompson returns from Puerto Rico with his two children after their mother had surrendered them for a short visit. The mother institutes custody proceedings in New York Family Court. The court places the children in the temporary custody of the mother's new husband and grants the father visitation rights pending further hearings.
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed began living together in New York City in September 1968. They continued until the end of 1973. During this time they held themselves out as husband and wife even though Caban remained married to another woman until 1974. Mohammed gave birth to two children during this period: David Andrew Caban on July 16, 1969, and Denise Caban on March 12, 1971. Caban was named as the father on both birth certificates. The couple jointly supported the children while living together as a family. In December 1973, Mohammed left Caban with the children and began residing with Kazin Mohammed, whom she married on January 30, 1974. For the following nine months, the children visited their maternal grandmother weekly, allowing Caban to see them regularly. In September 1974, the grandmother moved to Puerto Rico and took the children with her at the Mohammeds' request. Caban maintained contact through his parents in Puerto Rico. In November 1975, he traveled there to retrieve the children, returning with them to New York. Upon learning of the children's location, Maria Mohammed attempted to recover them with police assistance. The Mohammeds then initiated custody proceedings in New York Family Court. That court awarded temporary custody to the Mohammeds and granted visiting rights to Caban and his new wife, Nina. In January 1976, the Mohammeds filed a petition for adoption of the children under section 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law. The Cabans responded with a cross-petition for adoption in March 1976. A hearing occurred before a Law Assistant to the Surrogate in Kings County, where both parties presented evidence and cross-examined witnesses. The Surrogate granted the Mohammeds' adoption petition. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision, relying on the Court of Appeals' ruling in In re Malpica-Orsini. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, leading to review by the United States Supreme Court.
View caseTabitha Taylor files a complaint in California seeking custody of her children after the father takes them to New York. The trial court immediately grants her temporary custody and restrains both parents from removing the children from the state pending resolution of jurisdictional issues.
Ezra Kulko married Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during a three-day stopover in California while en route from a military base in Texas to Korea. Both parties were New York domiciliaries who returned to New York after the marriage and Ezra's service. Their children Darwin and Ilsa were born in New York in 1961 and 1962. The family lived together in New York City until their separation in March 1972. Following the separation, Sharon moved to San Francisco, California. In September 1972, Sharon flew to New York to sign a separation agreement providing that the children would spend school years with their father and vacations with their mother in exchange for $3,000 annual child support payments during her custody periods. Sharon obtained a Haitian divorce incorporating the agreement and returned to California, where she remarried. The children resided with their father during the school year until December 1973, when Ilsa remained in California after her father bought her a one-way ticket. In January 1976 Darwin flew to California using a ticket sent by his mother. Less than one month after Darwin's arrival, Sharon commenced an action in California Superior Court to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment, modify it to award her full custody, and increase the father's child-support obligations. Ezra appeared specially and moved to quash service on the ground that he lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court sustained the rulings in a 4-2 decision before Ezra appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
View caseTiffany Torres has served as a foster parent for nine years. When the agency removes the child, the foster parents argue that their long-term temporary custody created a protected interest. The court rejects the claim, holding that prolonged foster placement does not confer a vested right superior to the natural parent's rights.
In 1976 appellees consisting of individual foster parents and the Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform filed a civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They acted on behalf of themselves and foster children who had resided in their homes for a year or more. They named as defendants various New York State and New York City child welfare officials. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the pre-removal procedures provided in state statutes and regulations. The District Court appointed independent counsel to represent the foster children to forestall conflicts. It also granted leave to natural mothers to intervene as defendants. The court certified a class of foster parents and children who had lived together for more than one year. A divided three-judge District Court held the existing pre-removal procedures constitutionally defective. It permanently enjoined their enforcement. Four appeals reached the Supreme Court from the New York City officials, New York State officials, independent counsel for the children, and intervening natural mothers. Under New York's foster care system most placements occur through voluntary written agreements. Natural parents and authorized agencies execute these agreements to transfer care and custody of the child to the agency. The agency then places the child in a licensed foster home under a contract allowing either party to terminate at will. Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an obligation to visit and plan for the child's future. Children may also enter foster care by court order following findings of abuse, neglect, or delinquency. When an agency decides to remove a child, state regulations require ten days' written notice to foster parents except in emergencies. Opportunities exist for conference and fair hearing. Additional procedures apply in New York City. Judicial review is available under § 392 after eighteen months. The record showed that the median duration of foster care in New York exceeded four years. Many children experienced multiple placements and limited contact with natural parents.
View caseTravis Tate and his spouse lose temporary custody of their child after the state substantiates neglect allegations. Although the parents retain a fundamental liberty interest in the care of their child, the temporary placement with the state does not terminate their rights and requires fundamentally fair procedures before any permanent severance occurs.
In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody. Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.
View caseA court may award temporary custody without a hearing only when no party files an opposing affidavit. The statute permits decision on affidavits alone if there is no objection. An opposing affidavit triggers the requirement of a hearing before entry of the order.
Supporting sources
The motion must be supported by an affidavit setting forth facts that justify the requested order. The moving party must also give notice and a copy of the affidavit to other parties, who may file opposing affidavits.
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The temporary custody order is vacated unless a parent or custodian moves that the proceeding continue as a custody action and the court finds after a hearing that the circumstances and the child's best interests require entry of a custody decree.
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No. When an opposing affidavit is filed, the court must hold a hearing before entering the temporary order. Decision on affidavits alone is permitted only in the absence of objection.
Supporting sources
…sought an order restraining appellant from removing his children from the State. The trial court immediately granted appellee temporary custody of the children and restrained both her and appellant from removing the children from the State of California. See 19 Cal. 3d 514, 520, 564 P. 2d 353, 355 (1977). The record does not…