Concept
Challenges Before Enforcement
Ripeness
Challenges Before Enforcement
Ripeness most often arises when a person asks a federal court to review a statute or regulation before anyone has enforced it against her. The traditional way to test a law is to break it and raise the objection as a defense, and that route is unfair to anyone who doubts the law’s validity: she must either obey a rule that may be unconstitutional or violate it and accept punishment if a court upholds it. Denying review on ripeness grounds can force exactly that choice.1 The Court has therefore often declined to dismiss such cases on ripeness-related grounds, pointing to the unfairness of making plaintiffs “bet the farm . . . by taking violative action” to test a law’s validity.2
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner shows the dilemma in a regulatory setting. The drug manufacturers could comply with the new labeling rule only by changing all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials, destroying stocks of printed matter, and investing heavily in new type and supplies; the alternative was to continue their present course and risk serious criminal and civil penalties for distributing “misbranded” drugs.3 The Court found the challenge ripe because it presented a pure question of law, fit for judicial resolution before enforcement, and because the plaintiffs faced substantial hardship.4 This section widens the view from agency regulations to pre-enforcement challenges generally.
Early review has costs of its own. Prosecutors invite courts, in enforcement proceedings, to adopt narrowing interpretations that limit any infringement on constitutional values, and a facial challenge filed beforehand may prevent those interpretations from developing. A suit against a criminal statute that has grown stale through years of nonenforcement may also awaken sleeping dogs that prosecutors would have let lie.5 Declaratory relief is discretionary, too. The extent to which federal courts may use the declaratory judgment procedure to control state action lies in the sound discretion of the Court, and that discretion is a convenient instrument for carrying out the policy against premature constitutional decision.6
Because the costs and benefits of early review pull in opposite directions, the doctrine sorts pre-enforcement plaintiffs by how concrete the threat to them is. Plaintiffs whose link to enforcement is thin, because they have only a general wish to engage in conduct the law might forbid or only a subjective chill, present unripe claims, as the first subsection shows. Plaintiffs who face a credible threat of enforcement, or whose harm from the law’s operation is inevitable, may sue before any penalty arrives, as the second subsection explains.
Vague Plans and Subjective Chill
The plaintiffs with the thinnest connection to enforcement say only that they would like to do something the law might forbid. United Public Workers v. Mitchell is the leading example. Federal employees there challenged the Hatch Act’s limits on their political activity, but the precise nature of their intended activities was unclear, and the Court found “no threat” of interference “beyond that implied by the existence of the law and the regulations.”7 Several plaintiffs were merely planning to take part in campaigns at some future time, and the Court ordered their claims dismissed as unripe.8 “A hypothetical threat is not enough,” the Court wrote; it could “only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their publication.”9
Two reasons explain why a general wish to act falls short. First, the constitutional question depends on the particular act. The Court reached the merits for one employee only after the Commission’s charges and proposed findings and his own admissions defined the issue, and on that record it held that his particular activities could constitutionally support disciplinary action.10 Without comparable specifics for the other plaintiffs, a ruling would have addressed the statute in the abstract. Second, ill-defined controversies pull courts beyond their role: if courts expanded their power to take jurisdiction over “ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues,” the Court warned, they “would become the organ of political theories.”11
The same case shows what a specific plaintiff looks like. One employee had actually violated the Hatch Act and was the target of an administrative proceeding to secure his discharge; as to him the Court found the dispute ripe and reached the merits.12 Ripeness settled only whether the Court would speak, because the employee whose claim was ripe still lost.13 The others failed for want of specificity, not because their theory of invalidity differed. An employee who has already acted supplies the facts most plainly, but a plaintiff who has not yet acted can also present a ripe claim when a defined plan meets a credible threat, as the next subsection shows.
The demand for specifics has a cost, and Justice Douglas, dissenting in Mitchell, thought it too high. He saw in the other plaintiffs’ interest in clarifying their legal obligations a sufficient basis for pre-enforcement review, and many observers agree. Denial of review may force parties to violate a law in order to secure a test of its constitutionality; yet too great a willingness to entertain pre-enforcement challenges may produce premature and perhaps unnecessary litigation.14
Laird v. Tatum presents a different defect: the weakness lay in the claimed injury, not in the plaintiffs’ plans. Relying on Mitchell, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ challenge to Army surveillance did not present a case for resolution by the courts, because it rested mainly on the challengers’ fear of future punitive action based on the results of the surveillance.15 The complaint rested largely on “speculative apprehensiveness that the Army might at some future date misuse the information in some way that would cause harm,” and that apprehension amounted to neither “specific present objective harm” nor a “threat of specific future harm.”16
A subjective chill is a reaction inside the plaintiff. Two people who object equally to a government program may feel its effect differently, so the feeling alone shows neither what the government has done nor what it will do. The injury becomes real only if the Army misuses the information, and that is a contingency, and a claim cannot rest on one. Mitchell and Laird therefore make one demand from two sides. In Mitchell the plaintiffs could not say what they would do, so the court could not tell how the law applied. In Laird the plaintiffs could say what they did, but not what the government had done or would do to them, so the court could not tell whether any harm existed. A plaintiff must be specific about both halves of the controversy: her own conduct and the government’s response.
