Concept
Speech Pursuant to Official Duties
Public employment
Speech Pursuant to Official Duties
The prosecutor in Garcetti v. Ceballos, Richard Ceballos, held a calendar deputy position and came to believe that the affidavit supporting a warrant in a pending case contained inaccuracies. He spoke by telephone with the deputy sheriff who had sworn the affidavit and received no satisfactory explanation. He then relayed his findings to his supervisors, Carol Najera and Frank Sundstedt, and followed up with a disposition memorandum that explained his concerns and recommended dismissal of the case.1
Ceballos claims that retaliation followed: reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion. His employment grievance was denied on a finding that he had suffered no retaliation, so he sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the retaliation for his March 2 memo violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.2
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the memo’s allegations were protected under the analysis of Pickering and Connick.3 Judge O’Scannlain, concurring, agreed that circuit precedent compelled that result but urged that circuit law be revisited and overruled. He stressed the distinction between speech offered by an employee “acting as an employee carrying out his or her ordinary job duties” and speech by an employee “acting as a citizen expressing his or her personal views on disputed matters of public import.” In his view, an employee who speaks in the course of routine, required employment obligations has no personal interest in the content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.5
The reversal turned on the capacity in which Ceballos spoke, a question that must be settled before the Pickering balance is reached. This section first states the rule and the ideas that support it. It then explains how courts decide what falls within an employee’s duties, a question the Court left to a practical inquiry. It ends with the dissenting opinions and the other protections the majority had in mind.
The Garcetti Rule
Public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment; the amendment protects an employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.6 Garcetti identifies a circumstance in which the employee is not speaking as a citizen at all. When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the Court held, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.7
The holding works as a gate. Pickering and the cases that followed it identify two inquiries, and the first asks whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on the employer’s reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, the possibility of a claim arises, and the question becomes whether the government had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.8 Speech made pursuant to official duties fails the first inquiry, so a court never weighs the employer’s reaction against the employee’s interest, however weighty the subject.
Ceballos did not dispute that he wrote the memo pursuant to his employment duties,9 and the Court treated that fact as decisive. He spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case, and that consideration distinguishes his case from those in which the First Amendment protects against discipline.10
One fact that might suggest protection did not matter. The memo concerned the subject matter of his employment, but the Court called that, too, nondispositive, because the First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job. Pickering itself says why: “Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”11 What separates protected from unprotected speech is therefore the speech’s relationship to the job, not its topic: whether the employee spoke in fulfilling a responsibility the job imposed.
Two earlier cases mark the other side of the line. The letter in Pickering had no official significance and resembled letters that numerous citizens submit every day.12 The remark in Rankin v. McPherson came in a conversation about the Reagan administration’s policies, and the Court, having found a matter of public concern, went on to apply the Pickering balance.13
Three ideas support the rule. First, speech made pursuant to duties is the employer’s own work product. Restricting “speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”14 The majority supported the point by comparison to government’s control over messages it funds, as in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.15 Official communications also have official consequences, which creates a need for substantive consistency and clarity: supervisors must ensure that their employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s mission. Ceballos’s memo illustrates the point, since it demanded his supervisors’ attention and led to a heated meeting with employees of the sheriff’s department. If his superiors thought it inflammatory or misguided, they had the authority to take proper corrective action.16
Second, the rule leaves untouched what an employee says as a citizen. Refusing to recognize claims based on work product does not keep government employees out of public debate. They retain the prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to civic discourse, though that prospect does not invest them with a right to perform their jobs however they see fit.17 The Court also answered the Court of Appeals’ concern about an anomaly by calling it limited in scope: it reaches only expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities, not statements or complaints, like those in Pickering and Connick, made outside the duties of employment. An employer troubled by the anomaly, moreover, has the means at hand to avoid it.18
Third, the rule shields managerial discretion from judicial supervision. Justice Breyer, in dissent, states the majority’s premises: government employers need sufficient discretion to manage their operations, and the Constitution does not seek to displace managerial discretion by judicial supervision. He describes the majority’s fear as department management by lawsuit.19
Because failure on either half of the first inquiry has the same consequence, the order of the first two steps is a matter of convenience. The fixed point is that both come before the balance.
Students most often err by treating the subject of the speech as the end of the inquiry. The Ninth Circuit held Ceballos’s memo protected under Pickering and Connick, and the Supreme Court reversed because he wrote it pursuant to his duties.21 Once an employee has not spoken as a citizen, the importance of what the speech reports cannot carry the claim to the balance.
