Concept
Matters of Public Concern
Public employment
Matters of Public Concern
Pickering asked courts to weigh the employee’s interest, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the State’s interest, as an employer, in the efficiency of its public services.1 Connick v. Myers made the first half of that phrase decisive. The speech there grew out of a workplace quarrel, and the Court had to decide whether such speech belongs on the employee’s side of the scale at all.
Sheila Myers was an assistant district attorney in New Orleans. She opposed a transfer to another section of the criminal court, refused to accept it, and was fired by the district attorney, Harry Connick.2 Before the firing she had circulated a questionnaire among her colleagues. It asked about office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, their confidence in various supervisors, and whether they felt pressured to work in political campaigns.3 Connick, and his first assistant, who called the episode a “mini-insurrection,” judged the questionnaire an act of insubordination that interfered with working relationships.4 The lower courts ruled for Myers, but the Supreme Court held that her discharge did not offend the First Amendment.5
The Court resolved the case with two questions, asked in order. The first, a threshold, asks whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern; the answer decides whether a federal court reviews the employer’s decision at all. The second applies only to speech that clears the threshold and asks how heavily the employer’s interest in an orderly office weighs against the employee’s interest in speaking.6 The subsections below take them in that order.
Content, Form, and Context
Ordinary government dismissals escape judicial review. When no fixed tenure, statute, or regulation protects the job, the dismissal is not reviewable even if the stated reason is mistaken or unreasonable.7 Pickering carved out an exception for employees who speak as citizens on community affairs, so the threshold asks whether the words fall inside that exception or remain an ordinary personnel matter. The Court drew the line there for a practical reason. If every matter transpiring in a government office were a matter of public concern, virtually every remark, and certainly every criticism of a public official, would plant the seed of a constitutional case, and the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a “roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”8
Failing the threshold costs the employee less than the word “unprotected” suggests. The Court held only that when a public employee speaks as an employee on matters only of personal interest, then, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum for reviewing the wisdom of the personnel decision.9 The employee loses Pickering review of the employer’s decision. The holding does not turn private-matter speech into a category the government may punish whoever utters it, and an exam answer should state the result in those terms.
Courts decide whether speech addresses a matter of public concern from its content, form, and context, as revealed by the whole record.10 Content asks what the statement is about, form asks how it was delivered, and context asks what circumstances produced it. The three must be read together because any one can mislead: a personal grievance can be dressed in the vocabulary of government, and a statement on a genuinely public subject can serve a private quarrel. Speech qualifies when it can fairly be considered as relating to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest.11 In practice, speech on broad social or policy issues, or about discrimination, inefficiency, or impropriety in a government office, tends to qualify. Complaints about the employee’s own evaluation, working conditions, or grooming rules tend not to.12
Connick applied the test to Myers’s questionnaire one question at a time, and with a single exception every question failed. The questions about colleagues’ confidence in supervisors, office morale, and the need for a grievance committee were extensions of her dispute over the transfer.13 The Court granted that discipline and morale relate to an agency’s efficient performance. It found, though, that the questions aimed to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors, not to evaluate the office’s performance, and that they reflected one employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause célèbre.14 Context did much of the work, because a questionnaire that emerged from a persistent dispute over her own transfer reads as one more move in that dispute.15
The question about political campaigns cleared the threshold. Given the history of political-patronage cases such as Branti v. Finkel and Elrod v. Burns, the Court found it apparent that whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the community, on which public employees must be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.16 One document, written by one employee in one dispute, thus held speech on both sides of the line. The campaign question asked about a practice in which the community has a stake. The morale and trust questions asked how colleagues felt about a transfer policy that had just landed on Myers. Because one question qualified, the case did not stop at the threshold. It moved on to the balance, which the next subsection takes up.
