Also known as: federal taxpayer standing · citizen standing · taxpayer standing · citizen suit standing · Article III standing · Flast standing
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional limit on federal judicial power that denies Article III standing to plaintiffs who assert only their status as federal taxpayers or citizens and challenge the legality of government conduct. The doctrine treats such claims as generalized grievances shared equally by the public at large. It requires instead a concrete and particularized injury in fact that affects the plaintiff in a personal way.
Fatima Flores, a federal taxpayer, sued a federal ethics agency alleging that its failure to issue required public-integrity regulations violated a statute and undermined public trust. She identified no personal financial loss, no change in her own conduct, and no distinct harm beyond the general interest in lawful government action. The court dismissed the suit because the asserted injury was shared equally by all citizens.
Francisco Frost downloaded an app and discovered that his frequent-flyer number was displayed more fully than a federal privacy statute permitted. He alleged only the bare statutory violation and identified no account access, identity theft, or other tangible consequence. The court held that the procedural breach alone did not supply the concrete and particularized injury required for standing.
Francois Fortier, identifying solely as a federal taxpayer, sued to enjoin expenditures under a federal education program that he claimed violated the Establishment Clause. He alleged no personal financial stake beyond the ordinary burden of paying taxes and no distinct injury from the challenged outlays. The court recognized standing because the challenge targeted congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause.
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Faith Fitzgerald and Frederick Ferguson, designated proponents of a state ballot initiative, attempted to appeal a federal injunction that blocked the measure after the state agency declined to appeal. They asserted only their support for the law and their role in its enactment. The court denied appellate standing because they alleged no personal concrete injury distinct from the public at large.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections. Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others. All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003. More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC. The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits. Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules. The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names. A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
Finn Fletcher, a federal taxpayer and citizen, sued to compel disclosure of CIA expenditures under a statute requiring public reporting. He alleged only that the agency had failed to comply with the reporting requirement and that he possessed a general interest in government transparency. The court dismissed the action for lack of a particularized injury.
Richardson, a United States taxpayer, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado challenging the constitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. He alleged that the Act's provisions permitting the Agency to account for its expenditures solely on the certificate of the Director of Central Intelligence violate the Statement and Account Clause of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution. Richardson claimed injury as a taxpayer because the challenged law prevented him from learning how Congress spends public money and from taking steps to correct what he believed to be illegal and unconstitutional uses of public funds. In 1967 Richardson wrote to the Government Printing Office requesting documents published by the Government in compliance with the constitutional clause. The Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of the Department of the Treasury replied by sending copies of the Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government along with monthly and daily reports. Richardson then wrote again, quoting part of the CIA Act and asking whether the statute cast reflection upon the authenticity of the Treasury's Statement and how he could receive further information on CIA expenditures. The Bureau replied that it had no other available information. Richardson next asserted that the CIA Act was repugnant to the Constitution and requested that the Treasury Department seek an opinion of the Attorney General, but the Department declined. Richardson's complaint asked the court to issue a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from publishing their Combined Statement and representing it as the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate until the statement fully complies. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Richardson lacked standing and that the claim presented a nonjusticiable political question. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Richardson had standing as a taxpayer under Flast v. Cohen and that the claim was justiciable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued the EPA to compel regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions, asserting harm to its coastal property and the health of its citizens. The state identified concrete, particularized injuries including loss of shoreline and increased flooding risks traceable to the agency's inaction. The court recognized standing because the asserted injuries were not generalized grievances shared equally by all citizens.
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. The petition asserted that carbon dioxide and other gases were heat-trapping greenhouse gases that had accelerated climate change, with carbon dioxide as the most important contributor according to the IPCC's 1995 report. The EPA received more than fifty thousand comments after requesting public input in 2001. A National Research Council report from 2001, prepared at the White House's request, stated that greenhouse gases from human activities were causing surface air temperatures to rise. On September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the petition on two grounds: the Clean Air Act did not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, and even assuming authority, the agency would not regulate due to scientific uncertainty about causation and concerns that regulation would conflict with the President's comprehensive approach involving voluntary programs and international negotiations. The denial order referenced Congress's decision in 1990 not to enact binding emissions limitations and the political history of climate change issues. Petitioners including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states and private organizations then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review in 2005. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006 to address the issues raised by the denial. Massachusetts submitted affidavits showing that global sea levels rose 10 to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, already causing loss of coastal land owned by the Commonwealth, with projections of further inundation by 2100. The United States transportation sector alone emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999, accounting for over 6 percent of worldwide emissions.
A bare statutory violation does not create standing. The plaintiff must show that the violation produces a concrete and particularized injury in fact, such as a real risk of harm to the plaintiff personally. Generalized assertions that the government failed to follow the law remain insufficient even when Congress authorizes citizen suits.
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…adequate safeguards against abuse), vacated, Lee v. Oregon , 107 F. 3d 1382 (CA9 1997) (concluding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing). Lee , of course, is not before us, any more than it was before the Court of Appeals below, and we offer no opinion as to the validity of the Lee courts' reasoning. In Vacco v.…
…in the federal courts a suit . . . ." Ibid. In Massachusetts v. Mellon , 262 U. S. 447 (1923), we dismissed for lack of
…the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. This requirement is consistent with the limitation imposed upon state-taxpayer standing in federal courts in Doremus v. Board of Education , 342 U. S. 429 (1952). Secondly, the
…§ 305 is 45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008. This alleged injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III standing. See Whitmore, supra , at 158 ("A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Los Angeles v.…
…continuing violations were also alleged. See 484 U. S., at 64. It is true, as Justice Stevens points out, that the issue of Article III standing
No. State-law proponent status does not supply the personal, concrete injury required by Article III. Proponents who assert only a generalized interest in enforcing the measure lack standing to appeal when the responsible state agency declines to do so.
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No. Associational standing requires at least one identified member who has suffered or faces a concrete and particularized injury. Allegations of broad statutory violations that affect the public at large do not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.
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No. A plaintiff who has never submitted a claim and alleges only that the language might permit an unlawful denial in the future asserts a speculative, non-imminent harm. That bare statutory grievance does not meet the concrete-injury requirement.
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