Concept
Scope of the Right
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power
Scope of the Right
The Nineteenth Amendment makes two commands. Its first sentence forbids the United States and every State to deny or abridge the right of citizens to vote “on account of sex,” and its second gives Congress power to enforce “this article” by appropriate legislation.1 Because the enforcement power is a power to enforce that article, every question about what Congress may do begins with a question about what the article forbids. The prohibition has three elements: action by a government, a denial or abridgment of the vote, and sex as the reason. A court reviewing an enforcement statute needs all three in view before it can tell whether the statute carries out the prohibition.
This unit marks the perimeter in two steps. The first subsection teaches the core, the test for when sex is the reason a government refuses or curtails a vote. The second traces the edges: the tax rules, sex-equality claims, and private conduct that the prohibition leaves to other law.
Sex as a Voter Qualification
Nearly every dispute over the Amendment's core turns on three words, “on account of sex.” A rule that conditions voting on being male is the plain violation, the one the Amendment was written to end. The hard cases involve rules that never mention sex yet seem to fall on one sex, and they need a working test: how tight must the link be between a person's sex and the refusal? The answer comes from the Fifteenth Amendment, which uses the same phrase with race in place of sex. In Leser v. Garnett, the Supreme Court described the Nineteenth Amendment as “in character and phraseology precisely similar to the Fifteenth.”2 The Eleventh Circuit has added that the relationship between voting and race is the most thoroughly discussed in Supreme Court precedent, that but-for causation is clear in that context, and that the same understanding extends to the Nineteenth Amendment's ban on sex-based voter qualifications.3 Justice Douglas, concurring in Baker v. Carr, likewise called sex an impermissible standard by reason of the Nineteenth Amendment.4
The clearest statement of the test appears in Jones v. Governor of Florida, an Eleventh Circuit decision about the Twenty-Fourth Amendment that compared the wording of the voting amendments. The court concluded that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are best understood to forbid any voter qualification that makes race or sex a but-for cause of the denial of the right to vote.5 A but-for cause is a factor without which the denial would not have happened, and the court put the point directly: when a State sets a voter qualification that would allow a person to vote but for the person's race or sex, it violates the Constitution.6 Treat this as persuasive authority from a court of appeals and not as a Supreme Court holding on the Nineteenth Amendment, and check the opinion's subsequent history before relying on it.
The test is a counterfactual: would the person have been allowed to vote if their sex alone were different? That question keeps the inquiry on the one reason the Amendment names. A court need not decide whether a voting rule is wise, or whether it burdens one sex more than the other in some loose sense; it asks only whether sex changed the outcome for this person. And because the question is causal, a rule's wording does not control. What matters is what actually decides the refusal.
The Amendment's wording also limits how far the test travels. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments say “on account of,” while the Twenty-Fourth alone says “by reason of,” and the Eleventh Circuit treated that variation as a sign of a difference in meaning.7 The but-for reading therefore belongs to the “on account of” amendments and should not be carried over to the Twenty-Fourth without more.
A tempting error is to treat every voting rule that happens to keep some woman off the rolls as a Nineteenth Amendment problem. The swap test corrects that instinct, because a rule that applies identically to everyone gives the counterfactual nothing to catch.
The Amendment reaches more than a flat refusal, because it also forbids abridging the vote. A government that lets a woman cast a ballot and then counts it for less has still curtailed her right. Gray v. Sanders, an equal protection decision about weighted votes, makes the point by example: if a State in a statewide election weighted the male vote more heavily than the female vote, “none could successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable.” The same opinion stated that every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once and counted correctly, and that “the right to have one’s vote counted” has the same dignity as “the right to put a ballot in a box.”9 Because the sentence about sex is an illustration inside an equal protection opinion, it supports the abridgment point and is not a Nineteenth Amendment holding. The point still matters, because a ban limited to exclusion could be satisfied by admitting women to the ballot and discounting what they cast. A State that counts every ballot once, whoever cast it, has not abridged the vote on account of sex in this way.
