Concept
Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts packs the whole tort into a single sentence. A person who, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes another severe emotional distress is liable for that distress and for any bodily harm that results from it.1 The sentence has three working parts: extreme and outrageous conduct, intent or recklessness, and severe distress caused by the conduct. Liability for bodily harm is an add-on. The Third Restatement keeps the structure and speaks of severe emotional harm where the Second speaks of distress.2
Courts usually unpack the sentence into four requirements. In Harris v. Jones, the Maryland court adopted the four elements outlined in Womack, observed that they are essentially the elements of § 46, and explained why close adherence matters: it minimizes two problems inherent in a tort of this character, telling the true claim from the false one and the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong.3 Kentucky's formulation in Craft v. Rice states four mandatory requirements, and its use of the word must tells the reader that a plaintiff has to satisfy every one.4
The conduct element examines what the defendant did, not what symptoms the plaintiff developed. Many courts have dropped any requirement of physical symptoms or manifestations, or hold it inapplicable where the facts tend to show the reality of the plaintiff's harm.5 The Third Restatement disavows the requirement and limits claims to “serious emotional disturbance,” whether or not physical manifestations accompany it.6 The requirement also typically does not apply to parasitic claims of distress.7 That leaves the demanding conduct element to do much of the work of separating serious wrongs from trifling annoyances.
The sections below start with the baseline decency test, because each later refinement varies it. They then take up four settings that recur in the cases and move conduct toward or away from the line: insults and petty indignities, abuse of a position of power, a plaintiff's known sensitivity, and repetition over time. Intent, causation, and severity get their own sections.
The Decency Standard
The Restatement demands conduct that is “extreme and outrageous,” and comment d fuses the two adjectives into one demanding test. Liability has been found only where the conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.8 Courts that recognize the tort adopt that language as their own, as Maryland did in Harris and Nebraska did in Brandon v. County of Richardson.9 The superlatives are deliberate. Emotional harm is easy to claim and hard to disprove, so the test looks for behavior that most people would condemn as shocking and leaves the ordinary friction of social life alone. The usual way to apply it is to recite the facts to an average member of the community and ask whether the listener would resent the actor and exclaim, “Outrageous!”10
The decency test stands apart from the defendant's state of mind. Comment d says it is not enough that the defendant acted with a tortious or even criminal intent, that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress, or that the conduct was marked by “malice” or by the degree of aggravation that would support punitive damages for another tort.11 The Supreme Court has made the same point from the other direction: the law does not give the intent to inflict emotional distress much solicitude, and most jurisdictions make it civilly culpable only where the conduct is sufficiently “outrageous.”12 Intent is its own element of the claim, so if ill will could satisfy the conduct element, that element would add nothing. Wrongful is not the same as outrageous either. In Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., a mortgage lender was abusive and insulting to a homeowner while wrongfully undertaking to foreclose on the property, and the court found the conduct unreasonable but not extreme and outrageous.13
Proof of outrage can help prove the other elements, but proof of intent does not prove outrage. The D.C. courts allow the requisite intent or recklessness to be inferred from the outrageousness of the acts,14 and the extreme and outrageous character of conduct is itself important evidence that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.15
Courts judge outrageousness objectively, on all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.16 The yardstick is the common acceptation of the community, not the plaintiff's private sense of injury: the intrusion must be calculated to cause severe distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities, in the absence of special knowledge or notice.17 Context still counts. Conduct is not to be judged in a sterile setting, detached from the surroundings where it occurred, and the personality of the person addressed is a factor. As Prosser put it, “There is a difference between violent and vile profanity addressed to a lady, and the same language to a Butte miner and a United States marine.”18
Cochran v. Cochran shows the yardstick at work. The court held that an alleged “Value Jet” message was not so extreme as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community: reciting those facts to an average member of the community might prompt a shake of the head in disapproval, but not the exclamation “Outrageous!”19
