Concept
Congressional Abrogation
Does state sovereign immunity bar the suit?
Congressional Abrogation
Federal question jurisdiction does not, by itself, open a federal court to a private suit against a State. In Hans v. Louisiana, a Louisiana plaintiff sued his own State for reneging on its bonds, alleging a violation of the Contracts Clause; the claim arose under federal law and entered through neither door the Eleventh Amendment closed, yet the Court dismissed it.1 The Amendment’s text reaches only suits against a State by citizens of another State and by citizens or subjects of a foreign state.2 Hans nonetheless relied on earlier decisions holding that a State cannot be sued “on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”3 Those decisions attacked state laws as impairing the obligation of contracts and sought relief against officers acting under them; the Court treated the suits as virtually against the States and barred them, although no one denied that they arose under the Constitution.4
The Court has made Hans’s broad reading of the immunity the law, with exceptions,5 and abrogation is one of them: Congress, acting validly, strips a State of its immunity without the State’s consent.6 Two questions decide whether a given statute does so. First, did Congress make its intent to subject States to private suits clear in the text it enacted? Second, did Congress act under a constitutional power that can support that result? A statute can pass the first test and fail the second, as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did.7 The Fourteenth Amendment supplies a power that qualifies; Article I, with one exception, does not.
Clear Statement Rule
The first question concerns text. Congress abrogates the immunity only by making its intent to subject States to private suit unmistakably clear, and the Court’s clear statement inquiry focuses on what Congress actually enacted.8 The demand echoes the reluctance Hans preserved from Hamilton, who thought it “altogether forced and unwarrantable” to ascribe to the federal courts “by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the state governments,” a power to hear suits on a State’s debts.9
A statute that authorizes suit against a broad class of defendants does not meet the standard merely because States belong to the class. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, the Rehabilitation Act barred employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds and authorized federal-court suits against those recipients, yet a person wrongly denied state employment had no right to sue the State in federal court. Applying the clear-statement principles strictly, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the action.10
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act shows what clear text looks like. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court recognized that Congress had spoken clearly: the Act subjects the States to its provisions and abrogates their Eleventh Amendment immunity.11 The Act borrows the enforcement provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, § 216(b), which authorizes employee suits against States “in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.” Read with the FLSA’s definition of a public agency to include a State, that provision identifies States as defendants who may be sued.12
The words that choose the forum matter as much as the words that name the defendant. A Utah statute that authorized suit against the State in its own courts, the Court had held, fell short of a clear declaration of consent to suit in federal court; § 216(b) “contains no such ambiguity.”13 Nor did it matter that the clear language reached the ADEA through an amendment to an incorporated provision. The Court has never required Congress to speak with different gradations of clarity depending on how a statute was assembled, and it will not infer ambiguity from the sequence in which a clear textual statement was added.14
Because the inquiry looks to what Congress enacted, silence defeats abrogation.15 In Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations period for a federal claim first filed against a State in federal court, dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and refiled in state court after the period had run, because the statute’s text said nothing about claims against States.
Clear text establishes only that Congress meant to abrogate; it cannot supply a power Congress lacks. The ADEA again shows the difference. It spoke clearly, and the Court still held that Congress could not use section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to support the abrogation, because the abrogation exceeded that power.16 A statute that fails the first question leaves the State immune absent consent. A statute that passes must still find a power.
Fourteenth Amendment Power
A clear statement still needs a source of power, and the Court has found one in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce the guarantees of section 1,18 and the Court has held that it authorizes Congress to abrogate the States’ immunity, beginning with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.19
Fitzpatrick began as a suit by present and retired male employees of Connecticut, who alleged that the State’s retirement plan discriminated against them because of sex in violation of Title VII. Title VII had originally excluded state and local governments, and Congress later amended it to bring them in.20 The Court began where Edelman v. Jordan ended, with the “threshold fact of congressional authorization” to sue the State as employer. It found that fact clearly present, the prerequisite found in Parden and wanting in Employees.21
What separated Fitzpatrick from Parden was the source of power. The authorization in Parden rested on the Commerce Clause; the legislation in Fitzpatrick rested on section 5, and the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified by the States after the Civil War, “quite clearly contemplates limitations on their authority.”22 A later opinion put the point in structural terms. By imposing explicit limits on the States and giving Congress power to enforce them, the Amendment “fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution,” so that when Congress enacts appropriate legislation to enforce it, federal interests are paramount and Congress may assert an authority over the States that the Constitution would otherwise withhold.23
The Amendment supplies the power, but Congress must still use it. Fitzpatrick did not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment negates immunity by its own force; the decision rested on Congress’s express abrogation under section 5. Without a statute, a State is immune even when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not fill the gap, because it does not expressly authorize suits against States and States are not “persons” under it.24
Section 5 is not a blank check. In Kimel the Court held the ADEA’s abrogation invalid even though Congress spoke clearly, because section 5 lets Congress enforce section 1, not define it or decide what violates it. Age is not a suspect class, so a State may draw rational age distinctions, such as a mandatory retirement age for certain employees, without violating the Constitution. A law enacted under section 5 therefore needs congruence and proportionality between the injury Congress seeks to prevent or remedy and the means it adopts, and Congress cannot abrogate merely by announcing that it is enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment; the statute must actually enforce section 1, not redefine it.25 Congress had identified no pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, and so the ADEA failed the test and the States kept their immunity in ADEA cases.26
Congruence and proportionality does not require a statute to parrot the Amendment. Congress’s power to enforce includes the authority to remedy and to deter violations by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including conduct the Amendment’s text does not itself forbid.27 The question is whether the statute’s reach is proportionate to the constitutional wrong Congress identified.
