Also known as: fitness for human habitation · fitted for human habitation · habitable · habitability
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of residential premises quality requiring that leased property be safe, sanitary, and suitable for ordinary human occupancy. The standard is measured by compliance with applicable housing codes or satisfaction of bare living requirements such as adequate heat, freedom from infestation, and structural integrity.
Farah Fox leased an apartment from Franklin Foundry. The stair railings violated the local housing code and caused Farah to fall and sustain injuries. Because the condition rendered the premises unfit for human habitation, the landlord became liable for the resulting physical harm after failing to repair despite notice.
Farah Fox leased an apartment from Franklin Foundry. Extensive black mold developed in the HVAC system after the tenant took possession. The condition made the premises unfit for human habitation, exposing the landlord to liability for harm to persons outside the leased property once reasonable repairs were not performed.
Felipe Figueroa purchased beachfront lots intending to build a residence. A state regulation prohibited all permanent habitable structures on the property. The restriction left the lots without any use that would render them fit for human habitation, triggering a takings analysis.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseFinn Fletcher withheld rent after the landlord ignored repeated requests to fix a nonfunctional heating system and rodent infestation. The conditions rendered the apartment unfit for human habitation, allowing the tenant to raise the breach as a defense in an eviction proceeding.
In November 1969 the City Bureau of Buildings declared the single-family residence rented on a month-to-month basis for $100 per month by appellants Donald and Edna Lindsey and other tenants from appellee Normet unfit for habitation because of substandard conditions including rusted gutters, broken windows, broken plaster, missing rear steps, and improper sanitation. The tenants requested repairs which the landlord refused except for one minor item. After paying the November rent they withheld the December rent. On December 15 the landlord's attorney sent a letter threatening court action unless the accrued rent was paid immediately. On January 7, 1970, before any state eviction proceedings had begun, the tenants filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.160, was unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its continued enforcement. A three-judge district court was convened. It issued a temporary restraining order and ordered the tenants to pay rent into an escrow account during the proceeding. The parties entered a lengthy stipulation of facts, submitted exhibits and depositions, and the district court granted the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Oregon statute established a summary procedure for resolving disputes over possession of real property. Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date. A tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on the tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue if the plaintiff ultimately prevails. The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true. A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. The district court upheld the validity of the statutes under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The tenants appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseFumiko Fujimoto operated a group home for recovering addicts in a single-family zone. The city enforced an occupancy cap that prevented the home from functioning as a fit residence for its intended occupants. The restriction raised fair-housing questions about whether the premises could remain habitable for the protected class.
In the summer of 1990, respondent Oxford House opened a group home in the City of Edmonds, Washington, for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction. The group home, called Oxford House-Edmonds, is located in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences. Upon learning that Oxford House had leased and was operating a home in Edmonds, the City issued criminal citations to the owner and a resident of the house. The citations charged violation of the zoning code rule that defines who may live in single-family dwelling units. The occupants of such units must compose a "family," and family, under the City's defining rule, "means an individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics, adoption, or marriage." Oxford House-Edmonds houses more than five unrelated persons, and therefore does not conform to the code. Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing Act. The parties have stipulated, for purposes of this litigation, that the residents of Oxford House-Edmonds "are recovering alcoholics and drug addicts and are handicapped persons within the meaning" of the Act. Oxford House asked Edmonds to make a "reasonable accommodation" by allowing it to remain in the single-family dwelling it had leased. Edmonds declined to permit Oxford House to stay in a single-family residential zone, but passed an ordinance listing group homes as permitted uses in multifamily and general commercial zones. Edmonds sued Oxford House in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City with failure to make a "reasonable accommodation" permitting maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. The United States filed a separate action on the same FHA "reasonable accommodation" ground, and the two cases were consolidated. Edmonds suspended its criminal enforcement actions pending resolution of the federal litigation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held that the defining provision is exempt from the FHA under § 3607(b)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the absolute exemption inapplicable, and remanded the cases for further consideration. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an Eleventh Circuit decision declaring exempt a similar family definition provision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
View caseFrancisco Frost purchased a condominium unit subject to a strict no-pets covenant. Enforcement of the rule against an emotional-support animal threatened to render the unit unsuitable for the owner's residential needs. The court weighed whether the restriction rendered the premises unfit for human habitation under the circumstances.
Lakeside Village is a 530-unit condominium development in Culver City consisting of 12 separate three-story buildings whose residents share common lobbies, hallways, laundry, and trash facilities. In April 1978 the developer recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions that included the provision that no animals, defined to mean dogs and cats, livestock, reptiles, or poultry, shall be kept in any unit. Plaintiff Natore Nahrstedt purchased a unit in January 1988 and moved in with her three cats, which she kept entirely inside the unit. When the Lakeside Village Condominium Association learned of the cats it demanded their removal and levied successive monthly fines against Nahrstedt. Nahrstedt then filed suit against the Association, its officers, and two employees seeking declaratory relief that the pet restriction was unreasonable as applied to her indoor cats, invalidation of the assessments, damages for invasion of privacy and emotional distress, and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the cats were noiseless, created no nuisance, and had not damaged any portion of her unit or the common areas, and it incorporated by reference the grant deed, the declaration, and the condominium plan. The Association demurred to the complaint on the ground that the restriction was reasonable as a matter of law. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to every cause of action and dismissed the complaint. A divided Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissal, concluding that Nahrstedt had stated a claim for declaratory relief because the reasonableness of enforcing the restriction against her particular cats presented a factual question. The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal maintained that the recorded restriction should be treated as presumptively valid under the law of equitable servitudes. On the Association's petition the Supreme Court granted review.
View caseNo. In a majority of states the warranty requires that premises be fit for human habitation or meet bare living requirements even if the local code is satisfied or absent. A material code violation remains an important but not conclusive factor.
A tenant may terminate when unremedied conditions such as infestations or heating failures render the premises unsafe or unusable for their intended purpose. Reasonable relocation costs are then recoverable under the applicable damages framework.
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The tenant must vacate and take reasonable steps to ensure the landlord learns of the termination decision and its reason. Compliance with any lease-specified notice method satisfies the requirement. Actual receipt by the landlord is not required.
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No in most jurisdictions. The warranty arises from the builder's direct relationship with the first purchaser and requires privity. A later buyer lacks that relationship and therefore has no claim.
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…536-537 (1973). Section 1351.03 limits population density directly, tying the maximum permissible occupancy of a dwelling to the habitable floor area. Even if John, Jr., and his father both remain in Mrs. Moore's household, the family stays well within these limits. : This explains why Meyer and Pierce have…