Who applies the test matters as much as the test. Under comment h, the court decides in the first instance whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous, and where reasonable people may differ, the jury decides whether the conduct in the particular case was outrageous enough to result in liability.20 The split follows from what the yardstick measures. Because it measures the community's reaction, a jury is the natural body to apply it when the facts could go either way, and the judge's first screen keeps liability from resting on conduct that no reasonable person would call outrageous. The screen can also favor the plaintiff. In Brandon, the Nebraska Supreme Court found the material facts undisputed and held the defendant's conduct extreme and outrageous as a matter of law, although it was unclear whether the district court had found the evidence insufficient as a matter of fact or as a matter of law.21
Two decisions show the judge's first look going each way. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club involved a doctor's alleged false or reckless statement that a person was suffering from a fatal disease. The court reasoned by comparison with the practical joker: if a person is liable for playing such a joke, liability is a fortiori justifiable where a doctor falsely or recklessly makes it known that someone has a fatal disease.22 Cruel hoaxes have supported recovery since the tort's earliest cases. In Wilkinson v. Downton, a practical joker told the plaintiff that her husband had been smashed up in an accident and lay at a pub with both legs broken, and the shock gave her a serious physical illness with permanent consequences.23
Abourezk v. New York Airlines ended the other way. The plaintiff sued over a pilot's refusal to let him leave the aircraft, and the appellate court affirmed summary judgment: no reasonable juror could find the refusal the kind of outrageous behavior the test describes, and the plaintiff offered no facts that could support a contrary conclusion even with every reasonable inference drawn in his favor.24 The difference lies in the conduct. A doctor's false or reckless statement about a fatal disease attacks a person's peace of mind in a way an average listener might well call outrageous, while a refusal of a request, however unwelcome, belongs to the ordinary friction that comment d leaves alone. Every refinement below adjusts how this baseline applies to a particular kind of conduct or plaintiff.
Insults and Petty Indignities
The plain insult is the behavior the extreme-and-outrageous element screens out most often. Comment d says liability clearly does not extend to “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,” and that plaintiffs must be expected to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.26 The law has no occasion to intervene whenever someone's feelings are hurt. There must be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must remain through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.27 An insult is the plainest example of behavior driven by a wish to wound, and, as the last subsection showed, a wish to wound does not by itself make conduct outrageous.
Two concerns support the exclusion. The first is that ordinary life is full of bad manners, and a tort that tried to remedy them all would have no principled stopping point. Harris relied on the observation that, against much of the friction and clashing of temperaments in community life, “a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.”28 The second is the problem Harris names at the outset: telling the true claim from the false and the trifling annoyance from the serious wrong.29 An insult is the cheapest thing to allege and the hardest to disprove. If it could carry the claim, every bitter quarrel would produce a plaintiff, and the outrageousness element would stop separating real injuries from inflated ones.
Insult cases pose the threshold question in its purest form. Even where a court would allow recovery for mental suffering, absent physical consequences, inflicted in the course of other intentional or malicious torts, it must still decide whether the use of insulting language under the circumstances described is an actionable invasion of a legally protected right.30 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida put the question that way over a store employee's insult to a customer. Courts answer with an objective test. The intrusion must be calculated to cause severe distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities, and there is no inclination to treat mere vulgarities, obviously intended as meaningless abusive expressions, as actionable.31 A plaintiff cannot close the gap by calling the speaker grossly reckless. That assertion “cannot take the place of allegations showing that the words were intended to have real meaning or serious effect.”32
The line does not track how vile the words were. In the decisions Harris collected, a police officer told the plaintiff he was crazy as a bedbug and would be put back in an asylum and his children taken from him, another official puffed up his cheeks and bulged his eyes at the plaintiff seven or eight times, and a supervisor wrote to a paraplegic employee, “You must realize that your job was created for you because of your handicap.” None committed the tort.33 In Booker v. Silverthorne, the defendant called the plaintiff a “God damned liar” and said he would break the plaintiff's neck, and the court held that the language merited the severest condemnation but was not civilly actionable.34
Abusive creditors and contractors fall on the same side. In Medlin the lender's abuse was unreasonable but not extreme and outrageous, and in Alsteen v. Gehl a home improvement contractor's conduct toward a homeowner, though abusive, insulting, and deceitful, was held not extreme and outrageous.35 A threat to do what the defendant has a legal right to do is likewise generally not actionable absent aggravating circumstances, and a defendant who exercises a legal right answers for it only if the conduct goes so far beyond what the right requires that it becomes extreme and outrageous.36 The next subsection returns to that limit.