A chain of contingencies is the same defect in its purest form. In Roe v. Wade, the Does, a married couple, claimed an injury that depended on events that had not occurred: a failure of contraception, a resulting pregnancy, and a wish to end it that the Texas statutes might forbid. Any one of those events might never happen, and all of them might not combine, and the Court affirmed the dismissal of their complaint.
The same demand for a specific, current project applies when an association sues for its members. In Warth v. Seldin, a builders’ association sought prospective relief against a town’s zoning ordinance, but its complaint referred to no specific project of any member that the ordinance or its enforcement currently precluded. It did not allege that any member had applied for a building permit or variance for a current project, and it gave no indication that the town had delayed or thwarted any project. The association therefore had failed to show an injury to its members “of sufficient immediacy and ripeness to warrant judicial intervention.”17 A housing council in the same case had the opposite problem: it had a specific project, Penfield Better Homes, but its complaint did not allege that the project remained viable when suit was filed in 1972 or that the town’s actions still blocked it. However vigorous that controversy once was, it was no longer a live, concrete dispute.18
Warth is chiefly a standing decision, and the injury standard it applies serves both doctrines: abstract injury is not enough, and the threat of injury must be “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”19 The overlap is the subject of the next section, and standing cases show the same concern with the plaintiff’s own injury. When Arizona taxpayers chose to contribute to school tuition organizations, they spent their own money, not money the State had collected from the respondents, and that distinction refuted the respondents’ assertion of standing.20
Steps one and three track the two defects separated above: a plan too undefined for the law to be applied, and an injury that is a reaction instead of a harm. A plaintiff who passes all five steps has a defined plan and an injury grounded in something the government has done or threatened, and the next subsection takes up what makes such a threat credible.
Credible Threats and Inevitable Harm
A plaintiff who has not been arrested, prosecuted, or sued can still present a ripe controversy, and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus gives the governing statement. The Court there identified a recurring question, when the threatened enforcement of a law creates an Article III injury, and answered that a person subject to such a threat need not show an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action.22 The Susan B. Anthony List (SBA) had issued a press release saying that Driehaus’s vote in Congress for the Affordable Care Act was a vote for “taxpayer funded abortion.” The Ohio Elections Commission voted 2 to 1 that probable cause existed to find a violation of the state’s false-statement law, and the Commission dismissed the complaint only after Driehaus lost his reelection campaign.23
The injury-in-fact requirement was nonetheless met, because a plaintiff satisfies it by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute,” together with “a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.”24 Each element has its job. The intended conduct ties the dispute to a particular act; the arguable constitutional interest means that giving up the act would be a real loss; and the credible threat supplies the probability that the government will respond, the first of the ripeness factors.25
No arrest is required because an arrest requirement would force the dilemma described at the start of this section. A plaintiff could test the law only by committing the act she believes protected and waiting for the penalty, choosing between abandoning the conduct and risking punishment under a law that may be invalid. The Court has often refused to dismiss cases for that reason, declining to make plaintiffs “bet the farm” by taking violative action.26 The credibility requirement keeps that logic from swallowing the doctrine. If the law’s existence alone sufficed, anyone covered by a statute could sue, and the Mitchell plaintiffs, who faced no threat of interference “beyond that implied by the existence of the law and the regulations,” show why that cannot be the rule.27
Babette and Alex show where the line falls. Babette, a video store owner who merely hears of an ordinance that might reach her adult videos, has little to fear: the probability that she will be harmed is slight to nonexistent, and her suit is most likely unripe.28 Suppose instead that the local prosecutor warns her that any future rental of those videos will subject her to prosecution, and that a nearby store owner has already been prosecuted for renting the same titles. Although no action has been taken against Babette, her claim is most likely ripe, because the threatened prosecution creates a real controversy in which she must either comply with the law or run the risk of prosecution.29 SBA stood where Babette stands once warned, with an added fact: the Commission had already acted against its press release by finding probable cause that the false-statement law had been violated.30 In the Alex example, a plaintiff twice threatened with arrest faced a threat of prosecution real enough to satisfy standing and ripeness.31 In each setting the government has acted toward the plaintiff, and that separates the plaintiff from someone who merely dislikes a law.
