Also known as: threadbare recitals · threadbare recital · conclusory allegations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action unsupported by factual allegations. Courts disregard such statements on a motion to dismiss and examine only the remaining well-pleaded facts to determine whether they plausibly support relief rather than mere possibility.
Elliot sued NovaLend alleging that executives lied about default rates and cooked the books. The complaint compared marketing materials to later reports but named no executive, meeting, or document showing knowledge or intent. After setting aside the conclusory labels, the court found no factual content allowing a plausible inference of fraud and granted the motion to dismiss.
Friends of the Earth sued Laidlaw claiming repeated permit violations harmed members who used the river. The complaint stated only that members were concerned about pollution without describing any specific visits, injuries, or plans to return. The court treated the generalized harm assertions as threadbare, disregarded them, and dismissed for lack of injury-in-fact facts.
Laidlaw Environmental Services acquired a hazardous waste incinerator facility in Roebuck, South Carolina in 1986 that included a wastewater treatment plant. Shortly thereafter, it obtained an NPDES permit effective January 1, 1987 authorizing limited discharges of pollutants including mercury into the North Tyger River. Laidlaw repeatedly exceeded the permit limits, violating the mercury discharge limit on 489 occasions between 1987 and 1995. On April 10, 1992, Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental Action Network sent Laidlaw a 60-day notice letter of their intent to file a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. On June 9, 1992, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control reached a settlement with Laidlaw requiring payment of a $100,000 civil penalty. On June 12, 1992, FOE filed its federal citizen suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief plus civil penalties. After a bench trial the District Court found the violations, imposed a $405,800 penalty, awarded litigation costs to FOE, and denied injunctive relief because Laidlaw had achieved substantial compliance since August 1992. The Fourth Circuit assumed without deciding that FOE initially had standing but held that the case had become moot because civil penalties payable to the government would not redress any injury FOE had suffered. The Supreme Court granted certiorari; after the Fourth Circuit decision but before argument the entire Roebuck facility was permanently closed, dismantled, and placed for sale with all discharges permanently ceased.
View caseSwierkiewicz sued Sorema alleging termination on account of national origin and age. The complaint recited the statutory elements and asserted discriminatory motive without identifying any comparator, statement, or circumstance supporting the claim. After setting aside the bare recital as threadbare, the court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible claim.
Akos Swierkiewicz, a native of Hungary who was 53 years old at the time of his complaint, began working for Sorema N.A. in April 1989 as senior vice president and chief underwriting officer. Sorema is a reinsurance company headquartered in New York and principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation. Nearly six years later, Sorema's Chief Executive Officer François M. Chavel demoted Swierkiewicz to a marketing and services position and transferred the bulk of his underwriting responsibilities to Nicholas Papadopoulo, a 32-year-old French national. About a year later, Chavel appointed Papadopoulo as chief underwriting officer, even though Swierkiewicz had 26 years of experience in the insurance industry while Papadopoulo had only one year of underwriting experience. Following his demotion, Swierkiewicz was isolated by Chavel, excluded from business decisions and meetings, and denied the opportunity to reach his true potential. In April 1997, Swierkiewicz sent a memo to Chavel outlining his grievances and requesting a severance package. Two weeks later, after refusing to resign without a severance package, Swierkiewicz was fired by Chavel. Swierkiewicz filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He alleged that he had been terminated on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also alleged that he had been terminated on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals concerning the proper pleading standard for employment discrimination cases.
View caseResidents sued state officials alleging that legislative districts diluted their votes. The complaint asserted that the apportionment impaired equal representation but supplied no demographic data, voting patterns, or specific effects on any plaintiff. The court found the allegations too conclusory to present a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseSmith sued state officials claiming the registration statute violated due process. The complaint stated only that the law imposed punishment without any factual description of Smith's circumstances or how the requirements affected him personally. The court dismissed the claim because the threadbare assertion failed to allege facts supporting a plausible constitutional violation.
Plaintiff Paula Smith filed this suit for injuries she allegedly sustained in Montego Bay, Jamaica while a passenger aboard the S/S ENCHANTED SEAS, a cruise vessel operated by defendant Commodore Cruise Line, Limited. After removing the suit from Louisiana state court based on diversity of citizenship, Commodore moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for improper venue, or in the alternative, for transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Commodore contends that the forum selection clause contained in the passenger ticket contract with Smith provides for exclusive venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Smith disputes the enforceability of the clause on the grounds that Congress overruled the Supreme Court decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, that Smith did not freely bargain for the forum selection clause, and that Smith did not have notice of the clause. The forum selection clause is found in paragraph 27 of Commodore's Passage Contract. The front of the Passage Contract provides in bold that each passenger should carefully examine all the conditions of this contract, particularly the conditions on pages 4-12. On page 4 of the contract, the following is stated in bold that acceptance of this contract by the passenger shall constitute an acceptance by the passenger of all the terms and conditions set forth herein. Commodore submitted the affidavit of Stephen Field, formerly Commodore's Vice President of Insurance and Claims, attesting that the standard Passage Contract is an identical form of the Passage Contract which was issued and delivered to Paula Smith for the cruise in question. A duplicate original would have been given to Ms. Smith. Smith did not submit any evidence to controvert the affidavit.
View caseLugar sued Edmondson Oil alleging that the company used state attachment procedures to seize property without due process. The complaint asserted joint action with the state but provided no facts showing that the company acted under color of law beyond invoking the statute. The court held that the conclusory joint-action allegation did not state a plausible Section 1983 claim.
In 1977, petitioner Lugar, the lessee-operator of a truckstop in Virginia, became indebted to respondent Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., his petroleum supplier. When Lugar fell behind in payments, Edmondson filed suit on the debt in Virginia state court and, ancillary to that action, petitioned for prejudgment attachment of Lugar's property under Virginia Code § 8.01-533. Acting on an ex parte petition alleging that Lugar was disposing of property to defeat creditors, the state court clerk issued a writ of attachment that the county sheriff executed, sequestering Lugar's property. A state trial judge later conducted a hearing on the attachment and ordered it dismissed because Edmondson had failed to establish the statutory grounds alleged in the petition. Lugar then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Edmondson and its president. His complaint alleged that respondents had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law, challenging both the constitutionality of the Virginia attachment statute and its application to him. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that respondents' actions did not constitute state action as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. It held that a private party acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 only when there is a usurpation or corruption of official power by the private litigant or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a significant degree. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' construction of the under-color-of-state-law requirement.
View caseA threadbare recitation merely repeats the legal elements of a claim without supporting facts. A well-pleaded allegation supplies concrete details that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference of liability when accepted as true.
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No. Courts disregard threadbare recitations and test only the remaining factual allegations for plausibility. If those facts do not nudge the claim across the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint is dismissed.
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Parallel conduct plus a bare assertion of agreement or conspiracy remains consistent with lawful independent action. Without additional factual content showing a meeting of the minds, the claim fails the plausibility test.
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Attached affidavits that supply specific factual details may provide the necessary enhancement. Generalized affidavits that merely repeat conclusory statements do not cure the defect.
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