A single slur is an insult, and a daily campaign of slurs is a pattern. In Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., continuous humiliation and embarrassment from racial jokes, slurs, and comments by coworkers and supervisors was held to state a claim.
Three kinds of fact move abusive words out of the default: circumstances of aggravation, repetition over a significant period, and abuse of a relationship or status that gives the defendant power over the plaintiff.37 Students often reach for the defendant's intent instead, but intent cannot do this work, because an insult is almost always meant to hurt. Two decisions on unwelcome sexual overtures show aggravation at work. In Jones v. Clinton, the court found that the conduct alleged was a sexual proposition, albeit an odious one, that was relatively brief, involved no coercion or threats of reprisal, and was abandoned as soon as the plaintiff made clear it was unwelcome. It knew of no authority holding that such an encounter, without more, gives rise to a claim of outrage, and it contrasted a case in which an older relative used wine and medication to foist sex on a minor cousin, conduct that went “beyond a mere sexual encounter.”38 In Samms v. Eccles, the Utah court accepted that a solicitation would not ordinarily be actionable but found “aggravated circumstances” where a married woman was hounded by telephone calls from May to December, some late at night, and the defendant once came to her home and exposed himself.39 Duration and intrusion carried the Utah plaintiff across the line, and the other court found neither.
Threats follow the same pattern, because a threat that is vague or never backed by action is one more release of steam. In Cochran, the court called the alleged statements “the kind of boastful, peevish, spleen-venting which frequently occurs between the parties to an intimate relationship gone bad,” and noted that if the defendant had tried to follow through on any threat, the statements might have been viewed in a more menacing context.40 In Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for Southern California, by contrast, union officials phoned the plaintiff on different occasions, said he would be put in the hospital, and raised the well-being of his wife and children. The court held that each statement, alone or as part of a course of conduct, was sufficiently outrageous to state a claim.41 The same insult can land on opposite sides of the line depending on who delivers it and what power the speaker holds over the listener, which is the subject of the next subsection.
One recognized exception removes the extreme-and-outrageous threshold altogether. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 48, innkeepers, common carriers, and other public utilities may be liable for profane, grossly insulting, or indecent language by their employees acting within the scope of employment, and proposals to extend the rule to all possessors of land open to the public have had little success.42 A bus driver's gross abuse of a passenger can therefore reach a jury on that footing alone, while a store clerk's remark to a customer is measured against the full outrageousness standard.
Online insults follow the default rule. In Shrader v. Beann, an e-mail posted on an Internet trade website's forum, explaining that a publisher no longer worked with the plaintiff because of concerns about the originality and usefulness of the plaintiff's work, did not support the claim.43 A wider audience adds reach but not the aggravating facts that lift an insult over the line, so an online plaintiff needs the same repetition, intrusion, or abuse of power as any other plaintiff.
Abuse of Position or Power
Whether conduct is extreme and outrageous can depend on who is acting toward whom. Comment e says the extreme and outrageous character of conduct may arise from the defendant's abuse of a position, or relation with another person, that gives the defendant actual or apparent authority over that person or power to affect that person's interests, and courts scrutinize carefully the conduct of a defendant who is in a peculiar position to harass the plaintiff.45 The last subsection ended on this point, because the same insult that is only a release of steam from a stranger can carry a claim when the speaker holds power over the listener.
A stranger's insult ends when the plaintiff walks away, and the plaintiff can answer back at no cost. A supervisor who controls the paycheck, a landlord who controls the home, an official who controls a person's liberty, and a lender who controls credit cannot be left behind so easily, because leaving costs something and answering back invites retaliation. The defendant's position gives the same words more force and gives the defendant more power to hurt, which is why courts examine such conduct with particular care. Position is evidence of outrage, not a substitute for it. The question that organizes this subsection is whether the position makes the same conduct worse, or whether the defendant is merely exercising a right the position carries.
