Also known as: voluntary act · voluntariness requirement · actus reus voluntariness
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A principle of criminal law providing that no person may be convicted of an offense unless the prohibited conduct includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which the person is physically capable. A volitional act is a bodily movement willed by the actor. Certain movements such as reflexes, convulsions, or actions during unconsciousness or sleep are excluded from the category of voluntary acts.
A worker with a known seizure disorder suddenly convulses while adjusting monitoring knobs at a waste facility. The convulsion disables the alarm and allows untreated sludge to continue flowing. Because the movement is a reflex rather than a willed act, it supplies no voluntary conduct on which to base liability for the resulting environmental release.
A lender holding a promissory note from a borrower intentionally cancels the instrument by striking through the borrower's signature and writing the word 'paid' across the face. The lender then sues for the underlying debt. The cancellation is an intentional voluntary act that discharges the borrower's obligation on the note.
A doctor writes a prescription for lethal medication at the request of a terminally ill patient who wishes to end life. The patient later ingests the medication. The doctor's act of writing the prescription is a voluntary affirmative act that supplies the conduct element for any potential criminal charge arising from the patient's death.
New York, like most states, criminalizes aiding another to commit or attempt suicide. Patients may nevertheless refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. Petitioners are New York public officials responsible for enforcing state law. Respondents Timothy E. Quill, Samuel C. Klagsbrun, and Howard A. Grossman are physicians practicing in New York. The physicians assert that prescribing lethal medication for mentally competent, terminally ill patients suffering great pain would be consistent with their medical standards. They are deterred by the state's ban. Along with three gravely ill patients who later died, the physicians sued the State's Attorney General in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They argued that the ban violates equal protection because New York allows refusal of life-sustaining treatment, which they claim is essentially the same as physician-assisted suicide. The District Court disagreed with their position. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in 1996. It held that New York law unequally treats competent persons in the final stages of fatal illness who wish to hasten death. Those on life-support may direct removal, but others may not self-administer prescribed drugs. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1996. New York enacted its assisted-suicide statutes in 1965. It later protected the right to refuse treatment through 1987 do-not-resuscitate legislation and 1990 health care proxy laws, both in the Public Health Law. In 1994, a state task force unanimously recommended against legalizing assisted suicide.
View caseA defendant stands in open court and verbally admits guilt to robbery charges after consulting with counsel. The plea is later challenged as involuntary. The defendant's spoken admission and signature on the plea form constitute voluntary acts that satisfy the conduct element of the offense for purposes of conviction.
The State of New York indicted Santobello in 1969 on two felony counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree. Santobello initially entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. After negotiations, the Assistant District Attorney agreed to permit a plea to the lesser-included offense of Possession of Gambling Records in the Second Degree and promised to make no recommendation as to sentence. On June 16, 1969, Santobello withdrew the not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge. The court accepted the plea after Santobello confirmed it was voluntary and the facts described by the prosecutor were true. A series of delays followed, owing primarily to the absence of a pre-sentence report, so that by September 23, 1969, Santobello had still not been sentenced. By that date petitioner acquired new defense counsel. Petitioner's new counsel moved immediately to withdraw the guilty plea. In an accompanying affidavit, petitioner alleged that he did not know at the time of his plea that crucial evidence against him had been obtained as a result of an illegal search. In addition to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner renewed the motion to suppress and filed a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes. These motions in turn caused further delay until November 26, 1969, when the court denied all three and set January 9, 1970, as the date for sentencing. On January 9, 1970, Santobello appeared before a different judge because the original judge had retired. A new prosecutor replaced the one who negotiated the plea and recommended the maximum one-year sentence, citing Santobello’s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had promised no sentence recommendation and sought an adjournment to prove the promise, though the State later conceded in subsequent proceedings that the promise had been made. The sentencing judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence at the New York City Correctional Institution for men, stating that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence the decision. Santobello obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and was admitted to bail pending appeal. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Santobello then sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
View caseA federal agent physically enters and searches a residence located in another country without a warrant. The entry and subsequent seizure of documents are voluntary bodily movements that constitute the conduct element of any Fourth Amendment claim arising from the search.
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He is believed by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency to be one of the leaders of a large and violent organization in Mexico that smuggles narcotics into the United States. Based on a complaint charging him with narcotics-related offenses, the Government obtained a warrant for his arrest on August 3, 1985. In January 1986, Mexican police officers, after discussions with United States marshals, apprehended Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico and transported him to the United States Border Patrol station in Calexico, California. There, United States marshals arrested respondent and eventually moved him to a correctional center in San Diego, California, where he remains incarcerated pending trial. Respondent subsequently was convicted in a separate prosecution for the kidnaping and torture-murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar. Following respondent's arrest, Terry Bowen, a DEA agent assigned to the Calexico DEA office, decided to arrange for searches of Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican residences located in Mexicali and San Felipe. Bowen believed the searches would reveal evidence related to respondent's alleged narcotics trafficking activities. Bowen telephoned Walter White, the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the DEA office in Mexico City, and asked him to seek authorization for the search from the Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police. After several attempts to reach high ranking Mexican officials, White eventually contacted the Director General, who authorized the searches and promised the cooperation of Mexican authorities. DEA agents working in concert with officers of the MFJP searched respondent's properties in Mexicali and San Felipe and seized documents. In particular, the search of the Mexicali residence uncovered a tally sheet, which the Government believes reflects the quantities of marijuana smuggled by Verdugo-Urquidez into the United States. The District Court granted respondent's motion to suppress evidence seized during the searches. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA defendant raises a gun, aims it at a victim, and pulls the trigger during an argument. The resulting shot kills the victim. The defendant's deliberate raising and firing of the weapon are voluntary acts that satisfy the conduct requirement for homicide liability.
In January 2003, petitioner Keshia Dixon purchased multiple firearms at two gun shows. During the purchases, she provided an incorrect address and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for a felony. Dixon was indicted and convicted on one count of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). She was also convicted on eight counts of making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of § 922(a)(6). At trial she admitted that she knew she was under indictment when she made the purchases and that she knew doing so was a crime. Her defense was that she acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him. In her request for jury instructions on the duress defense, Dixon asked that she have the burden of production and that the Government then be required to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court, finding itself bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, denied the request. Instead, the court instructed the jury that Dixon had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence. After her conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected Dixon's contention that the instructions were erroneous. Given contrary treatment by other federal courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLiability requires conduct that includes a voluntary act or a capable omission. A voluntary act is a willed bodily movement. Reflexes, convulsions, and movements during unconsciousness or sleep are excluded.
Supporting sources
Possession qualifies as a voluntary act only when the person knowingly receives the item or remains aware of control over it for a period sufficient to permit termination of possession.
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A bodily movement that occurs while a person is asleep or unconscious is not a voluntary act. Criminal liability cannot rest on such movements even if the person created the conditions leading to unconsciousness.
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An omission satisfies the requirement only when the person is physically capable of performing the omitted act and the law imposes a duty to act.
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…to make known that which might subject him to punishment, it was not intended to shield him from the consequences of his own voluntary act.' 161 U.S., at 595-596." Id. , at 427-428. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission , 378 U.S. 52, decided today, we held that a state immunity statute which provided that no testimony given…