Defining Official Duties
Whether a statement was made pursuant to official duties is the fact on which the rule turns, and the Court left that question mostly open. Because the parties did not dispute that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to his duties, the Court had no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties where there is room for serious debate.23 It did reject the suggestion that employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions, and it called the proper inquiry “a practical one.” Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a task in a written description is “neither necessary nor sufficient” to show that the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment purposes.24
The two halves of that statement guard against opposite manipulations. A written entry is not sufficient because otherwise an employer could strip protection from citizen speech simply by drafting. Justice Souter feared exactly that response. He predicted that government employers would expand stated job descriptions to include more official duties, so that even speech now protectable would fall outside the First Amendment, and he offered the example of defining teachers’ responsibilities expansively by investing them with a general obligation to ensure sound administration of the school.25 A written entry is not necessary because what matters is what the employee is actually expected to perform. A task that supervisors expect an employee to carry out is part of the job whether or not anyone wrote it down.
Souter doubted that the practical inquiry cures the problem. In his view it will not discourage employers from setting duties expansively, and it will engender litigation to decide which stated duties were actual and which were merely formal.26 He pressed the point with questions the majority left open: whether a prosecutor’s discretionary statements about cases, addressed to the press on the courthouse steps, are made pursuant to official duties, and whether a government nuclear scientist’s complaint to supervisors about a colleague’s improper handling of radioactive materials is made pursuant to duties.27
The subject of the speech does not answer the question either, as Souter’s pair of hiring complaints shows. A school personnel officer who protests to the principal that the principal disapproves of hiring minority job applicants speaks on a matter within his job responsibilities, so on the majority’s line he is unprotected. A teacher in the position of the plaintiff in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District who complains to the principal about hiring policy is protected, because choosing personnel was not what the teacher was hired to do.28 The listener and the subject are the same in both complaints, and only the speaker’s job differs. Souter objected to that line, but the pair shows how the test sorts cases.
Lane v. Franks marks the line between speech about the job and speech that is part of it. A unanimous Court held, based on Garcetti, that a state college violated the First Amendment rights of the director of its program for underprivileged youth by discharging him for truthful testimony he gave after being subpoenaed in a criminal case.29 The Court’s rule is that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during that employment.”30
The second sentence of that rule carries the lesson. A statement about the job, or one built on what the employee learned on the job, is not for that reason a statement made pursuant to the job. What counts is whether the speech is itself part of what the employee is ordinarily expected to do. Classifying the testimony as citizen speech does not win the case; it sends the claim on to the remaining steps, public concern and the Pickering balance.31
The rule’s wording also marks where it stops. It speaks of testimony outside the scope of the employee’s ordinary duties, so an employee whose ordinary job includes testifying, such as a crime laboratory analyst whose assignments include presenting test results at trial, does not fit within it as stated. For that employee the question reverts to whether the testimony is itself part of the ordinary work.32
The majority in Garcetti also reserved a category. It acknowledged an argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by the Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence, and it declined to decide whether its analysis applies in the same manner to speech related to scholarship or teaching.33 Souter’s concern is concrete. The majority’s language is spacious enough to include the teaching of a public university professor, whose teachers necessarily speak and write “pursuant to official duties,” and he hoped that the majority did not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities.34 An exam answer should describe the question as reserved, not as decided either way.
The usual shortcut on an exam is to equate speech about the job with speech pursuant to the job, which is the equation Lane rejects. The opposite shortcut treats a broad written description as conclusive, which the practical inquiry forbids. Each substitutes a convenient proxy, the topic or the paperwork, for the question of what the employee was ordinarily expected to say.
Dissents and Alternative Protections
The majority met the objection that its rule leaves an employee who exposes wrongdoing on the job without a remedy by pointing outside the First Amendment. It referred to legislative enactments available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.36 For government lawyers it added rules of professional conduct, such as a California rule forbidding a government attorney to institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when the attorney knows or should know that the charges are not supported by probable cause, and constitutional obligations apart from the First Amendment, such as those recognized in Brady v. Maryland. These imperatives, together with obligations from other constitutional provisions and the criminal and civil laws, “protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions.”37
Three Justices wrote separately, each rejecting the categorical answer and each proposing a different substitute. These are the arguments of opinions that lost, and each should be attributed to its author:
- Justice Stevens would answer the question the majority framed with “Sometimes,” not “Never,” because it is senseless to let constitutional protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.38
- Justice Souter would apply the Pickering balance to duty speech, but would let the employee prevail only when the comment concerns a matter of unusual importance and is made with high standards of responsibility.39
- Justice Breyer would apply the Pickering balance only where professional obligations and a special constitutional obligation to speak are both present.40
All three accept that employers need room to manage. Stevens concedes that a supervisor may take corrective action when duty speech is “inflammatory or misguided,” and he asks what should happen when the speech is merely unwelcome because it reveals facts the supervisor would rather no one else discover.41 Souter agrees that an employee who speaks out on matters subject to comment in doing his own work has greater leverage to create office uproars and to fracture the government’s authority to set policy to be carried out coherently through the ranks.42 Breyer likewise understands the need to afford government employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations.43 The dispute is therefore about method. The majority protects the employer by removing duty speech from the First Amendment, while the dissents would keep some duty speech inside it and let the balance, or a narrowing screen, protect the employer.