Employment supplies the clearest illustration. In Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., the California Supreme Court said that an employee's status entitles the employee to more protection from insult and outrage than a stranger would receive. It found the tort where an employer, standing in a position of authority over the plaintiff, aware of his particular susceptibility to emotional distress, and acting to cause that distress, humiliated him, insulted his race, and terminated his employment without cause.46 A later California decision summarized the case as one in which a Black employee was fired in a despicable manner while the supervisor shouted racial epithets.47 The same epithet that is only an insult from a stranger weighs more when the speaker is ending the listener's livelihood. Alcorn also had facts a stranger case lacks, since the employer knew of the plaintiff's susceptibility and acted to cause distress, so the position was one of several features that together moved the conduct across the line.
Other workplace decisions apply the same reasoning to different kinds of power. In Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, the court held that a supervisor's sexual harassment of the plaintiff could reasonably be characterized as extreme and outrageous, and that the employer's own actions toward her after she reported the harassment could reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous as well.48 In Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., a new company president gave the plaintiff three options: a sales job at half his former pay, termination with three months' severance, or a warehouse supervisor job at the same pay with reduced benefits. He took the third, and the warehouse job turned out to be a janitorial one that had him sweeping floors and cleaning the employee cafeteria. He quit after four months with severe clinical depression and respiratory problems caused by dust, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed a $3.4 million award for age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.49 In both cases the employer used control over the plaintiff's job to impose fear or humiliation that no management purpose required.
Official authority belongs on the same list. In Brandon v. County of Richardson, the court called the relationship between the parties and the plaintiff's susceptibility important factors in judging outrageousness. Laux interviewed Brandon, a distraught victim of rape and physical assault, and on undisputed facts the court held Laux's conduct during the interview extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.50 The court added that the extreme and outrageous character of the conduct is itself important evidence that Brandon suffered severe distress, evidence the district court failed to consider when it wrongly found the conduct not outrageous.51
Trust relationships create the same dependence. Medicine places physicians in the central treatment role, with other providers supporting them.52 In mental health treatment, patients often develop an attachment to and dependence on the therapist as an intended consequence of the treatment, which makes them vulnerable to exploitation of the power and position that arise through the transference process.53
Control over housing and money creates dependence of its own. Threats and indignities by bill collectors, insurance adjusters, landlords, school officials, police and those posing as police, and officials of a trade association have supported liability where they go beyond ordinary persuasion or the demands the defendant has a right to make and become flagrant abuses of power in the nature of extortion.54 In Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, a landlord answered a tenant's rent protest by shouting at her, ordering her out within three days, threatening to throw her out personally, and saying, “We are going to handle this the way we do down South.”55 How far a landlord's tort liability to a tenant extends beyond the rent is a recurring question,56 and tenants have recovered for outrageous landlord conduct such as the sexual harassment, persistent lack of heat, and severe pest infestation in Haddad v. Gonzalez and the landlord's act in Chryar v. Wolf of putting a tenant's belongings on the street with a sign inviting people to take them.
Credit works the same way, and a comparison of two lenders shows where the line falls. In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, a bank misrepresented to small business operators that further loans would follow if they assigned all their receivables, refused the loans once they had, forced them to sign excessive guarantees and security agreements, and let its employees ridicule them publicly with profanities, and the court deemed the conduct sufficiently outrageous.57 The lender in Medlin was abusive and insulting while wrongfully trying to foreclose on a home, and the court called that conduct unreasonable but not extreme and outrageous.58 What separates them is what each lender did with its power. The bank built a scheme of deception and leverage and then humiliated the plaintiffs in public, while the Medlin lender's abuse accompanied a wrongful but ordinary attempt to foreclose.
When an exam stem gives an adjuster, collector, or manager a harsh word or a hard decision, ask whether the position adds anything beyond the act itself.
The limit follows from what these roles require. A creditor collects, a landlord evicts, an adjuster decides claims, and an employer evaluates, disciplines, and investigates, and each of those lawful acts upsets the person on the receiving end, often by design. A defendant cannot be held liable merely for exercising a legal right, even if the defendant knows the exercise is likely to cause severe distress, but loses that protection if the conduct goes so far beyond what is necessary to exercise the right that it is extreme and outrageous.59 If knowledge that a lawful act would distress the plaintiff were enough, every exercise of authority would become a tort.
