Concept
Meaning of the Clause
Establishment
The Establishment Clause
Meaning of the Clause
The Establishment Clause opens the First Amendment’s treatment of religion: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 Its working core comes from Everson v. Board of Education, where the Court said that neither a state nor the federal government may set up a church, aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.2 The Fourteenth Amendment makes that bar binding on the states,3 and the Court applies it no less to acts that favor religion generally.4 This section takes the core in order: what the text reaches, why it binds state officials, what neutrality demands among sects and between belief and nonbelief, and what the Clause is for. The purposes come last because the tests in the following sections are instruments for serving them.
The Text and Its Reach
The phrase “respecting an establishment of religion” reaches well past the creation of an official church. Everson’s list begins with setting up a church, but it moves at once to laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another, and it adds that government may neither force nor influence a person to go to or stay away from church, or to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.5 No person may be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, or for church attendance or nonattendance.6
Two more items on the list concern money and control. No tax in any amount, large or small, may be levied to support religious activities or institutions, whatever they are called and whatever form they take.7 And neither government may, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group, nor may a religious group participate in the affairs of government.8 The second idea drove Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, where a statute let a church veto liquor licenses for premises near it and the Court held that the arrangement entangled the church in an exercise of governmental power.
The school-prayer cases show the reach in operation. The modern Court has consistently held that public schools may not conduct religious exercises, and Engel v. Vitale held that the Clause forbade having students recite aloud, every school day, a short prayer composed by state appointees, even though the prayer was meant to be nondenominational.9 The Court reasoned that “it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people.”10 A prayer meant to favor no denomination still fell, so the violation could not have depended on denominational preference.
A law can also fail without sponsoring worship or paying for it. In Lemon v. Kurtzman the Court concluded that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each state involved excessive entanglement between government and religion, and it measured that relationship by examining the character and purposes of the institutions benefited, the nature of the aid, and the resulting relationship between government and religious authority.11 The same inquiry can come out differently when the facts change. For church-related colleges, the Court reasoned that students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that college courses by their nature limit sectarian influence, and that religion is therefore less likely than in primary and secondary schools to permeate secular education. The risk that aid will support religious activity falls, and so does the need for intensive government surveillance, which lessens the entanglement.12
Application to the States
The First Amendment’s words restrain only Congress, yet the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment made the establishment-of-religion clause applicable as a prohibition against the states.14 Everson’s list therefore binds state governments, and the Court describes the First Amendment’s ban as “made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth.”15 The route ran through free exercise first. Cantwell v. Connecticut suggested that the Establishment Clause was likewise incorporated, and the Court so ruled in 1947 in Everson.16
The result is that state action meets the same test as federal action. In McCollum v. Board of Education the Court declined to distinguish or overrule Everson’s incorporation holding, and it held that a state may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, use its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in disseminating their doctrines and ideals.17
Incorporating this Clause invites an objection that incorporating Free Exercise does not: an anti-establishment command restrains government, so it looks less like a liberty of persons. The Court’s answer is that the Establishment Clause protects liberty too. Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, explained that the Clause is “a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty,” and that the framers “did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone.”18 Justice Thomas, concurring in Van Orden v. Perry, has argued that the history and text of the Clause resist the idea that it was incorporated against the states.19 Current doctrine applies the Clause to the states, so that view is a critique and not the law. The last section of this chapter returns to it.
Neutrality Among Sects
Government violates the Establishment Clause if it discriminates among religious groups, and the discrimination survives only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.21 The Court has called this the clearest command of the Clause: one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.22 Larson v. Valente is the model case. Minnesota imposed registration and reporting requirements on charitable organizations but exempted religious institutions that received more than half of their financial support from members’ contributions, and the Court declared the law unconstitutional.23
Justice Brennan explained the disparity. The provision distinguished well-established churches that had achieved strong but not total financial support from their members from churches that are new and lacking in a constituency, or that favor public solicitation over reliance on member support.24 Because the law discriminated on the basis of religion, the Court applied strict scrutiny. The state had a compelling interest in protecting citizens from abusive solicitation, but it had not shown that the fifty percent rule was closely fitted to that interest.25
Madison’s warning explains why the Court treats this as the plainest violation: “the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects.”26 A power to prefer is not confined to the first preference it makes. Larson shows the modern form of the harm: the exemption rewarded the groups that qualified, and the burden of registering and reporting fell on the groups that did not.