Two later cases show the threshold at work on speech that many listeners would find offensive. In Rankin v. McPherson, a clerical employee in a county constable’s office, after hearing of an attempt on the President’s life, told a coworker she hoped a second attempt would succeed, and the Court held that her discharge violated the First Amendment. Her remark counted as speech on a matter of public concern because it came in a conversation about the administration’s policies, and its controversial and inappropriate character was irrelevant to that question.17 In City of San Diego v. Roe, a police officer sold videos of himself engaged in sexually explicit acts. The Court held that the videos did not address a public concern, because they did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the department’s functioning or operation.18
Set side by side, the cases show that shock value does not move the answer. Both employees did something many listeners would find offensive. McPherson’s remark came in talk about government policy, so it related to a matter of political concern to the community, while Roe’s videos concerned only himself and shed no light on the department’s work. The variable is whether the expression can fairly be linked to a concern of the community. Whatever weight offensiveness carries comes later, as evidence that the speech harms the employer’s operations, the subject of the next subsection.
Form plays a narrower role than the word suggests, because speaking privately or inside the office does not by itself remove a message from public concern. In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, a public school teacher was dismissed after making statements to her principal about the school’s racially discriminatory policies, and her speech was protected.19 Garcetti v. Ceballos later observed that expressing views inside the office rather than publicly is not dispositive. Many citizens do much of their talking inside their workplaces, and treating all speech within the office as automatically exposed to restriction would not serve the goal of treating public employees like members of the general public.20 Form and context remain part of the inquiry, but a private setting counts against public concern only in combination with what the statement says and what prompted it.
Justice Brennan’s dissent attacked the threshold on two fronts. First, he argued that the majority’s standard counts the manner and context of a statement on both sides of the Pickering balance, although how and where an employee speaks bears on whether the speech harms the employer, the second half of the inquiry.21 Second, he argued that courts should not restrict the concept of public concern artificially to keep routine grievances out of federal court. The proper control, in his view, is to give adequate weight to the public’s interest in the efficient performance of government and in employee discipline and harmony when the balance is struck.22 He added that the community does care about the office’s internal operations: the local newspaper had reported at length on the office’s move to “plush new offices.”23 His third objection, to the balance itself, belongs to the next subsection.
The majority’s formulation is the rule, so an answer applies it step by step. Isolate each statement and ask what it says, how it was delivered, and what prompted it. Then decide whether the answers tie the statement to a concern of the community or only to the speaker’s own situation. A statement that clears the threshold goes on to the Pickering balance. One that does not ends the First Amendment claim against the employer’s decision, without making the speech punishable generally.
Weighing the Employer’s Interest
Clearing the threshold opens a weighing; it does not create a presumption for the employee. In Connick the District Court treated the speech’s public-concern status as enough to require the State to “clearly demonstrate” that the speech substantially interfered with official responsibilities. The Supreme Court held that this placed an unduly onerous burden on the State, because Pickering itself states that the State’s burden in justifying a particular discharge varies with the nature of the employee’s expression.25 The terms of the weighing therefore depend on how much the speech serves public debate and on what it did, or reasonably threatened to do, to the office.
The employer’s side of the scale holds the government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public, which the Pickering balance requires courts to consider fully.26 Drawing on Justice Powell’s opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, the Court explained that a government employer needs wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. That includes the power to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation, and to do so with dispatch.27 The reason is practical. Prolonged retention of a disruptive employee can damage discipline and morale, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of the office.28
Those concerns are strongest where the work depends on trust among the people doing it. The Court agreed with the District Court that nothing showed the questionnaire impeded Myers’s own ability to perform her responsibilities. It also agreed that the office’s efficient operation depends on assistants maintaining close working relationships with their superiors.29 The second finding supplied the rule of deference: when close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.30 The employer need not allow events to unfold until the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before acting.31 This harm develops quietly. Confidence between prosecutors and their supervisors erodes before it visibly breaks, so a rule demanding proof of actual breakdown would let the damage arrive before the remedy. Deference therefore tracks the job: it is greatest where confidence among colleagues is part of the work.
The content of the questionnaire shows the deference at work. Question 10 asked whether the assistants had confidence in and relied on the word of five named supervisors. The District Court had discounted the questionnaire because it presented ideas and opinions, which receive greater constitutional protection than statements of fact that might criticize a superior. The Supreme Court answered that this reasoning may bear on the value of Myers’s speech but has no logical relationship to whether the questionnaire undermined office relationships. Questions, like forcefully stated opinions and facts, carry messages, and the purpose of this one, if not its likely result, was to precipitate a vote of no confidence in Connick and his supervisors, so it carried the clear potential for undermining office relations.32 Two quantities are in play. The speech’s value to public debate goes on the employee’s side, and its capacity to disrupt goes on the employer’s side. A point that raises the first does not answer the second.