The decisions sort lawful but unwelcome acts from abusive ones. A supervisor who screamed, yelled, and made threatening gestures while criticizing an employee's job performance did not commit the tort in Schneider v. TRW, Inc., and summary judgment was proper.60 Interrogation cases show the line from both sides. Liability followed where the questioner meant to frighten the plaintiff by raising his voice, pounding his fist on the table, and threatening to have her arrested, but not where the interrogation lasted only thirty minutes and was conducted in a pleasant voice.61 Wilson marks the boundary from the other direction, because the Fifth Circuit observed that Monarch would have faced no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress if it had simply fired the plaintiff.62
Position adds weight to conduct and leaves the decency standard in place. Harris collected decisions in which a police officer told a man he was crazy as a bedbug and would be put back in an asylum, and a supervisor wrote to a paraplegic employee that the job had been created because of his handicap. Neither was held extreme and outrageous.63 Each defendant held authority over the plaintiff, yet each delivered an insult or a clumsy reprimand without the further features present in Alcorn, such as a discharge without cause accompanied by racial abuse of an employee known to be susceptible. Spotting a title in the fact pattern and stopping there skips the question of what the defendant did with the power.
One narrow rule lowers the bar by status alone. Innkeepers, common carriers, and other public utilities may be liable for profane, grossly insulting, or indecent language by their employees acting within the scope of employment, without the usual showing of extreme and outrageous conduct.64 Courts remain cautious about extending the idea. A restaurant patron's claim based on a waiter's insult did not state a cause of action in Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., and New York and Arizona have abandoned the heightened standard of care for common carriers.65
Known Sensitivity
The decency standard measures conduct against a person of ordinary sensibilities, and comment f names the one situation in which that yardstick moves. The extreme and outrageous character of conduct, it says, may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other person is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity, and the conduct “may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know.”67 Harris set the comment beside the decency language when it laid out the conduct element,68 and Brandon drew the working rule from it: conduct that might otherwise be merely rude or abusive may be outrageous when the defendant knows the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress.69
The reason for the shift lies in what the objective yardstick is for. It protects defendants from liability for reactions they could not have anticipated, since no one can adjust a remark or a prank to a vulnerability that is invisible. A defendant who knows of the vulnerability has lost that protection. Pressing on after learning of a weakness amounts to choosing the weakness as the target, and that is the heartless behavior comment f describes.
The trigger is the defendant's knowledge, and that limit keeps the rule from swelling into a general rule that defendants take their plaintiffs as they find them. A defendant is not liable to the extent that the plaintiff's emotional response falls outside the range of normal human reactions to the conduct, and the conduct must be such that a reasonable person of ordinary sensitivity would be expected to experience severe distress. If the defendant knows of a peculiar sensitivity, however, the defendant may be liable for conduct that is extreme and outrageous in light of that vulnerability even though the same conduct would not produce a severe response in a normal, healthy adult.70 Absent such knowledge, mere verbal abuse, name-calling, rudeness, and threats to do what the defendant has a legal right to do are generally not actionable unless aggravating circumstances are present.71 Compare the objective standard itself, which asks about a person of ordinary sensibilities “in the absence of special knowledge or notice.”72
Nickerson v. Hodges is the standard illustration. The plaintiff, an eccentric woman who had been treated for mental illness, believed her ancestors had buried a pot of gold and spent months digging for it after a fortune teller gave her a map. The defendants filled a pot with rocks and dirt, buried it where she would find it, and staged its opening before townspeople assembled at the local bank. She suffered acute distress and serious illness, and the defendants were held liable. Aimed at an ordinary person, a buried pot of rocks is a hoax most listeners would call tasteless, and few would exclaim “Outrageous!” The jokers built this hoax around an obsession they plainly knew about, and the public staging guaranteed her humiliation.
