Also known as: welfare & subsistence · public assistance · minimum living standard
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of public assistance programs that supply cash or in-kind benefits to persons unable to meet basic living needs. Courts may override private agreements that eliminate support when enforcement would render a party eligible for such programs at separation or dissolution.
Wren Wallace and Wendy Wu signed a premarital agreement eliminating spousal support. After twelve years of marriage Wendy filed for divorce. Wren's savings were depleted and he faced eviction with no income. The court ordered Wendy to pay support in an amount sufficient to keep Wren off cash public assistance.
Willow Walker received disability benefits that the agency later terminated after an administrative review. She challenged the process under the Due Process Clause. The court held that a post-termination evidentiary hearing satisfied due process because the benefits were not the sole source of subsistence income.
George Eldridge was first awarded Social Security disability benefits in June 1968. In March 1972 he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. He completed and returned the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying recent medical sources. The state agency obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After reviewing those reports and other information in his file, the agency sent Eldridge a letter stating that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination and advised Eldridge that he could request time to submit additional information. Eldridge responded in writing, disputing one characterization of his medical condition and asserting that the agency already possessed sufficient evidence of his disability. The state agency then made a final determination that Eldridge had ceased to be disabled in May 1972; the Social Security Administration accepted that determination. In July 1972 Eldridge received written notice that his benefits would terminate after that month and that he could seek reconsideration by the state agency within six months. Instead of requesting reconsideration, Eldridge filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He challenged the constitutionality of the Secretary's termination procedures and sought an injunction barring termination of benefits until a pretermination evidentiary hearing was provided, together with immediate reinstatement of benefits. The District Court held that the existing procedures violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, ordered the Secretary to provide Eldridge a pretermination hearing, and directed reinstatement of benefits pending that hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.
View caseWade Watson's welfare payments were cut off without any hearing after the agency found him ineligible. He sued claiming a due process violation. The court ruled that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing was required because termination threatened his very means of survival.
Residents of New York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program brought this action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the state and city officials who administered those programs. At the time the suits were filed, New York had no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. The suits prompted the State Commissioner of Social Services to amend the Department of Social Services regulations. The amendment required local officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient's aid to follow either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of § 351.26. The City of New York elected to follow subdivision (b). It promulgated Procedure No. 68-18. Under that procedure a caseworker who doubts a recipient's continued eligibility first discusses the doubts with the recipient. The caseworker then recommends termination to a unit supervisor. If the supervisor concurs, the recipient receives a letter stating the reasons for the proposed termination and notifying the recipient that within seven days he may request review by a higher official and may submit a written statement. The reviewing official decides whether to discontinue aid. Aid stops immediately upon affirmation, and the recipient is notified in writing of the reasons. The city's procedure contains no provision for the recipient's personal appearance before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The letter sent to the recipient states that he may request a post-termination fair hearing before an independent state hearing officer. At the hearing the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a record made. If the recipient prevails, all funds erroneously withheld are paid. A recipient whose aid is not restored after the fair hearing may obtain judicial review under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy due process. The court rejected the argument that the combination of the post-termination fair hearing and the informal pre-termination review was constitutionally adequate. Only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.
View caseWarren Wu challenged the constitutionality of the federal old-age benefits program funded by payroll taxes. The court sustained the program as a valid exercise of the taxing and spending power that addressed a national problem of economic insecurity among the elderly.
The Social Security Act was enacted on August 14, 1935. Title VIII of the Act imposes an income tax on employees measured by wages paid during the calendar year and an excise tax on employers with respect to having individuals in their employ, also measured by wages. Both taxes start at one percent for 1937 to 1939 and increase by one-half of one percent every three years thereafter up to three percent. It exempts agricultural labor, domestic service, government service, and persons over age 65. Wages in excess of $3,000 per year are excluded from the computation. Title II of the Act creates an Old-Age Reserve Account in the Treasury and authorizes annual appropriations to it beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1937. The amount is determined on a reserve basis using actuarial principles and a three percent interest rate. It provides for monthly pensions beginning in 1942 to persons who have attained age 65, worked at least one day in each of five separate years since December 31, 1936, earned at least $2,000 since that date, and are not receiving wages from regular employment. Benefits do not exceed $85 per month and are measured by a percentage of wages that decreases as wages increase, as well as certain lump sum payments in specified contingencies. A shareholder of the Edison Electric Illuminating Company of Boston brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to enjoin the corporation from making the payments and deductions required by the Act. The bill alleged that the corporation had decided to obey the statute despite the shareholder's protests. Compliance would cause employee unrest, demands for increased wages, and irreparable loss to the corporation and its shareholders from which recovery would be impossible as a practical matter. The corporation appeared and answered without raising any issue of fact. The United States Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the United States Collector for the District of Massachusetts intervened as defendants. The District Court held that the tax upon employees was not properly at issue and that the tax upon employers was constitutional. It denied the injunction and dismissed the bill. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the decree. The intervening defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The petition presented two questions: whether the tax imposed upon employers by section 804 is within the power of Congress under the Constitution, and whether the validity of the tax imposed upon employees by section 801 is properly in issue and if so whether that tax is within the power of Congress under the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseWayne Walker, a lawful permanent resident, was denied state welfare benefits under a statute limiting aid to citizens. The court struck down the restriction because it violated equal protection by discriminating against resident aliens without a compelling justification.
