Concept
The Fundamental Rights Threshold
Privileges and Immunities Clauses
The Fundamental Rights Threshold
The Comity Clause promises the citizens of each state “all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”1 The Court does not read “all” literally. Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that the Nation is composed of individual states, and the clause permits them. Others hinder the formation, purpose, or development of a single Union, and the clause forbids them.2 Only privileges “bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity” must be shared equally by residents and nonresidents alike.3
A claimant who has cleared the citizenship stage therefore faces a second gate with two parts. The interest the state's law touches must be fundamental in this national sense, and the law's burden on the out-of-stater must be significant. The three subsections below follow that sequence: which privileges qualify, where the Court has drawn limits around recreation and public employment, and how heavy the burden must be.
The word “fundamental” also appears in due process and equal protection, where it marks the rights that trigger strict scrutiny, but the two inquiries differ. The regulation of conditions of employment is not a fundamental-rights problem in those doctrines, yet the ability to engage in private-sector work is protected under Article IV.4 On an exam, never carry a conclusion from one doctrine to the other on the strength of the shared label.
Privileges That Qualify
The clause does not list the privileges it protects, so the Court has relied on an early circuit opinion. In Corfield v. Coryell, the first case to construe the clause, Justice Bushrod Washington described the protected interests as those that are “fundamental” and that “belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments.”5 His examples fall under five heads, and the Supreme Court has endorsed them:6
- The right to pass through or travel in a state.
- The right to reside in a state for business or other purposes.
- The right to do business there, whether in trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.
- The right to take, hold, and dispose of property, real or personal.
- The right to an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than the state's own citizens pay.
Read literally, that list invites the argument that any advantage a state gives its residents belongs on it. The Court has answered with a limiting gloss. In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, it said that the activity in question must be “sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation,” and that a state must treat residents and nonresidents equally “[o]nly with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.”7
The gloss follows from the clause's purpose. Every head on the Corfield list describes something a person does to travel, settle, or earn a living in another state, and a state free to close those doors to outsiders could wall off its share of the national market. The gloss turns the list from an inventory into a test: a claimed interest qualifies when denying it to outsiders would damage the Nation's economic and civic unity. An interest that matters greatly to the claimant but leaves that unity untouched falls outside the clause.
The decided cases fall into two settings. In one, a state discriminates against out-of-staters with regard to constitutional rights. In the other, it discriminates with regard to important economic activities, most often the ability to earn a livelihood. Where the discrimination involves neither, the Court has refused to apply the clause.8 In Saenz v. Roe, the Court summarized the clause's protections for nonresidents who enter a state to obtain employment, as in Hicklin v. Orbeck, to procure medical services, as in Doe v. Bolton, or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, as in Toomer v. Witsell. Those protections are not absolute: the clause bars discrimination “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.”9
Toomer shows the livelihood cases at their plainest. The Court recalled that one privilege the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State, and it found that South Carolina “plainly and frankly discriminates against non-residents,” with an effect so great that it was “virtually exclusionary.”10 Private-sector employment belongs on the list for the same reason. Like other commercial activity, it is essential to the economic vitality of the Nation.11
The practice of law shows the test applied to a licensed profession. In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, a nonresident who passed the state's bar examination was refused admission because the state limited its bar to residents. The Court held that the practice of law qualifies as a privilege because, like the occupations in earlier cases, it is important to the national economy. It added that out-of-state lawyers often represent people who raise unpopular federal claims, so nonresident counsel is sometimes the only way to vindicate those rights. The clause reaches only privileges bearing on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity,12 so showing that law practice qualifies was the claimant's first step, not the last. The state's asserted justifications still had to survive the substantial-reason inquiry, and they did not.
The list also reaches a traveler who is not working at all. In Doe v. Bolton, Georgia prohibited out-of-staters from obtaining abortions in the state, and the Court held that the clause protects the right to enter a state seeking the medical services available there. A state therefore may not limit to its own residents the general medical care available within its borders.13 The Court reasoned by analogy to people who enter other states to ply a trade. The Georgia law also discriminated across all medical facilities, public and private, and that breadth matters, because a state has more room to favor its own residents in distributing public resources, a point taken up in the later section on state-owned resources.14
The Court has added to the Corfield list only occasionally, and it has refused to add access to public records. In McBurney v. Young, Virginia's freedom-of-information law gave only Virginia citizens a right to inspect public records. The Court held that the clause does not embrace a right to access public information on equal terms with citizens. Freedom-of-information laws are “of relatively recent vintage,” the Court observed, and nobody contended that the Nation's unity foundered in their absence or suffers now because some states keep their records laws citizens-only. It therefore found no right “basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union.”15 Doe and McBurney show what a claimant must supply to win a new addition to the list: an analogy to a recognized head, or evidence that denying the interest to outsiders damages the Union. The medical-care claim had the first, and the records claim had neither.
The right of an out-of-stater to carry a firearm illustrates step four. In Bach v. Pataki, the Second Circuit considered a New York handgun licensing scheme open only to residents and to people whose principal employment was in the state. The court ruled that even if carrying a firearm were a protected privilege, the scheme did not violate the clause, and it rested its decision on the state's justification. The threshold question therefore stayed open.
Recreation and Public Employment
The Court has described the clause as protecting economic interests, chiefly the ability to earn a livelihood, together with civil liberties, and it has held that discrimination against out-of-staters in other areas is not prohibited.17 Two limits show how that reading works: recreation, and work for the government itself.
