Concept
Finding State Action
State action
Finding State Action
The Fourteenth Amendment restrains only government, so a plaintiff who sues a restaurant owner, a utility, or a civil litigant must show that the defendant’s conduct is, in law, the government’s conduct. Government defendants need no such showing. An official who acts within the ostensible scope of official authority acts under color of law, even when the act is unconstitutional.1 Attribution becomes the question when the defendant looks private, and the answer draws a boundary: private persons keep their freedom to choose, and the state answers only for conduct that is fairly its own.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority models the inquiry. A privately run restaurant leased space in a parking building that a state agency owned and maintained. The Court found a symbiotic relationship, because the state received rent and shared in the benefits of the restaurant’s operation, and it held that the restaurant’s racial discrimination was attributable to the state and subject to the Equal Protection Clause.
Different facts produce different answers. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., a heavily regulated electric utility, alleged to hold a monopoly, ended a customer’s service under its own general terms, and the Court found no state action: regulation and monopoly status, without more direct state involvement, did not make the utility’s decision the state’s.2 In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., a private civil litigant used peremptory challenges to strike jurors, and the Court found state action, because peremptory challenges have no significance outside a court of law and exist to help the government select an impartial trier of fact.3 In each case the result turned on how the defendant’s conduct connected to government. The label “private” settled nothing.
The next subsection explains why the Court has declined to reduce those connections to one formula. The subsection after it presents the two-part approach the Court uses to organize the inquiry.
No Single Test
Burton also explains why no formula exists. Only by “sifting facts and weighing circumstances” can the nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct be given its true significance. For that reason, the Court said, fashioning and applying a precise formula for state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an “impossible task” that it had never attempted.4
The reason lies in the subject. The state’s laws of property, contract, and tort underlie every private activity, and the state is often a regulator or funder through contracts, subsidies, or tax benefits.5 A test that counted any such link would sweep in nearly every business and erase the private sphere. A test that listed only a few qualifying links would miss cases in which the government’s role is real but indirect. The question therefore cannot be whether private action connects to the state. It is whether the state’s involvement has risen above a neutral baseline, and judges differ in how they picture that baseline.6
The Court frames that question as one of responsibility for a particular act. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. asked whether there is “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action” of the regulated entity, so that its action may fairly be treated as the state’s own.7 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association later put the critical question as whether “the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”8 The word specific carries the weight. A lease, a subsidy, or a regulatory regime ties the state to the defendant’s business generally, but the plaintiff’s complaint concerns one act, such as a refusal of service or a termination, and the state answers for that act only if it stands behind it. This reading keeps a general relationship with government from turning every decision the actor makes into a state decision. It also separates the nexus inquiry, which asks whether the conduct is so closely related to the government’s that the choice to undertake it may fairly be called the state’s, from the symbiotic-relationship approach, which looks to the parties’ overall relationship. Courts sometimes use the two labels interchangeably.9
Jackson itself shows the inquiry coming out against attribution. A private electric utility, extensively regulated by the state and alleged to hold a monopoly, ended a customer’s service under its own general rules, and no state order was aimed at that customer.10 The Court found the connection too thin. Regulation does not by itself convert a business’s action into the state’s, however extensive and detailed the regulation, and a monopoly, assumed for argument’s sake, did not decide the case because the termination bore little relationship to the monopoly status.11 The Court allowed that a heavily regulated utility with some protected monopoly may more readily be found a state actor than a business lacking those features. Those features improve the plaintiff’s chances without answering the question.12
Jackson also closed a second route to attribution. Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion noted that the Court had found state action in a private entity’s exercise of powers “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,” and it found none here, because supplying utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. Justice Marshall’s dissent answered that utility service is a public function, since the state invariably either provides the service itself or permits private companies to act as state surrogates.13 The next sections return to that argument.
Both the commission’s order and Jackson involve a regulated private utility and a customer who loses service. They differ in where the choice originated. In the commission’s order, the state made the decision and the company carried it out. In Jackson, the utility made its own decision inside a regulatory setting. A state that commands an act answers for it, and the command may arrive as a statute: a state is responsible for discrimination a private party commits while acting under the requirements of state law, as when a restaurant owner is required by state law to refuse service to minorities.14 A state that only licenses or regulates the actor leaves the choice with the private actor, and the choice stays the actor’s own. Involvement short of command can also suffice. Under the entanglement exception, the Constitution applies when the government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct that violates it, and the later sections on state involvement develop what counts.15
The cases are hard to reconcile, and the reasons are historical as well as conceptual. Through the 1960s the Court defined state action broadly, with racial discrimination in view, and the principles it announced then were wide enough to reach a great deal of private conduct. Burton, decided in 1961, belongs to that period. Since the 1960s, especially in cases involving constitutional provisions other than equal protection, the Court has applied a much narrower definition.16 It has seldom overruled the earlier decisions; it has distinguished or reinterpreted them, which leaves tension among the cases and some room for interpretive flexibility.17 The pressure to stretch the Constitution has also eased, since Congress and the states have legislated against much private discrimination. The disputes now more often ask whether private actors must give employees or customers a hearing, a setting in which federal judicial intervention seems less called for.18
The third step does the real work. The usual mistake is to stop at the observation that the state is involved somewhere. Regulation, licensing, and funding appear in nearly every case and prove little until they are tied to the act under challenge. A strong answer states the nexus question, identifies who made the decision to do the challenged act, and shows which landmark case the facts resemble.
