Also known as:executive departments · cabinet department
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A principal administrative unit of the federal executive branch headed by an officer whose written opinion the President may require on matters relating to official duties.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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President Seeks Written Advice
President Keller directed Secretary Lopez of the Department of Agriculture to submit a written assessment of how a new subsidy statute would affect crop prices nationwide. Lopez prepared and delivered the assessment to the White House within the requested timeframe. The assessment informed the President's decision on whether to seek additional legislative changes.
Immunity Claim by Former Official
Elise Everly, a former assistant secretary in the Department of Defense, faced a damages suit for actions taken while supervising procurement contracts. She moved to dismiss on grounds of official immunity. The court evaluated whether her role within an executive department shielded the conduct from liability.
Richard Nixon v. A. Ernest Fitzgerald457 U.S. 731 (1982)
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion.
Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred.
Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony.
At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.
Ewan Eckhart served as an independent counsel investigating alleged misconduct by an executive department head. The Attorney General sought to limit the scope of the investigation. The court assessed whether the counsel's placement outside normal department channels complied with constitutional appointment rules.
Alexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore B. Olson487 U.S. 654 (1988)
Edith Eberhardt sued the Department of the Interior after it approved a project affecting wildlife habitats. She claimed the approval violated statutory consultation requirements. The court examined whether her injury was traceable to action by an executive department sufficient to confer standing.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife504 U.S. 555 (1992)
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas.
Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad.
Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Erika Echevarria faced deportation after the Attorney General suspended her removal under a statute later subject to a one-house veto. She argued the veto mechanism improperly allowed congressional override of an executive department decision. The court considered the separation of powers implications for executive department functions.
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act.
On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship.
Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal.
Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
Elijah Edwards sought a writ compelling the Secretary of State to deliver a judicial commission signed by the President. The Secretary refused on grounds that the appointment process remained incomplete. The court determined whether the executive department head could be ordered to perform a ministerial duty.
Marbury v. Madison5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State.
During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out.
James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
May Congress place an adjudicatory tribunal inside an executive department without violating Article III?
Congress may create non-Article III tribunals within executive departments to perform a mix of administrative and adjudicatory functions as part of a regulatory program. Such tribunals need not be staffed exclusively by life-tenured judges. The key limit is that the tribunal must remain within the legislative scheme and leave ultimate judicial review available where Article III requires it.
Supporting sources
Does the President violate the Take Care Clause by directing an executive department to disregard a clear statutory limit?
The President must execute statutes as written and may not direct subordinates to ignore unambiguous statutory commands. Ordering an executive department to exceed a statutory cap substitutes presidential policy for congressional command. Such an instruction exceeds the executive power and violates the constitutional duty of faithful execution.
Supporting sources
When is an officer serving within an executive department considered an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause?
An officer is inferior when duties are limited in jurisdiction and tenure and the officer remains subject to supervision and good-cause removal by a principal executive officer. Limited jurisdiction to a single matter plus removal by the Attorney General satisfies the inferior-officer standard. Congress may therefore vest appointment of such an officer in a court of law.
Supporting sources
487 U.S. 654 (1988)
…to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular executive department to which the duties of such officers appertain. But there is no absolute requirement to this effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it would be difficult in many cases to determine…