How easily Congress can show that proportion depends on the right at stake. Age and disability classifications receive no heightened review and survive if there is a rational basis for them at a class-based level. A sex-based classification must serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to achieving them, so it is easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.28 That contrast explains the different results in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, a sex-discrimination case in which Congress’s remedy against the States was upheld, and in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. There the Court held ADA damages suits by state employees barred, because disability classifications receive rational-basis review, the history of irrational employment discrimination by the States was inadequate, and Congress therefore lacked section 5 authority to impose a money damages remedy.29
Pointing to a genuine constitutional right does not rescue a statute either. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Congress had expressly abrogated the States’ immunity from patent-infringement suits, and the plaintiff defended the abrogation as protecting a patent holder’s property under the Due Process Clause. The Court held that section 5 did not authorize it.30
Article I Powers
Article I raises the same second question, and the Court has mostly answered it no. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Congress had authorized a tribe to sue a State in federal court under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress no power to authorize that suit and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.33
Seminole Tribe also overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. A plurality there had relied on the notion that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to abrogate; nothing in the Constitution’s text or history supports that conclusion.34 Overruling fits the way the Court treats constitutional precedent: stare decisis is “not an inexorable command” and is “at its weakest” in constitutional cases, where only amendment can alter the Court’s interpretation, and the Court weighs the quality of the decision’s reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, later legal developments, and reliance.35
The reasoning that replaced Union Gas is structural. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction.36 The immunity itself, the Court has said, stems “from the structure of the original Constitution itself,” which incorporated the traditional understanding that a sovereign was not subject to suit without its consent. The Amendment spoke only to the federal judicial power because that was the power Chisholm had construed contrary to the original understanding.37 Hans reflects the same background: a consensus that sovereign immunity, for States as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away.38
That logic holds even where Congress’s authority is at its strongest. Indian commerce lies under the exclusive control of the Federal Government, yet the Eleventh Amendment still prevents Congress from authorizing private suits against unconsenting States in that field. Even complete lawmaking authority over a subject does not carry the power to open a federal courtroom to a damages suit against the State.39 Fitzpatrick isolates the variable. Title VII, as amended, also authorized suits against a State, and the suit survived because the authorization rested on section 5, a power added after the Eleventh Amendment and directed at state authority, which shifted the federal-state balance.40 The Article I powers were granted in the original Constitution, alongside the immunity its structure preserved, and they did not shift that balance.41
Two natural arguments for saving an Article I statute change nothing. A statute limited to prospective relief still authorizes a private suit against a State, and a statute that gives the States some regulatory authority in exchange for their exposure to suit does not alter what Article I can do. In each case the question is whether the statute rests on a power that can abrogate, and Article I is not such a power.42
The other side of the argument has its own pedigree. One concurring opinion in Fitzpatrick maintained that the States surrendered their immunity “in the plan of the Convention,” at least insofar as they granted Congress specifically enumerated powers, so that every enumerated power could carry abrogation with it.43 Both sides invoke Hamilton. Hans read him, together with Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, as right about the Constitution’s design, a view the people confirmed by adopting the Eleventh Amendment.44 Seminole Tribe settled the question for Article I.
Kimel restated the holding: Congress’s powers under Article I do not include the power to subject States to suit at the hands of private individuals. If the ADEA rested solely on the commerce power, the private petitioners could not maintain their suits against their state employers.45 Congress’s power to regulate States and its power to subject them to private damages suits are different powers.
The rule is not confined to federal court. In Alden v. Maine the Court held that Congress lacked Article I authority to require States to answer for FLSA violations in their own courts. It rejected the contention that substantive federal law by its own force overrides the immunity, and it rejected the claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause supplies incidental authority to subject States to private suits.46 Together, Seminole Tribe and Alden mean that Commerce Clause statutes cannot be enforced through private damages suits against unwilling States and their agencies in either federal or state court. Municipalities are unaffected, and federal agencies such as the Department of Labor keep their power to enforce those statutes against States.47
The immunity does not leave federal law unenforceable against States. Individual victims can seek injunctions against state officials under Ex parte Young, the United States can sue nonconsenting States, and Congress can use its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.48 The Ex parte Young route rests on a legal fiction, but it carried Brown v. Board of Education and the other cases protecting individual liberty from state infringement.49 Even there the Court hesitates when Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for enforcing a statutory right against a State.50 These routes are among the exceptions that qualify the Court’s broad reading of the immunity.51 A State can also consent to suit, and consent works through waiver rather than abrogation.52
One Article I power has proved different. In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court held that, under the Article I power to legislate in bankruptcy, Congress may assign the federal courts jurisdiction to proceed against nonconsenting States as defendants in bankruptcy cases. The Court reasoned first that bankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood today and at the time of the framing, is principally in rem jurisdiction.53
The same inquiry governs any federal statute that gives a rights holder a remedy against infringers, patent and copyright alike, when the alleged infringer is a State.54 The first question is whether Congress spoke clearly. The second is whether it acted under a power that can abrogate, and outside bankruptcy that power is generally section 5.