The Lugar Two-Part Approach
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. reduced the attribution question to two parts. Its premise is that most rights the Constitution secures protect against infringement by governments only, so the conduct that allegedly causes a deprivation must be fairly attributable to the state. Without that limit, a private party would face constitutional litigation whenever it invoked a state rule. The first part asks whether the deprivation was caused by the exercise of a right or privilege the state created, or by a rule of conduct that the state, or a person for whom the state is responsible, imposed. The second part asks whether the party charged with the deprivation “may fairly be said to be a state actor,” which can be true because the party is a state official, because the party acted together with or obtained significant aid from state officials, or because the party’s conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.21
The facts of Lugar show how the parts operate. An oil company suing a debtor in Virginia state court obtained, under a state statute, a prejudgment writ of attachment, a court order seizing some of the debtor’s property before any judgment had been entered.22 The creditor sought the writ by an ex parte petition, a filing made without notice to the debtor, alleging that the debtor might dispose of the property to defeat creditors. A court clerk issued the writ, and the county sheriff executed it. The debtor then sued the creditor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that gives a remedy for constitutional deprivations committed under color of state law, and alleged that the creditor had acted jointly with the State to take his property without due process.23 The Court found state action, by a vote of five to four.24
The first part sorts a debtor’s complaints by what the state actually did. A debtor in Lugar’s position can attack two different things. An attack on the attachment scheme itself targets a right the state created, since the statute gave the creditor the power to obtain a seizure on an ex parte filing, so the first part is satisfied for that claim. A complaint that the creditor abused the process on its own initiative targets something the state neither created nor imposed, because the abuse was the product of the creditor’s independent action, so the first part fails for that claim.25 The Court drew the same line: private misuse of a state statute is conduct that cannot be attributed to the State, while the procedural scheme the statute creates is the product of state action and is subject to constitutional restraints.26 The first part thus ties the harm to something the state really did, and it keeps the state from answering for a private party’s independent wrongdoing.
Once the challenge targets the scheme, the second part asks whether this defendant stands close enough to the state to be treated as its agent. The creditor in Lugar was no official, yet a clerk issued the writ and a sheriff executed it at the creditor’s request. A private party’s joint participation with state officials in seizing disputed property makes that party a state actor, and invoking the aid of state officials to use state-created attachment procedures suffices when the state has built a system under which officials attach property on one party’s ex parte application.27 The creditor did more than rely on a permission. It set the state’s machinery in motion, and officials took the debtor’s property because it asked them to.
A warehouse sale produces the opposite result on the second part. In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, a warehouse operator proposed to sell a customer’s stored goods under a state statute that permitted private sales, and the Court found no state action. The first part was met, since the operator’s right to sell existed because state law conferred it. The second part failed: the operator was no official, no official took part in the sale, and the state’s creation of the right was not enough without a more affirmative showing of state complicity.28 The Court distinguished Lugar on exactly that ground. The warehouse remedy could be exercised with no state official intervening, while the attachment writ was issued and executed by officials.29 Both creditors reached a debtor’s property under authority that state law supplied, so the hinge is whether an official acted.
The two parts are conjunctive, so a claim must satisfy both. The abuse-of-process theory in Lugar ends at the first part: once the deprivation cannot be traced to anything the state created or imposed, a court need not ask whether the creditor is a state actor.30 Flagg Bros. shows the converse. A state-created right satisfied the first part, and the claim still failed at the second. Each part guards against a different overreach. The first keeps the state from answering for a private party’s independent wrongs. The second keeps the doctrine from reaching every private act that rests on state property, contract, or tort law, which describes nearly everything private people do. If a state-created right alone sufficed, constitutional litigation would follow whenever a private party relied on a state rule.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. shows the approach at work. The Court began within the Lugar framework and found the first part satisfied beyond question: peremptory challenges have no significance outside a court of law, and their sole purpose is to permit litigants to assist the government in selecting an impartial trier of fact.31 For the second part, it examined three considerations: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, whether the actor performs a traditional governmental function, and whether the injury is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.32 Because both parts leave wide latitude for subjective judgment, results under Lugar vary with the facts, the policy concerns a court finds salient, and judicial philosophy. They varied in the same way under the older, more compartmentalized categories.33 The next sections take up those categories: traditional public function, public-private symbiosis, and official involvement.34
Two cautions follow from the steps. A state-created right satisfies only the first part, so a student who stops there reaches the wrong answer in Flagg Bros.; the remaining question is whether an official acted. And a complaint about the private party’s own misuse of a state procedure fails at the second step, before the defendant’s status is ever considered.