Also known as:disparate treatment discrimination · disparate-treatment · disparate treatment
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
Intentional discrimination in which a decisionmaker treats an individual less favorably than others because of a protected characteristic.
Sources & Authorities
How it applies
Common Examples
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Outdated Coverage Formula Challenge
Dominic Drake, a state election official, seeks to update voter registration rules. Federal authorities impose preclearance based solely on 1990s data that singles out his state. The selective burden arises from intentional reliance on stale formulas that treat his state differently from others without fresh justification.
Zoning Permit Denial
Derek Douglas applies for a special-use permit to operate a group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Cleburne. City officials deny the permit after citing concerns unique to the residents' disabilities while granting similar permits to other facilities. The denial rests on intentional differential treatment tied directly to the disability classification.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Cases
Casebooks
City of Cleburne, Texas, et al. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., et al.473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985)
Promotion Practices Dispute
Destiny Davis and other female employees at Diamond Manufacturing allege they were passed over for management roles. Company records show that store managers exercised subjective discretion that consistently favored male applicants with similar qualifications. The pattern demonstrates intentional sex-based treatment embedded in the promotion process.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes564 U.S. 338 (2011)
Housing Ordinance Challenge
Darius Dixon seeks to build multifamily housing in Huntington. Town officials enact and enforce zoning rules that block the project while permitting comparable development elsewhere. The selective application reflects intentional treatment based on the anticipated racial composition of future residents.
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)
Contractual Training Denial
Deborah Dunn, a Black employee at Dominion Capital, requests specialized training available to white colleagues. Supervisors refuse her request citing unwritten performance concerns not applied to similarly situated white employees. The refusal constitutes intentional race-based treatment in the terms of her employment contract.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union491 U.S. 164 (1989)
Workplace Environment Claim
Dylan Duffy alleges that her supervisor at Decker Electronics made repeated unwelcome sexual advances tied to her gender. The advances created a hostile environment that altered the conditions of her employment. The conduct amounts to intentional sex-based treatment prohibited by Title VII.
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)
Common questions
Frequently Asked
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What must a plaintiff prove to establish disparate-treatment discrimination?+
A plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent by treating the plaintiff less favorably because of a protected characteristic. Direct evidence of intent or circumstantial evidence that permits an inference of intent satisfies the requirement.
Supporting sources
How does disparate-treatment discrimination differ from disparate-impact discrimination?+
Disparate-treatment discrimination requires proof of intentional differential treatment based on a protected trait. Disparate-impact discrimination focuses on facially neutral practices that produce unequal results without regard to intent.
Supporting sources
Can statistical evidence alone prove disparate-treatment discrimination?+
Statistical evidence may support an inference of intent when it reveals a consistent pattern of less favorable treatment for members of a protected group. Standing alone it rarely suffices without additional circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive.
Supporting sources
521 U.S. 702 (1997)Constitutional Law
…her patient assistance in committing suicide. Today we hold that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the resulting disparate treatment of two classes of terminally ill people who may have the same interest in hastening death. I agree that the distinction between permitting death to ensue from an underlying fatal disease…