Harris shows the rule applied to a disability, and it also shows the rule's limit. Over a five-month period, Jones approached Harris at work more than thirty times to mimic his stuttering verbally and physically, and two or three times a week told him in a “smart manner” not to get nervous.73 The Maryland court called it crystal clear that Jones's conduct was intentional, but it never decided whether the conduct was outrageous, because the evidence of severe distress was legally insufficient. That element requires a severely disabling emotional response, and its severity is a necessary element of any recovery. The court added that a preexisting susceptibility does not necessarily preclude liability if the conduct intensified the existing condition.74 Known susceptibility therefore moves only the outrageousness line, and the plaintiff must still satisfy the severity requirement taken up in the sections below.
Courts discuss several kinds of susceptibility. The physically infirm, the mentally ill, and children are the standard examples.75 Youth matters because a child cannot weigh a frightening statement the way an adult can. In Korbin v. Berlin, the defendant approached a six-year-old girl and told her that her mother had taken a man away from his wife and that God would punish them. Pregnancy is another recognized susceptibility. In Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., a creditor came to the home of a woman seven months pregnant and screamed profanity, abuse, and accusations of dishonesty in front of others, and her severe emotional disturbance ended in a miscarriage for which she recovered. A visible pregnancy shows how knowledge can be proved from the circumstances without any admission by the defendant.
Recent victimization can supply the vulnerability as well. Brandon, citing Drejza v. Vaccaro, called the relationship between the parties and the plaintiff's susceptibility important factors, and applied them to Brandon, a distraught victim of rape and physical assault who was being interviewed by Laux.76 Attachment can work the same way. In Burgess v. Taylor, a woman too ill to care for her two beloved horses pastured them with defendants who promised to return them if they could no longer keep them. The defendants sold the horses for slaughter within a week and then lied about their whereabouts, and the court noted that it was appropriate to take into account the defendants' knowledge of her vulnerability based on her attachment to the horses.
Employment supplies a further setting, and it connects to the interrogation cases above. In one reported case, the employer knew the employee was emotionally frail. The employee was interrogated most of the day at 30-minute intervals without a lunch break, cursed at, accused of stealing, threatened with arrest, and denied access to his prescription tranquilizer.77 That ordeal sits far from a brief, pleasantly conducted interview, and the employer's knowledge of the frailty is one of several differences, alongside the length, the cursing, and the threats.
Knowledge of a susceptibility changes the measure without replacing the requirement of outrage. In Cochran, the court assumed for argument that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts showing they were susceptible to emotional distress and still held that “major outrage is still essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt[], is not enough.”78 Susceptibility is one factor weighed with the rest of the circumstances. What separates Nickerson from Cochran is what each defendant did with the knowledge. The jokers built a public spectacle around the plaintiff's obsession, while the Cochran defendant, whatever he knew, delivered only the boastful talk of a relationship gone bad, so his knowledge had little outrage to amplify.
The hinge in that pair is what the attendant knew when he acted, and an exam stem will usually put the same hinge in front of you. A plaintiff with a phobia, a disability, or a painful history shows that a susceptibility exists, but only a fact showing that the defendant learned of it, through disclosure, prior dealings, or circumstances too obvious to miss, lets the analysis shift. Where the stem says only that the defendant should have realized, or says nothing about what the defendant knew, the conduct is measured against an ordinary person, and a prank or insult that would not outrage an average listener stays on the near side of the line. The severity sections below return to this boundary, because distress outside the range of normal human reactions generally goes uncompensated, and the defendant's knowledge of a peculiar susceptibility is the fact that changes the picture.79
Pattern and Repetition
Section 46(1) tests whether the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, and nothing in that test confines it to a single act.81 Conduct that might not be extreme and outrageous if done once or twice can become so when repeated many times or over a significant period.82 Illinois courts treat the duration of the behavior as one factor in deciding outrageousness: a pattern, course, and accumulation of acts can make conduct “sufficiently extreme to be actionable, whereas one instance of such behavior might not be.”83 The rule matters most where each act alone looks like an insult or a hard decision and the claim rests on the sum.
