Also known as:tutelae · tutelage · tutelages · tutelar · tutelary · guardianship · tutorship
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A legal relationship in which a court appoints a guardian to manage the person or property of an individual who lacks capacity due to minority, mental illness, or other impairment. The guardian acts under court supervision to protect the ward's interests and may exercise powers only to the extent authorized by the appointing order.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Contract Attempt by Ward
Tabitha Taylor's property was placed under guardianship after a court found her mentally incapacitated. She later signed a contract to sell land without the guardian's involvement. The buyer later sought enforcement, but the agreement was held voidable because the guardianship deprived Tabitha of capacity to incur contractual duties.
Arbitration Over Guardianship
Tonya Takahashi and her former partner submitted all disputes, including child custody matters, to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded sole guardianship of their child to one parent. A court later vacated that portion of the award because an arbitrator lacks authority to grant guardianship of a child.
Theo Thomas was under a court-appointed guardianship for financial affairs. He attempted to enter a large investment contract on his own. The other party could not enforce the agreement against him because the guardianship status removed his capacity to bind himself contractually.
Tribal Status as Ward
Theresa Tucker, a member of a federally recognized tribe, challenged a federal regulation that treated the tribe as subject to congressional oversight similar to a ward under guardianship. The court upheld the regulation, noting that the tribe's status as a domestic dependent nation placed it in a relationship of tutelage to the United States.
Baker v. Carr369 U.S. 186, 211
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties.
The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass.
Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties.
Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment.
A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
Tamara Tan, a high school athlete, objected to a random drug test required by school policy. School officials defended the search by pointing to their custodial and tutelary responsibility for students. The court upheld the testing because the school's protective role over minors justified the intrusion.
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton515 U.S. 646 (1995)
Vernonia School District 47J operates one high school and three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon.
In the mid-to-late 1980s, teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use among students. Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980's. A Vernonia high school football coach had observed suspicious steroid use by his athletes. The District's wrestling coach had witnessed students sharing steroids and had discovered steroids in a school locker. The District had a drug testing policy for student athletes since before 1989, but it had not been enforced for lack of funding.
In the fall of 1989, the District received funds for a drug testing program and approved a Student Athlete Drug Policy. The Policy authorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who participated in the District's athletic programs. The Policy applied to all students participating in interscholastic athletics. It required students and their parents to sign a consent form agreeing to drug testing as a condition of participation. Athletes were tested at the beginning of the season and then randomly throughout the season.
The testing procedure required students to provide a urine sample in a bathroom stall with an adult monitor of the same sex standing outside the stall. The monitor listened for normal sounds of urination. The samples were sent to a laboratory for analysis. A positive test result led to a meeting with the student and his or her parents. The student was given the option of participating in a drug assistance program or being suspended from athletics for the remainder of the season and the next season.
In the fall of 1991, respondent James Acton, who was then a seventh grader, signed up to play football at the District's middle school. He was denied participation because he and his parents refused to sign the consent form for drug testing. They then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution. After a bench trial, the District Court dismissed the suit on the merits. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated both the Federal and the State Constitutions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Thaddeus Tran sought to register a trademark containing a vulgar term. The PTO refused registration on morality grounds. Tran argued the refusal violated free speech protections. The court analyzed whether the government's role in trademark registration carried any tutelary function that might support content-based restrictions.
Iancu v. Brunetti139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)
Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT. According to Brunetti, the mark is pronounced as four letters, one after the other.
Brunetti applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for federal registration of the mark under the Lanham Act. A PTO examining attorney denied the application, determining that FUCT was a total vulgar and therefore unregistrable. On review, the Board stated that the mark was highly offensive and vulgar and had decidedly negative sexual connotations.
It found that Brunetti’s website and products contained imagery, near the mark, of “extreme nihilism” and “anti-social” behavior. In that context, the Board thought, the mark communicated “misogyny, depravity, [and] violence.” Brunetti brought a facial challenge to the “immoral or scandalous” bar in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court held that the prohibition violates the First Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The PTO rejected marks conveying approval of drug use (YOU CAN’T SPELL HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC for pain-relief medication, MARIJUANA COLA and KO KANE for beverages) because it is scandalous to “inappropriately glamoriz[e] drug abuse.” But at the same time, the PTO registered marks with such sayings as D.A.R.E. TO RESIST DRUGS AND VIOLENCE and SAY NO TO DRUGS—REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE.
Does appointment of a guardian automatically strip a person of all contractual capacity?
No. A person under guardianship for property management lacks capacity only to the extent the guardianship order removes authority to incur contractual duties. Limited guardianships may leave capacity intact for other transactions.
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Can parties agree to let an arbitrator decide guardianship of a child?
No. Statutes expressly prohibit arbitrators from granting guardianship of a child or incapacitated person even when the parties submit all disputes to arbitration.
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What standard determines whether a school may conduct searches under its tutelary role?
Schools may conduct searches that are justified at inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances, because their custodial and tutelary responsibility for students permits greater latitude than ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis.
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Does a finding of testamentary capacity survive a limited financial guardianship?
Yes. A court may impose a limited guardianship for financial management while expressly finding the ward retains capacity to decide property dispositions at death, and that finding controls the validity of a later deed or will substitute.
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369 U.S. 186, 211
…. . . , and not for the courts, to determine when the true interests of the Indian require his release from [the] condition of tutelage' . . . , it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe . . . ." United States v.…