Also known as:genuine disputes of material fact · genuine dispute as to any material fact · genuine issue of material fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factual disagreement that precludes summary judgment. The disagreement qualifies as genuine when the record contains evidence permitting a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. The disagreement qualifies as material when the fact would affect the outcome under the governing substantive law.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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GPS Logs Versus Delivery Receipts
Global Cargo moved for summary judgment on Sean’s misclassification claim and supported the motion with a dispatcher’s declaration describing selected GPS logs. Sean opposed with uncited delivery receipts showing repeated late arrivals. The receipts directly contradict the inference of strict control that Global Cargo drew from the cited logs, creating a genuine dispute of material fact on the degree of supervision that a reasonable jury could resolve either way.
Video Evidence of Police Chase
A motorist sued a deputy sheriff after a high-speed pursuit ended in a crash. The deputy moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds and submitted a dash-cam video. The video showed the motorist weaving through traffic and running red lights at dangerous speeds. Because the video conclusively established the motorist’s reckless driving, no genuine dispute of material fact remained on the reasonableness of the force used.
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over, but respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour.
Deputy Timothy Scott heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by police vehicles from the pursuing officers. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway.
Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a Precision Intervention Technique maneuver. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to go ahead and take him out. Scott instead applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle. As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed, rendering respondent quadriplegic.
Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow respondent's Fourth Amendment claim to proceed to trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The record includes a videotape capturing the events in question.
A magazine published an article accusing a lobbying group of ties to organized crime. The group sued for defamation and the publisher moved for summary judgment. The record contained some evidence that the reporters had relied on questionable sources yet also contained evidence that they had conducted additional verification. The conflicting evidence left a genuine dispute of material fact on whether the publisher acted with actual malice.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)
In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist.
Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement.
Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous.
The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.
A widow sued an asbestos manufacturer claiming her husband’s exposure caused his mesothelioma. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment and pointed out that the plaintiff had produced no admissible evidence linking any of its products to the decedent. Because the plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact on exposure, summary judgment was proper.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
In September 1980 respondent Catrett, as administratrix of her husband's estate, commenced a wrongful-death action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against fifteen named corporations including petitioner Celotex Corporation.
The complaint alleged that her husband Louis H. Catrett died in 1979 from exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on diversity grounds.
After extensive discovery Celotex filed a motion for summary judgment in September 1981 asserting that respondent had failed to produce any evidence that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex asbestos products. In response respondent produced a transcript of the decedent's deposition taken in a separate California proceeding, a letter from an official of one of Celotex's former insurance companies, and a letter from one of Celotex's customers.
In July 1982 the District Court granted summary judgment to Celotex on the ground that respondent had made no showing of exposure to Celotex products in the District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory period. Respondent appealed only that ruling.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Celotex had failed to meet its initial burden because it made no effort to adduce affirmative evidence supporting its motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the proper standard under Rule 56.
Parents sued a pharmaceutical company alleging that a drug caused their child’s birth defects. The company moved for summary judgment after the court excluded the parents’ sole causation expert under Daubert standards. With no remaining admissible evidence that the drug could cause the defects, the record presented no genuine dispute of material fact on causation.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)
Two minors brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, claiming they suffered limb reduction birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the United States between 1957 and 1982.
Limb reduction defects occur in fewer than one birth out of every 1000. Scientists do not know the mechanism by which any teratogen causes such defects. The plaintiffs offered testimony from three groups of experts. One group proposed to testify to a statistical link between Bendectin ingestion during pregnancy and limb reduction defects based on reanalyses of published studies that had reported no such association. A second group proposed to testify that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects in humans because it causes such defects in laboratory animals. A third group proposed to testify based on the similarity of Bendectin's chemical structure to other drugs suspected of causing birth defects.
The district court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow after excluding the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit examined the affidavits and prior trial testimony of the plaintiffs' experts. None of the experts had studied the effect of Bendectin on limb reduction defects before being hired to testify in this or related cases. None had published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal. The only review their work had received was by judges and juries.
Plaintiffs' epidemiological experts made vague assertions of a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects but did not state that the relative risk exceeded two. With the exception of Dr. Palmer, the remaining experts were willing to testify only that Bendectin is capable of causing birth defects. Dr. Palmer alone was willing to testify that Bendectin did cause the limb defects in each of the children, based on his review of the plaintiffs' medical records and his conclusion that Bendectin is a teratogen.
A customer sued a department store alleging that store employees and police officers conspired to deny her service because of race. The store moved for summary judgment. The customer produced no evidence that the employees and officers had reached an agreement. The absence of any proof of concerted action left no genuine dispute of material fact on the conspiracy claim.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)
Sandra Adickes, a white school teacher from New York, was working as a volunteer teacher at a Freedom School for Negro children in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, during the summer of 1964. On August 14, 1964, Adickes went with six of her Negro students to the Hattiesburg Public Library, where the librarian refused to allow the students to use the library and summoned the chief of police, who ordered the group to leave. The group then went to the S. H. Kress & Co. store in Hattiesburg to have lunch. Adickes filed suit against Kress in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
After the group sat down at the lunch counter, a policeman entered the store and observed them. A waitress took the orders of the Negro students but refused to serve Adickes on the ground that she was a white person in the company of Negroes. The group left the store without being served. As they reached the sidewalk, the same policeman arrested Adickes on a vagrancy charge.
The vagrancy charge against Adickes was subsequently changed, and she was tried and acquitted. Her complaint contained two counts under § 1983. One count alleged that Kress had refused her service pursuant to a custom of the community to segregate the races in public eating places that was enforced by the State. The other count alleged that the refusal of service and the arrest were the product of a conspiracy between Kress employees and the Hattiesburg police.
Kress moved for summary judgment on the conspiracy count and submitted depositions from the store manager, the waitress, and the arresting officers, along with affidavits from police officials, all denying any agreement or communication with the police about refusing service or making the arrest. Adickes opposed the motion by pointing to her deposition statement and an unsworn statement from a Kress employee indicating that a policeman had been in the store at the time of the refusal. The District Court granted summary judgment on the conspiracy count, holding that Adickes had failed to allege facts from which a conspiracy might be inferred. After a trial on the custom count, the District Court directed a verdict for Kress because Adickes had not proved other instances of whites being refused service while in the company of Negroes.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings on both counts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
When does a factual disagreement qualify as genuine for summary-judgment purposes?
A disagreement is genuine when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Unsupported allegations or speculation do not suffice. The nonmovant must produce admissible evidence that creates a triable issue.
Supporting sources
How does the materiality requirement differ from the genuineness requirement?
Materiality asks whether the disputed fact would affect the outcome under the governing substantive law. Genuineness asks whether the evidence permits a reasonable jury to decide that fact in the nonmovant’s favor. Both must be satisfied to defeat summary judgment.
Does a motion for summary judgment test the sufficiency of the pleadings or the sufficiency of the evidence?
Summary judgment tests the sufficiency of the evidence in the record after discovery. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the pleadings. The two devices operate at different stages and apply different standards.
What burden does the nonmovant carry once the movant shows an absence of evidence?
The nonmovant must identify specific facts in the record that create a genuine dispute. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant but does not weigh credibility or resolve factual conflicts at the summary-judgment stage.
genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the defendants had acted with actual malice. The District Court, in contrast, had carefully reviewed the evidence and had concluded that there was no evidence that the…