Concept
The Sherbert Test
Free exercise
The Sherbert Test
The Free Exercise Clause bars any law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, but its text does not say what a court should do when a law that applies to everyone collides with one person’s religious practice.1 Sherbert v. Verner answered that question by requiring the state to show a “compelling state interest” before it could burden a believer in this way.2 That answer governed free exercise claims for twenty-seven years, until Smith displaced it in 1990.3
The test has two steps. The claimant must first show that government has placed a significant burden on a sincere religious practice. The government must then show a compelling interest and that no alternative form of regulation would serve it.4 Sherbert’s own facts, and the cases that followed, show how each step works and why denials of unemployment compensation were the claims that won.
Step One: Substantial Burden
The clearest free exercise violation needs no test. Smith itself observed that a state would be “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion if it banned acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, and that it would doubtless be unconstitutional to ban the casting of statues used for worship or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.5 Sherbert raised a subtler problem, because the South Carolina statute never mentioned religion. Facial neutrality is no safe harbor in every case, since the Court later said that “facial neutrality is not determinative.”6 But the Sherbert claim never turned on hostility. It turned on the burden that a neutral rule placed on a believer.7
The claimant, a Seventh-day Adventist, lost her job with a South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her faith, and she could not find other work because her conscientious scruples ruled out Saturday work. The state’s unemployment statute required a claimant to be “able to work and . . . available for work,” and it made her ineligible if she failed, “without good cause,” to accept available suitable work.8
No law prohibited her Saturday observance. The Court nonetheless found a significant burden, because the statute conditioned unemployment insurance on her willingness to forgo conduct her religion required.9 The first step therefore asks about the pressure on the believer, and it does not require a criminal sanction.
The change from the earlier approach was real. Under Braunfeld v. Brown, a state that imposed only an indirect burden on religious conduct faced just marginal limits: if it used reasonable means to reach a secular objective, and no alternative would achieve the same end as effectively, the regulation was valid however severe the burden.10 The dissents of Justices Brennan and Stewart in Braunfeld had pointed toward a different course for free exercise adjudication, and in Sherbert Justice Brennan asked instead whether the state could justify the burden.11
A claimant who cannot show this kind of pressure loses at the first step, however heavy the practical effect on religious life. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Court declined to apply Sherbert analysis to government logging and road construction on land that several tribes used for religious purposes, although it was undisputed that the activities “could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices.”12 The road conditioned no tribal member’s benefit on forgoing religiously required conduct, and that conditioning was what the unemployment denials did.13 Sherbert’s own loss was modest by the dissent’s count: temporary benefits, a fraction of regular weekly wages, running no more than 22 weeks.14 The size of the loss did not decide the first step. What decided it was whether the rule pressed the believer to forgo conduct her religion required.
Step Two: Compelling Interest
Once the claimant shows a burden, the state must justify it, and the justification is demanding. Justice Brennan was not satisfied that the statute reasonably served a secular interest. He required the government to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” and that “no alternative forms of regulation” would suffice.15 Yoder later compressed the standard into one sentence: “only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” Even a strong interest such as universal compulsory education, the Court added, is “by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.”16
The formula has two parts. “Highest order” sets the weight of the interest the state must claim. “Not otherwise served” is the least restrictive means requirement: government must show that burdening religion is the least restrictive way to achieve its compelling interest.17 The inquiry runs at the level of the claimant. The question is what it would cost the state to exempt this claimant, and others similarly situated, while leaving the law in force in other cases. If the exemption would cause no serious harm, it is a less restrictive means and the burden fails.18
South Carolina’s showing in Sherbert illustrates how a state fails. Even if the state could establish an interest in avoiding fraudulent claims by persons who feign a religious objection to Saturday work, it made no showing that alternative forms of regulation were unavailable to combat that abuse.19 A state that fears feigned objections must explain why it cannot meet the risk by some narrower means than denying benefits to every Sabbath observer. Testing whether a claimant’s objection is sincere, the inquiry described in the earlier section, is one candidate.
A state can win at this step when an exemption would defeat the program it protects. In United States v. Lee, an Amish employer with several Amish workers refused to pay Social Security tax because “the Amish believe it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and needy and therefore are religiously opposed to the national social security system.” The Amish had an excellent record of caring for their elderly without federal help.20 The Court accepted that the law significantly burdened a sincerely held belief, yet it held that denying the exemption was “essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.” Mandatory and continuous participation was vital to the system’s integrity, “it would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs,” and an exception would be hard to cabin, because the tax system could not function if denominations could challenge it on the ground that tax payments were spent in violation of their beliefs.21 One account reads the Court as reasoning that allowing any exemption would unravel the entire system.22
Sherbert and Lee therefore differ at the second step, not the first. Both claimants held sincere beliefs and faced a significant burden. In Sherbert the state could not show that no alternative to denial was available, while in Lee the Court accepted that exemptions could not be confined.23
Why Unemployment Cases Won
In Smith the Court tallied the results. Three times it had invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned benefits on a willingness to work under conditions forbidden by the claimant’s religion: Sherbert, Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission. It had never invalidated any other governmental action under the Sherbert test. Where it purported to apply the test elsewhere, as in Lee and Gillette, it always found the test satisfied, and in recent years it had abstained from applying the test outside the unemployment field at all.24
Hobbie shows how firmly the principle held. A Seventh-day Adventist was discharged because she refused to work certain scheduled hours on Friday night and Saturday, and the Court set aside the denial of her unemployment compensation. It did not matter that she had embraced her faith after she began the job. She still faced the coercive choice between faith and employment that Sherbert had struck down.25 Claims outside the unemployment field fared worse. The Court rejected, by a 5-4 vote, the challenge of an Orthodox Jewish Air Force psychologist who said his religion required him to wear a yarmulke in violation of the dress code in Goldman v. Weinberger.26
The unemployment systems favored claimants for a structural reason. Their eligibility rules asked whether a claimant had failed to accept suitable work “without good cause,” so officials already weighed each claimant’s reasons.27 In Smith the Court read the unemployment cases to stand for the proposition that where a state has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of “religious hardship” without compelling reason.28 Church of Lukumi later made the same point in terms of general applicability: a law is not generally applicable if it creates a mechanism for individualized exemptions, and the government may not refuse to extend that system to religious hardships without a compelling reason.29 The Sherbert dissent saw the same feature and objected to it. The holding, it said, required the state to “single out” for financial assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though the state denied assistance to others whose identical behavior is not religiously motivated.30
The test met a second limit when a claimant challenged a criminal prohibition. Sherbert itself distinguished earlier decisions that had allowed regulation of religiously prompted acts, observing that the conduct regulated in them had invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.31 Smith later observed that the Court had sometimes used the Sherbert test to examine challenges to such across-the-board criminal laws but had never applied it to invalidate one, and it described the unemployment decisions as having nothing to do with such prohibitions.32 By then the test’s most reliable victories had come in unemployment cases. Smith’s answer was that a neutral law of general applicability no longer receives strict scrutiny merely because it burdens a religious practice, and that heightened scrutiny is available only when the claimant also asserts the infringement of a separate fundamental right.33 The section on Smith takes up that holding.
The unemployment states lost at the third and fourth steps, where they offered a fear of fraud without showing that alternatives were unavailable. Lyng ended at the threshold, because the Court declined to apply the Sherbert analysis. Lee ended at the third and fourth steps, where the Court accepted that exemptions could not be confined.