Carmen Richardson, a lawfully admitted resident alien who emigrated from Mexico in 1956, was 64 years old when she instituted suit in July 1969 after becoming permanently and totally disabled. She had resided continuously in Arizona but was denied assistance to the permanently and totally disabled under Arizona Revised Statutes section 46-233 solely due to the requirement that aliens reside in the United States for fifteen years. Similar provisions conditioned old-age assistance and aid to the needy blind on citizenship or the same durational residency. Richardson brought a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Commissioner of the Department of Public Welfare seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as back payments. The three-judge court upheld Mrs. Richardson's motion for summary judgment on equal protection grounds. The Commissioner appealed. Probable jurisdiction was noted. In the consolidated Pennsylvania case, Elsie Mary Jane Leger, who arrived from Scotland in 1965 and later entered a common-law marriage with a United States citizen, and Beryl Jervis, who arrived from Panama in 1968, both lawfully admitted resident aliens and taxpaying residents, were denied general assistance under Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code section 432(2) because they were not citizens. Both had become ill and unable to work, rendering them ineligible for federal programs, and Leger received a temporary restraining order allowing her to obtain benefits. The Pennsylvania plaintiffs filed class actions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against state welfare officials. After a stipulation that denial caused undue hardship and encouraged departure from the state, the three-judge court enjoined enforcement of the citizenship restriction. The defendants appealed, with probable jurisdiction noted, and the cases reached the Supreme Court for review. The Arizona program participated in federal categorical assistance under the Social Security Act, while the Pennsylvania general assistance was state-funded only.
View caseWoodridge Manufacturing employed several undocumented workers whose school-age children were denied public education under a state statute. The court held that the statute violated equal protection because it imposed a lifetime hardship on children who could not control their immigration status.
Since the late 19th century the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry is a crime and those who enter unlawfully are subject to deportation, yet a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering and now live within various States including Texas. In May 1975 the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold state funds from local school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the United States. The revision also authorized local districts to deny enrollment to such children under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031. In September 1977 a class action was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County who could not establish legal admission. The suit challenged their exclusion from the Tyler Independent School District schools, and the State of Texas intervened as a defendant. After certifying a class of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin in the district, the court held an extensive hearing in December 1977. It found that the statute had neither the purpose nor effect of keeping illegal aliens out of Texas, that enrollment increases stemmed primarily from legal residents, and that barring undocumented children would save money but would not necessarily improve education quality. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction. During 1978 and 1979 additional suits were filed in other Texas districts. The Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated them in the Southern District of Texas. After a hearing the district court held the statute violated equal protection, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases.
View caseA court may require the other party to pay support to the extent necessary to prevent the disadvantaged spouse from qualifying for public assistance at separation or dissolution. The statute creates a narrow safety valve that respects the agreement except to the limited degree needed to protect the public fisc.
Supporting sources
No. When termination threatens the recipient's sole source of subsistence income, a pre-termination evidentiary hearing is required. A post-termination hearing suffices only when the benefits are not the sole means of survival.
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No. Durational residency requirements for welfare benefits violate equal protection when their purpose or effect is to deter the migration of indigent persons. Fiscal concerns alone do not justify the classification.
Supporting sources
…candidacies with large sums of public money, S. Rep. No. 93-689, supra , at 7, necessarily justifies the withholding of public assistance from candidates without significant public support. Thus, Congress may legitimately require "some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support," Jenness v. Fortson, supra , at…