An action or agreement undertaken by only one party without requiring reciprocal action or consent from the other. The concept identifies situations where one side alone initiates, accepts, or alters a legal relationship or obligation.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Presidential Cancellation Attempt
Congress passes a spending bill funding multiple programs. The President cancels only the portions he dislikes after signing the bill into law. A court holds the cancellations invalid because the President may approve or reject an entire bill but cannot alter specific provisions alone.
Landlord Holds Over Tenant
A tenant remains in possession after the lease expires with no new agreement. The landlord elects to treat the holdover as creating a new one-year term. The election binds the tenant to the additional term unless equitable factors allow extra time to vacate.
A buyer in State A purchases goods from a seller in State B. The seller never visits or advertises in State A. The buyer later sues in State A. The court finds no jurisdiction because the seller's contacts cannot be supplied by the buyer's unilateral decision to purchase.
Marital Property Disposition
A state statute permits only the husband to sell jointly owned marital property without the wife's consent. The wife challenges the statute after a sale reduces her interest. The court invalidates the law as an impermissible gender classification.
Impoundment of Funds
Congress appropriates funds for a specific program. The President directs agencies to withhold the money to achieve different policy goals. A court orders release of the funds because the executive may not refuse to spend amounts Congress has directed be expended.
Legislative Veto Challenge
Congress enacts a statute allowing one house to override an executive decision on deportation. An alien challenges the procedure after one house blocks suspension of his deportation. The court holds the one-house override unconstitutional because it alters legal rights without bicameral passage and presentment.
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act.
On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship.
Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal.
Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
How does a unilateral contract differ from a bilateral contract?
A unilateral contract forms when the offeree accepts solely by completing the requested performance, leaving only the offeror with a remaining promise. A bilateral contract forms upon the exchange of mutual promises, with both parties retaining future obligations at formation.
Can one party unilaterally create personal jurisdiction over another?
No. Minimum contacts require the defendant to purposefully avail itself of the forum. The unilateral activity of the plaintiff or a third party cannot satisfy this requirement.
Does the President possess unilateral power to cancel portions of enacted statutes?
No. The President's veto power permits only approval or rejection of an entire bill. Selective cancellation or amendment of statutory provisions exceeds that authority.
When may a landlord unilaterally bind a holdover tenant to a new term?
A landlord may elect to hold the tenant to another term solely because of improper holding over, unless the lease provides otherwise or equitable considerations justify an extension for the tenant to vacate.
384 U.S. 436 (1966)
…not sustain the present rules. Viewed as a choice based on pure policy, these new rules prove to be a highly debatable, if not one-sided, appraisal of the competing interests, imposed over widespread objection, at the very time when judicial restraint is most called for by the circumstances. II. CONSTITUTIONAL…
Secured TransactionsRights of third parties; perfected and unperfected security interests; rules of priority (§ 9-301, et seq.) · Defenses against assignee; modification of contract (§§ 9-404 through 9-406)UBEFoundational