Repetition changes the analysis for reasons that build on one another. A single outburst fits the safety-valve idea in comment d: it may be a lapse the speaker regrets by evening, and the law leaves such lapses alone.84 A defendant who keeps returning to the conduct has chosen to continue it, and that choice shows a purpose a momentary flare of temper does not. Repetition also changes what the plaintiff lives through. A person can absorb a harsh remark and move on, but a standing condition the plaintiff cannot escape wears differently.
Feltmeier v. Feltmeier applied the principle to a marriage in which the wife alleged more than a decade of verbal insults and humiliations, together with episodes in which her freedom of movement was taken away and physical injury was often inflicted. The Illinois court held that the alleged pattern, combined with its duration, was extreme enough to be actionable, because it worked a humiliation and loss of self-esteem.85 The court also took the state's domestic violence statutes as a legislative statement that such behavior is unacceptable, from which it inferred that violent behavior in the domestic setting is outrageous.86
The husband argued that the abuse occurred only a handful of times each year, so that no single year contained enough of it to matter. The court refused to trivialize the claim by calculating the annual number of abusive events. Even if the events occur only a handful of times a year, the repeated pattern inflicts daily psychic torment, and its victims live in a constant state of silent fear, generated by the knowledge that their spouse, the person with whom they sleep every night, harbors the capacity to hurt them.87 Abuse of this kind recurs without being constant, so a court applying the rule asks about the accumulated effect of the pattern, and a tally of incidents per year does not answer that question.
A pattern also helps on the other elements. The wife alleged that she had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, manifested by depression, fear of other men, and an inability to form relationships with them, and the court held severe distress adequately alleged.88 Given the alleged pattern, it was also reasonable to infer that the husband knew or should have known his conduct would have long-lasting ramifications.89
A pattern need not involve violence. In Howe v. Palmer, the defendants allegedly isolated the plaintiff from his family and church and separated him from his wife over a period of years while pressing him to convey an interest in his farm, and the court upheld the verdict as a concerted and relentless campaign to overpower his will, not simple insults or displays of anger. Many of the steps could be presented as counsel or ministry, and the harm came from how they accumulated into control over a man's family, faith, and property.
Wilson carries the same logic into the workplace. The employer would have faced no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress had it simply fired the plaintiff, and the liability came from the way it dealt with him, which left him doing janitorial work that was offered as a warehouse supervisor's job.90
Harassment by strangers or neighbors follows the same logic and has the same limit. In Flamm v. Van Nierop, the defendant constantly drove behind the plaintiff at a dangerously close distance, telephoned him at home and at work for no apparent reason and either hung up or stayed on the line in silence, and dashed at him in public places. A single silent call would be a trivial annoyance, but these acts followed the plaintiff onto the road, into the office, and into the home. In Swerdlick v. Koch, by contrast, neighbors who repeatedly photographed the plaintiffs and kept a log of their activity, in an effort to prove they were illegally running a business from their home, were held not liable. Repetition was present there too, but the neighbors were gathering evidence of a suspected violation, while the Flamm defendant sought only to frighten.
Vague threats do not accumulate the same way. In Cochran, the court held that the alleged statements contained no indication of actionable threat or menace and were boastful, spleen-venting talk, and it added that if the defendant had tried to follow through on a threat the statements might have been viewed in a more menacing context.91 Listing such statements more than once adds only steam, whereas a series of acts that frighten, intrude, or demean in their own right builds on itself.
Courts move more carefully when the pattern arises inside a family. In the marital setting, one court reasoned, the threshold of outrageousness should be set high enough, or the circumstances in which the tort is recognized described precisely enough, that the social good from recognizing the tort will not be outweighed by unseemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims.92 Courts also hesitate to subject internal family disputes and petty but strongly felt antagonisms to tort law, but when conduct exceeds all reasonable bounds of behavior tolerated by society they are likely to find a claim stated, as in a case where a brother and sister-in-law and nursing home employees kept a woman from seeing her ninety-eight-year-old mother.93 Feltmeier sustained its claim because the pattern consisted of violence, restraint, and humiliation, and a long list of unkind remarks would likely add little.
Proof of a pattern cannot replace the other elements. In Harris, the court called it crystal clear that the defendant's conduct was intentional, and the claim still failed because the evidence of a severely disabling emotional response was legally insufficient.94