A threat must also be credible in fact, and the plaintiff’s sincere fear does not make it so. Poe v. Ullman, discussed above, shows the other side: the Connecticut contraception statute had gone unenforced for decades, and the Court found the dispute too hypothetical to decide. Set beside Driehaus, Poe shows what credibility consists of. In Poe the State’s own history pointed toward continued inaction; in Driehaus its own conduct pointed the other way, because its commission had already acted. Credibility is therefore measured by what the government has done toward the plaintiff or toward conduct like the plaintiff’s.
A second route to ripeness needs no warning, because the law will operate on the plaintiff whether or not anyone threatens enforcement. The Court has called ripeness “peculiarly a question of timing,” and the phrase matters because delay and contingency are different things.32 A claim is unripe when it depends on an event that may never happen. A delayed event that is all but certain to occur is not a contingency, and the tempting error is to treat a law’s effective date as the moment a claim ripens. The real question is whether the law’s operation on the plaintiff is certain. If it is, waiting cannot make the facts clearer, and the plaintiff keeps absorbing whatever preparation the law demands.
Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan illustrates the rule. A state law prohibited discharging sewage from boats, and officials said they would not enforce it until land-based pump-out facilities were available, which would take time. The Court nonetheless found the challenge ripe, because enforcement was inevitable and boat owners had to begin installing new facilities in anticipation of the day the law took hold. Officials were not enforcing the law when suit was filed in either Lake Carriers or Poe, and that is why the contrast teaches the line. In Poe the long nonenforcement suggested the law might never be applied, so the open question was whether enforcement would ever come. In Lake Carriers the officials’ own announcement said when, not whether, so only timing was open, and the owners were already incurring the costs of preparation, the kind of present hardship Abbott recognized.33
Buckley v. Valeo applied the same reasoning to a challenge to the powers of a federal commission. While the case was pending, the commission began issuing rules under one of its grants of authority. Many of its other functions remained unexercised, but the date of their “all but certain” exercise was closer by several months than when the court of appeals ruled.34 The Court treated the question as one of ripeness, distinct from the jurisdictional limits of Article III, and noted that Congress was most concerned with obtaining a final adjudication of as many issues as possible.35
Present effect is another way a future act matters today. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court rejected an argument that a challenge to Congress’s power to remove the Comptroller General was unripe until Congress used that power. The officer’s presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress, the Court reasoned, creates a “here-and-now subservience” to another branch. The constitutional problem lay in an arrangement that shapes the officeholder’s incentives every day, so nothing more had to happen for it to exist. That feature separates Bowsher from the subjective chill in the previous subsection, where the harm depended on a future act of misuse that might never come.
Two more cases separate a government act that has already changed the plaintiff’s position from one that has not. In Clinton v. City of New York, the President’s cancellation of a statutory provision revived a substantial contingent liability, and the Court held that the cancellation caused an immediate injury even if the ultimate outcome remained speculative, because reviving such a liability “immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.”36 Anderson v. Green came out the other way. A California statute limiting welfare payments to new residents could not take effect without a federal waiver. A waiver had been in effect when the action was filed, but it had been vacated in a separate proceeding that HHS did not appeal, so the plaintiffs were receiving the same benefits as long-term residents and had suffered no injury. Any future injury depended on a new waiver, was purely conjectural, and left the case unripe.37 What distinguishes the two is whether the government’s act had already changed the plaintiff’s legal position.
Steps three through five do the real work. They are where the SBA and the boat owners succeeded and where the plaintiffs in Poe and Anderson failed, and step six guards against overreading the rule: a plaintiff who can name no government act and no certain operation of the law stands where Babette stood before the warning.
Driehaus framed its holding as one about Article III injury, because the Court held that the threat of enforcement of the false-statement statute amounted to an injury in fact.38 That places the credible-threat inquiry near the boundary between ripeness and standing, which the next section examines. Within ripeness itself, the inquiry maps onto the three factors that decide whether a contingent claim is sufficiently ripe: the probability that the predicted harm will take place, the hardship to the parties if immediate review is denied, and the fitness of the record for resolving the legal issues presented.39 A credible threat establishes the first factor, and a plaintiff who must prepare now for a certain law bears the second, which is why the two are so closely related.40
Contingency is not the only ripeness defect. In some settings a claim stays unripe until a prescribed procedure has run. A claimant seeking compensation for a taking must first seek it through the procedures the State provides, and the Court found that requirement met where a state court’s dismissal of the action showed that the inverse condemnation procedure was unavailable.41 Takings cases come up again among the applied settings below.