Stevens adds a practical objection. It seems perverse to him to fashion a new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors.44 Souter makes a related observation: the majority itself concedes some First Amendment protection when a public employee repeats statements made pursuant to his duties in a separate, public forum or in a letter to a newspaper.45 The incentive runs against the employer, which would prefer to learn of a problem from its own employee before the press does.
Souter builds his alternative on the premise that the balance exists for exactly this situation. Pickering balancing resolves the tension between the individual and public interests in the speech and the government’s interest in operating efficiently without distraction or embarrassment by talkative or headline-grabbing employees, and the need for that balance hardly disappears when an employee speaks on matters his job requires him to address. The individual and public value of such speech is no less, and may well be greater, because the employee addresses a subject he knows intimately for the very reason that it falls within his duties.46 To answer the employer’s concern, he would set the bar high from the outset. An employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties should not prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he does it, and only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can weigh out in the employee’s favor.47 He hoped that standard would discourage meritless actions, and he argued that the majority’s own “practical” inquiry invites factbound litigation over what counts as duty speech.48
Breyer’s alternative is narrower. In his view the First Amendment sometimes does authorize judicial action based on speech that both involves a matter of public concern and takes place in the course of ordinary job-related duties, but only in the presence of augmented need for constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference with governmental management.49 Both conditions appear where professional and special constitutional obligations are present together: the need to protect the speech is augmented, the need for broad government authority to control it is likely diminished, and administrable standards are quite likely available.50 A prosecutor is his example. The Constitution itself obliges a prosecutor to learn of, preserve, and communicate to the defense exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the government’s possession, and Breyer suggests that a prison doctor might have a similar constitutionally related professional obligation to tell superiors about seriously unsafe or unsanitary conditions in the cellblock.51
Breyer finds Souter’s screen too broad, and his reason shows what separates the two dissents. A standard keyed to unusual importance does not avoid the judicial need to undertake the balance in the first place. The prospect that a dissatisfied employee can file a complaint, engage in discovery, and insist that the court balance the interests may itself interfere unreasonably with the employer’s control of how an employee performs his basic job. It may also interfere with other grievance-resolution mechanisms, such as arbitration, civil service review boards, and whistle-blower remedies, for which employees and employers may have bargained or which legislatures may have enacted.52 Souter’s screen asks how important the subject is, so it can reach employees in many different jobs. Breyer’s screen asks whether something independent of the employer’s wishes, a professional obligation together with a constitutional one, requires the employee to speak, and so it admits fewer cases to the balance.
Souter answers the majority’s statutory reassurance directly. Individuals doing the same sorts of governmental jobs and saying the same sorts of things addressed to civic concerns will get different protection depending on the local, state, or federal jurisdiction that happens to employ them, and the combined variants of statutory whistle-blower definitions and protections add up to a patchwork, not a showing that worries may be remitted to legislatures for relief.53 He also resists the idea that duty speech is simply work the government commissioned. The government’s interest in an employee’s speech cannot be equated with the interest in a specific, prescribed, or forbidden substantive position, such as the federal interest in Rust, and Rust is no authority for the notion that government may exercise plenary control over every comment a public employee makes in doing his job.54
The memo that began the case shows how the approaches sort real facts. Ceballos wrote his disposition memorandum as a prosecutor, so under the majority’s rule it is unprotected. Breyer would reach the balance, because Ceballos’s speech was a government lawyer’s speech that, he says, fell within his obligations under Brady v. Maryland, and Breyer concluded that the conditions for balancing were met in the case.55 A memo reporting inaccuracies in a warrant affidavit would at least have to be measured against Souter’s list of eligible subjects, which includes official dishonesty and other serious wrongdoing.56
A student who attributes a dissent’s test to the Court, for example by saying that the Court balances duty speech when the subject is of unusual importance, misstates the law, because each of those tests comes from an opinion that lost. The better answer states the majority’s rule and its substitutes first. It then gives the dissenting objections: that categorical exclusion removes protection from the employees best placed to expose wrongdoing, rewards going public before speaking to a supervisor, and leaves the remedy to an uneven patchwork.