The manner, time, and place of the speech add a second set of facts. Drawing on Givhan, the Court observed that when a government employee personally confronts an immediate superior, institutional efficiency may be threatened by the manner, time, and place of the message as well as by its content. Myers prepared and distributed the questionnaire at the office, and completing it required her and others to leave their work.33 The Court allowed that professional employees deserve some latitude about when official work is performed, and that Myers violated no announced office policy. Still, it held that her exercise of speech rights at the office, unlike Pickering’s, supported Connick’s fear that his office’s functioning was endangered.34 A footnote marks the limit of the point: speech that occurs entirely on the employee’s own time and in nonwork areas of the office brings different factors into the calculus and might lead to a different conclusion.35
Context supplies the third consideration. When speech about office policy arises from an employment dispute over the very application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office. The Court accepted the finding that Myers’s reluctance to accept the transfer was not a sufficient cause in itself for her dismissal, but that did not make irrelevant the fact that the questionnaire emerged after a persistent dispute over transfer policy.36 The logic is intuitive. A survey that surfaces in the middle of a dispute over the author’s own assignment looks less like an inquiry into policy than like a campaign against the decisionmaker, and a supervisor who reads it that way has a reasonable basis for doing so.
Against these considerations the Court set the limited weight on the other side. Myers’s questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense, and it is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. That limited First Amendment interest did not require Connick to tolerate action he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.37 The operative question was therefore what Connick reasonably believed would follow from the questionnaire. Because the office depended on close working relationships, the case gives the most deference to employers whose staff must trust and work closely with their superiors.38
The deference has limits built into the holding. The Court cautioned that “a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.”39 The employer’s burden thus slides with the importance of the speech. The Court also stressed that, although particularized balancing is difficult, courts must reach the most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.40 It repeated Pickering’s caveat that the enormous variety of fact situations makes it neither appropriate nor feasible to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.41
Justice Brennan, joined by three colleagues, attacked the way the majority struck the balance.42 He pointed out that the District Court heard four of the five supervisors named in Question 10 testify and found that the question had no adverse effect on Myers’s relationship with her superiors.43 He invoked Tinker v. Des Moines for the proposition that undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.44 And he concluded that the decision would deter public employees from criticizing how agencies are run and would deprive the public of information it needs to evaluate elected officials.45 The majority’s reply is that deference attaches to the employer’s reasonable belief about close working relationships, a belief the employer may form before the damage is manifest. The disagreement is whether an employer’s fear of disruption can carry the balance when no evidence confirmed it. The majority said it can where the speech touches public concern in only a most limited sense. The dissent’s concern explains why the stronger-showing caveat matters when the speech counts for more.
The balance tips the other way when the employer’s interest is slight. In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court first found the clerical employee’s remark to be speech on a matter of public concern and then balanced her interest against the State’s interest in the effective functioning of the office.46 The majority relied on the fact that she served no confidential, policymaking, or public-contact role. She was not a peace officer, wore no uniform, and had no authority to make arrests or carry a weapon, and she made the remark in a private conversation in an area closed to the public.47 The State’s interest in content-related sanctions was therefore minimal, and nothing showed that the remark interfered with the effective functioning of the office or was made in a context that could discredit it.48 The dissent challenged whether a distinction should be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking employees.49
Set beside Connick, Rankin shows which facts move the employer’s side of the scale. Myers’s survey was aimed at her own supervisors, circulated at the office among colleagues, pulled others from their work, and grew out of a dispute over her own assignment, all in an office where confidence between lawyers and supervisors is part of the job. McPherson’s remark was aimed at a distant political figure and spoken privately to one coworker in an area closed to the public, by an employee whose job had no confidential, policymaking, or public-contact content, with nothing to show harm to the office. Her remark was arguably the more shocking of the two, yet shock added no weight to the employer’s side. The employer’s interest is measured by harm to the office’s functioning and standing, and offensiveness counts only as evidence of that harm.
The sixth step compares; it does not simply conclude. A reasonable belief of disruption wins easily against a speech interest that barely touches public concern, and it loses force as the speech more substantially serves public debate.