A plaintiff who alleges that government has singled out a faith does not always win under this principle. In Trump v. Hawaii, the plaintiffs argued that a Proclamation singled out Muslims for disfavored treatment in violation of the bar on official denominational preference.27 The Court, 5–4, declined to apply Larson’s nondiscrimination principle and upheld the Proclamation, which banned or restricted entry from seven countries with Muslim majorities.28
Religion Generally and Nonbelief
A benefit available to every faith alike invites a quick answer: no denomination is preferred, so the Clause is satisfied. The answer stops a step early. Since Everson, the Court has consistently held the Clause applicable no less to governmental acts favoring religion generally than to acts favoring one religion over others.30 Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lee v. Weisman illustrates the point with Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, which struck down a state tax exemption benefiting only religious periodicals even though the statute worked no discrimination among faiths.31 The exemption’s limit to religious publishers made it a preference for religion. A benefit open to religious and secular recipients alike lacks that feature, and the difference changes the analysis.
The same principle protects nonbelievers. Government can neither aid all religions against nonbelievers nor aid religions based on belief in God as against religions founded on different beliefs.32 That was the principle in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court struck down a Maryland law challenged by a secular humanist.33 Its protection extends to the adherents of nontheistic religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Ethical Culture.34 Everson’s own list, which forbids forcing anyone to profess a belief or disbelief, points the same way.35
The argument that the Amendment forbids only preference of one religion over another, and not impartial government aid to all religions, is an old one. The Court rejected it in McCollum, which also declined to overrule Everson.36 It resurfaces in current critiques of the doctrine, taken up in the last section of this chapter. Until the Court adopts it, the rule to apply is the one Everson announced.
Barring government from using its schools to spread religious doctrine shows no hostility toward religion. Hostility would be at war with the national tradition embodied in the guaranty of free exercise, because the First Amendment rests on the premise that religion and government can best achieve their aims if each is left free from the other within its own sphere, with a wall between Church and State “kept high and impregnable.”37 Nor does neutrality exclude religion from the classroom. The Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, or comparative religion. In Stone v. Graham the Court drew that line, observing that posting the Ten Commandments on classroom walls serves no comparable educational function and that its only likely effect is to induce schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps venerate and obey the commandments.38
Purposes Behind the Clause
The Clause protects religious liberty first of all. Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, described it as a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty, because the framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone.40 That is why the Clause does not wait for coercion. Everson forbids government to “force or influence” a person’s religious choices,41 and the Court has recognized that the fullest possible scope of religious liberty entails more than freedom from coercion.42
Official endorsement injures even those who are not coerced. Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.43 Favoring religion generally carries the same message to nonbelievers, which is why neutrality between religion and nonreligion belongs in the rule.
The Clause also protects religion from the state. A favored faith may be compromised as political figures reshape its beliefs for their own purposes, and it may be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.44 Keeping religion in private hands minimizes state intrusion on religious choice and best enables each religion to “flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.”45
The taxing and spending power supplies a fourth concern. One of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Clause was that the power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general. Madison, the leading architect of the religion clauses, warned in his Memorial and Remonstrance that the authority that can force a citizen to contribute three pence for one establishment may force him to conform to any other in all cases whatsoever.46
The purposes also set a limit. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or hindering a sectarian belief, and chaos would ensue if every such statute were invalid; the state could not criminalize murder for fear of promoting the Biblical command against killing.47 The Court’s task is to sort out the statutes and practices whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious liberty.48 The Lemon framework, taken up next, organizes that sorting around secular purpose, primary effect, and excessive entanglement.