The recreation limit comes from Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Commission. Montana required a nonresident to buy a combination license that included elk, and the nonresident paid 7½ times what a resident paid for the same privileges. A nonresident who wanted to hunt only elk paid 25 times what a resident paid.18 The nonresident hunters who sued said the schedule denied them equal treatment under Article IV, § 2, and the Court disagreed. Elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is “a recreation and a sport,” it is not a means to the nonresident's livelihood, and equality in access to Montana elk is “not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union.”19
The Court's reasoning shows why recreation falls outside a clause built around a national economy. The sport is costly and open mainly to wealthy nonresidents or to those devoted enough to sacrifice other values for it, and the hunter seeks the animal and the trophy, not income. The hunters could not claim they were deprived of a means of livelihood or of access to any part of the state. The Court also stressed that the elk supply is finite and was entrusted to the state's care by the people of Montana.20 The result generalizes: a state may attach residency or citizenship requirements to recreational hunting and fishing, because those activities are not fundamental Article IV privileges.21
The contrast with Toomer marks the line. Commercial shrimp fishing is a means of livelihood and is protected,22 while sport hunting for elk is not. A nonresident who depends on an activity for income can invoke the guarantee of doing business in another state on terms of substantial equality,23 and a nonresident who pursues it for pleasure cannot.
The second limit turns on who the employer is. United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden applied the livelihood principle to government-funded work.25 The Camden ordinance required that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors on city construction projects be Camden residents.26 The Court found the ability to seek employment with private construction companies working on projects funded with state or city dollars to be a matter of fundamental concern. It also held that the city's merely setting conditions on its expenditures in the marketplace does not preclude a violation.27 The Court rejected the claim of a market-participant exemption and remanded the case.28
The city's own workforce is a different matter. A requirement that city employees be city residents violates neither the right to travel nor equal protection. When a state or city reserves a share of publicly funded construction jobs for bona fide city residents, it faces no dormant commerce clause violation, because it is acting as a market participant. Article IV, by contrast, does review a state or city effort to bias private employment decisions by pressuring or requiring contractors on publicly funded projects to favor residents.29 Lower courts have treated direct government employment as outside the clause. In Salem Blue Collar Workers Association v. City of Salem, the Third Circuit held that government employment is not a privilege or immunity protected by Article IV, § 2.
The line fits the clause's purpose. A residency quota on a private contractor's crew reaches into the commercial market where nonresidents compete for work, and review under Article IV protects harmony among the residents of the several states and the vitality of the Nation as a single Union.30
Clearing the threshold does not decide the case for the contractor's worker. Camden was remanded, the standard of review was left unclear, and the Court said the city must make a factual record showing a “substantial reason” for the difference in treatment.31 The justification inquiry has its own section below.
Significant Burden Requirement
A law that touches a fundamental privilege does not automatically trigger Article IV, § 2.33 The first question asks what kind of activity the law affects, and the second asks how heavily the law presses on the out-of-stater who engages in it. The added burden must be significant. The clause guarantees the privilege of doing business in another state on terms of substantial equality with its citizens,34 and substantial equality tolerates small differences by definition. In McBurney the Court made the point directly: the clause does not require a state to erase every distinction between citizens and noncitizens that might give its citizens some detectable advantage.
A reading that tolerated no difference would turn the clause into a code of uniform treatment, and judges would have to review every fee schedule, filing procedure, and convenience a state offers its own people. The clause was written for a narrower danger, the erection of barriers that divide the national market. A nonresident who can reach the same result by a longer road has met no such barrier.
McBurney shows the line from the side of the claimant who loses. Virginia's Freedom of Information Act gave a right to inspect public records only to Virginia citizens. A nonresident whose business was gathering property records for clients was refused and argued that the refusal abridged his privilege to own and transfer property on equal terms with Virginians. The Court rejected the claim on the size of the burden: virtually all the records he wanted could be obtained by other means, and the fact that those means were somewhat more cumbersome and costly did not amount to a significant burden on his ability to own or transfer property. Property is one of the Corfield heads,35 so the claim failed at the burden step, not on the nature of the interest.
Toomer sits at the other end of the range. South Carolina's discrimination against nonresident shrimpers was so great that its practical effect was “virtually exclusionary.”36 No alternative route remained for a nonresident to fish commercially in those waters. The contrast measures the requirement: the question is whether the law materially impairs the out-of-stater's ability to participate in the state's economy. A near-total bar plainly does, while a detour that costs some extra time and money does not.
The hard exam question is the difference that falls between those poles.
A modest differential can therefore fall on a protected interest and still fail this requirement, because the test asks whether the difference meaningfully impairs the out-of-stater's ability to compete, not merely whether any difference exists.
The burden inquiry stands apart from the question whether the interest is fundamental, and a complete answer resolves each in turn. A heavy burden cannot rescue a claim at the first question: the elk hunters earlier in this chapter paid many times the resident fee and lost because hunting for sport is recreation. A fundamental interest cannot rescue a claim at the second: the records-seeker in McBurney invoked a protected interest and lost because the alternative routes left his ability to own and transfer property essentially intact. Either failure ends the Article IV analysis before the state is asked to justify the law. Only a significant burden on a protected interest puts the state to its proof, and then the state must show that nonresidents in fact pose the unique evils attributed to them.37 That justification is the subject of the substantial-reason section below.