attorney pro se

Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force agents arrested Gordon Shuster after discovering a methamphetamine laboratory at his residence in Rainbow, California. Shuster agreed to cooperate with the agents. He placed a call to respondent Gordon Mezzanatto's pager a few hours later. When Mezzanatto returned the call, Shuster told him that a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for $13,000. Shuster arranged to meet Mezzanatto later that day. At the meeting, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his friend. Mezzanatto produced a brown paper package containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine from his car. He also presented a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue and asked the officer if he wanted to take a hit. The officer gave a prearranged arrest signal after leaving the car to retrieve the money. Mezzanatto was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor to discuss cooperating with the Government. At the beginning of the meeting, the prosecutor stated that Mezzanatto would have to agree that any statements made could be used to impeach contradictory testimony at trial if the case proceeded that far. Mezzanatto conferred with counsel and agreed to proceed under those terms. He then admitted knowing the package contained methamphetamine while claiming he had dealt only in ounce quantities and had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week. The Government confronted Mezzanatto with surveillance evidence showing his car on Shuster's property the day before the arrest. It terminated the meeting for failure to provide completely truthful information. Mezzanatto was later tried on the charge. He took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he thought Shuster used the laboratory to manufacture plastic explosives for the CIA and that he did not know the package contained methamphetamine. Over defense objection, the prosecutor cross-examined Mezzanatto about inconsistent statements from the October 17 meeting. The prosecutor called an attending agent to recount those statements. The jury found Mezzanatto guilty. The District Court sentenced him to 170 months in prison. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed over Chief Judge Wallace's dissent in 998 F. 2d 1452 (1993). The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056 (1993).

On the evening of June 29, 1977, Brian Burbine was arrested by Cranston, Rhode Island, police officers in connection with a local burglary after Detective Ferranti received information from a confidential informant linking a man known as "Butch" living at a specific address to an earlier murder. Burbine, who lived at that address and was known by that name, was taken to the Cranston police station where Cranston detectives advised him of his Miranda rights; he initially refused to sign a written waiver form. At approximately 7:45 p.m. that same evening, Burbine's sister telephoned the Public Defender's Office in Providence to request legal assistance for her brother on the breaking-and-entering charge. Attorney Allegra Munson from that office telephoned the Cranston police station at 8:15 p.m., identified herself as Burbine's counsel, and was told by an officer that the police would not be questioning Burbine or placing him in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night. Munson was not informed that Providence police were present or that Burbine was a suspect in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey. Less than an hour later, three Providence detectives arrived at the Cranston station and began questioning Burbine about the murder. Prior to each of three interview sessions, Burbine was advised of his Miranda rights, and on three separate occasions he signed written forms acknowledging that he understood his rights and expressly waiving them; he then provided three written statements admitting responsibility for the murder. At no time during the questioning was Burbine informed that his sister had retained an attorney for him or that Attorney Munson had telephoned the station. Prior to trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, Burbine moved to suppress the statements. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Burbine had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them, and that the statements were voluntary. Burbine was convicted of first-degree murder. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On the afternoon of September 14, 2006, Minneapolis police responded to a 911 call of a shooting in South Minneapolis and found Bennie Hodges lying wounded with blood on his pants near the buttocks area. Hodges told the responding officer that he had been shot by appellant, whose nickname is "Little Cuz." Hodges was taken to the hospital, where police spoke to his mother, who had been with him and described the shooter as an African-American male roughly 25 years old with short braids to his neck but could not make a positive identification from a photographic lineup. The next day Hodges identified appellant in a photographic lineup as the shooter, and Hodges' mother independently identified appellant as the shooter in a separate photographic lineup. A next-door neighbor who saw the shooting described the shooter as an African-American male roughly 25-30 years old with braids, wearing a light-colored shirt and dark blue jeans, a description that matched appellant. Appellant was charged with first-degree assault, two counts of attempted first-degree aggravated robbery, second-degree assault, and felon in possession of a firearm; a second amended complaint added a charge of attempted first-degree murder. At trial the State presented testimony from Hodges, Hodges' mother, the next-door neighbor, and a friend of appellant who testified that she picked him up from a Subway restaurant that afternoon. The district court denied appellant's motion to suppress the photographic lineup identifications and granted the State's request to impeach appellant with two prior drug-related felonies if he testified. Appellant chose not to testify. The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and felon in possession of a firearm, but the district court declared a mistrial on the attempted first-degree murder charge because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. In March 2007 the district court first sentenced appellant to 60 months for the felon-in-possession conviction, which increased his criminal-history score from three to four and raised the presumptive sentence range for the first-degree assault conviction. The court then imposed the maximum presumptive sentence of 160 months for first-degree assault, to be served concurrently with the firearm sentence. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.