Also known as: child abuses · child abuser · child abusers · child abusing · child abused · child maltreatment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Intentional or neglectful physical or emotional harm inflicted on a child, including sexual molestation. Esp., a parent's or caregiver's act or failure to act that results in a child's exploitation, serious physical or emotional injury, sexual abuse, or death. An act or failure to act that presents an imminent risk of serious harm to a child also qualifies.
Connor Clark arrived at school with visible bruises. His teacher asked about the injuries to determine whether he faced continued harm at home. The child's identification of the abuser was admitted at trial because the exchange addressed an immediate safety concern rather than building a prosecution record.
Christian Coleman pleaded guilty to a state child abuse offense. His lawyer failed to advise him that the conviction could lead to deportation. The court later vacated the plea because the immigration consequences constituted a critical factor in the decision to accept the agreement.
Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years and served in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He faced criminal charges in Kentucky after being arrested for transporting a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer. Before entering a guilty plea to the drug distribution charges, Padilla's counsel did not advise him that the conviction would trigger deportation proceedings. Counsel instead told him that he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had lived in the country so long. Padilla relied on that advice when he pleaded guilty and later alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had received accurate information. In postconviction proceedings Padilla claimed that his attorney's erroneous advice about deportation constituted ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, treating deportation as a collateral consequence outside the protection of the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether federal law imposed on counsel an obligation to advise Padilla that his guilty plea would result in removal from the country.
View caseCorinne Cho noticed fresh marks on a student's arm during class. The child identified the mother's boyfriend as the source while the teacher sought to end the threat. The statements were admitted because the primary purpose was protection rather than evidence creation.
In March 2010, Darius Clark sent his girlfriend T.T. hundreds of miles away to Washington, D.C., to engage in prostitution while he cared for her two young children in Cleveland, Ohio: three-year-old L.P. and eighteen-month-old A.T. The next day Clark took L.P. to preschool. Teacher Ramona Whitley noticed that L.P.'s left eye appeared bloodshot. When they moved into the brighter lights of a classroom, Whitley noticed red marks like whips of some sort on L.P.'s face. After Whitley and lead teacher Debra Jones questioned him, L.P. identified his abuser as Dee and indicated that Dee was big. Jones's supervisor lifted L.P.'s shirt and found additional injuries; Whitley then called a child-abuse hotline. When Clark arrived at the school he denied responsibility and left with L.P. The following day a social worker located the children at Clark's mother's house and took them to a hospital, where a physician documented extensive injuries on both children, including black eyes, belt marks, bruises, a swollen hand, a large burn, and two pigtails ripped out at the roots. A grand jury indicted Clark on five counts of felonious assault, two counts of endangering children, and two counts of domestic violence. At trial the State introduced L.P.'s statements to his teachers, but L.P. did not testify because the trial court found him incompetent under Ohio Rule of Evidence 601(A). The court admitted the statements under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807 after finding sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and denied Clark's motion to exclude them on Confrontation Clause grounds. The jury convicted Clark on all counts except one assault count related to A.T. and sentenced him to twenty-eight years' imprisonment. A state appellate court reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds. In a four-to-three decision the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding the statements testimonial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseClaire Campbell faced felony child abuse charges. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove all male jurors. The conviction was reversed because the strikes rested on gender stereotypes rather than case-specific reasons.
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against J. E. B. on behalf of T. B., the mother of a minor child, in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. On October 21, 1991, the matter was called for trial and jury selection began with a panel of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were male. The State then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury. Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges on the ground that they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of gender. The court rejected the objection and empaneled the all-female jury, which found petitioner to be the father of the child and ordered him to pay child support. On postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its ruling. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment at 606 So. 2d 156 (1992), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 508 U. S. 905 (1993) to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.
View caseColin Chambers faced termination proceedings after repeated incidents of child abuse. The state proved its case by clear and convincing evidence of ongoing risk. The court severed parental rights because that standard satisfied due process.
In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody. Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.
View caseClifford Cox reported suspected abuse of his child to county services. Officials took no action and the child later suffered severe injury. The suit against the department failed because the Constitution does not impose an affirmative duty to shield individuals from private violence.
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1975. In 1980, a Wyoming court granted his parents a divorce and awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy DeShaney, who then moved with the child to Winnebago County, Wisconsin. In January 1982, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services became aware that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse after he was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. The examining physician notified DSS. A caseworker interviewed Randy DeShaney and visited the home, observing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head, but concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse to retain him in court custody and returned him to his father while recommending counseling and preschool enrollment. Over the next two years, Joshua was repeatedly treated for suspicious injuries at local hospitals, with physicians notifying DSS on multiple occasions. Caseworkers conducted regular visits, noted additional injuries, received reports from emergency room personnel and neighbors, and at one point convened a Child Protection Team that decided against retaining custody, yet consistently returned Joshua to his father's care after determining insufficient evidence existed for court intervention. In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child fell into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage requiring lifelong institutionalization for profound mental retardation. Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse. Joshua and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, its Department of Social Services, and two social workers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, claiming a deprivation of liberty without due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseStatements are nontestimonial when the primary purpose of the questioning is to address an ongoing emergency and protect the child rather than to create evidence for prosecution. Factors include the informality of the setting, the absence of law enforcement, the child's age, and the spontaneous nature of the response. Admission of such statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Supporting sources
No. The reporting requirement does not retroactively change the character of initial questioning that occurred to assess medical needs and safety. The primary purpose remains protective when the interaction takes place in a routine clinical setting without law enforcement involvement.
Supporting sources
The state must prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. This intermediate standard satisfies due process because it balances the parent's fundamental liberty interest against the state's interest in protecting the child from harm.
…131, 144 (D. Finkelhor, R. Gelles, G. Hataling, & M. Straus eds. 1983). In families where wifebeating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well. Violence Against Women, supra , at 12. Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.…