The prohibition also applies in presidential elections. In Williams v. Rhodes, Ohio invoked the power to select presidential electors to justify burdens on voting. The Court answered that a broad grant of power has limits: the taxing power, broad as it is, may not be used to violate the privilege against self-incrimination, and the power to select electors likewise cannot be exercised to violate express constitutional commands that bar States from passing certain kinds of laws. It added that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments were plainly intended to bar the Federal Government and the States from denying the right to vote on grounds of race and sex in presidential elections.10 The case was decided on equal protection grounds, so that remark is reasoning and not a holding, but it matches a text that names no category of election and binds the United States and every State.11
Finally, the text speaks of sex and not of women, and the Court has read it that way: the Amendment applies to men and women alike and by its own force supersedes inconsistent measures, whether federal or state.12 The swap test therefore runs in both directions. A rule limiting the ballot to women fails it for a man in the same way a men-only rule fails it for a woman. The one man who pressed such a claim in the Supreme Court lost for reasons that have nothing to do with his sex, and the next subsection explains why.
What the Amendment Leaves Alone
The three elements of the prohibition (government action, a denial or abridgment of the vote, and sex as the reason) also mark where it stops. Three kinds of claims fall outside: a tax rule that touches voters without turning on sex, a claim of sex inequality that has nothing to do with the ballot, and conduct by a private actor. The boundaries matter beyond this subsection, because Congress's power is a power to enforce “this article,” and the article contains only the prohibition just described.14
The Court drew the first boundary in Breedlove v. Suttles, which asked whether a tax rule that burdens voters violates the Amendment merely because it treats the sexes differently. Georgia required payment of a poll tax before registration, and the tax made an exception for nonvoting women.15 A man who had to pay argued that the scheme abridged men's right to vote on account of sex. The Court rejected the claim. By exacting payment before registration, it held, the right to vote is neither denied nor abridged on account of sex, and it is fanciful to suggest that the Georgia law was a disguise for denying men the vote.16 The Court added that the Amendment's purpose is not to regulate the levy or collection of taxes, and that the challenger's reading would turn it into a limit on the power to tax.17
The reasoning follows from what the Amendment names. Its text identifies a forbidden reason, sex, and identifies no subject area such as taxation. A payment rule therefore enters its territory only when the rule works to deny or curtail the vote on account of sex, and the Court found no such design or effect in the Georgia scheme. Treating every tax difference between men and women as an abridgment would have converted a ban on sex-based exclusion from the ballot into a general restraint on state revenue systems, a role the Amendment's words do not give it. A rule that says women may not register is a denial on account of sex. A rule that says a voter must pay a levy is a different kind of rule, and the Amendment's single reason does not reach it.
Be precise about what Breedlove still supports. Its poll-tax holding was overruled in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, and the Eleventh Circuit notes the overruling when it discusses the case.18 That court nonetheless treats Leser and Breedlove together as confirming that the Nineteenth Amendment operates just like the Fifteenth.19 What survives is the description of how the Amendment operates and its focus on sex as the forbidden reason. A poll tax is no longer tested under the Nineteenth Amendment, and an answer that cites Breedlove for the validity of poll taxes states a rule that is no longer law.
The second boundary concerns subject matter. The Amendment names a single right and a single forbidden reason, and nothing in its text resembles the general equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 Claims of sex discrimination outside the franchise, such as exclusion from jury service or from an occupation, therefore have to be framed as equal protection claims. That framework has its own machinery. The Court has not confined heightened scrutiny to race,21 and classifications by alienage, like those by race or nationality, are generally treated as suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.22 The Fourteenth Amendment also protects all persons within the jurisdiction, citizens and aliens alike, while the Nineteenth speaks only of the voting right of “citizens.”23
The sex-equality cases show the division of labor. In Frontiero v. Richardson, a four-Justice plurality would have treated sex classifications as suspect, and it mentioned the Nineteenth Amendment only as history, noting that women were denied even the right to vote until its adoption.24 The Court did not adopt the plurality's position, and sex classifications are now reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, as an equal protection matter.
The third boundary appears on the face of the Amendment, which restrains “the United States” and “any State” and says nothing about private persons.26 Governments write voter qualifications and run public elections, and the Amendment protects the right of citizens to vote against them. A private organization that sets its own internal rules is not a government denying anyone's right to vote in that sense, so the text supplies no ground for reaching it.
If a State had written the same restriction into a statute governing the election of public officers, the first element would be met and the analysis would change.
These three limits carry directly into the enforcement questions that follow. A claim that lacks any one of the Amendment's elements lies outside the prohibition, and Congress's power is a power to enforce that prohibition. A statute aimed at state tax systems generally, at jury service, or at the internal elections of private associations would have to explain how it enforces this article.