in aemulationem

Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.

Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were jointly tried and convicted in a California court on an information charging them with thirteen felonies including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender was appointed to represent both men. The defender moved for a continuance at the start of trial, citing the complexity of the case, his daily handling of different defenses, and a conflict of interest between the defendants. The motion was denied. The defendants dismissed the defender and renewed their motions for separate counsel and a continuance, but these requests were also denied. A jury convicted both defendants on all thirteen counts, and each received a prison term. Meyes and Douglas appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed their convictions. They then petitioned the California Supreme Court for further review, but the petitions were denied without a hearing. The defendants requested the assistance of counsel on appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The court denied their requests after reviewing the record and concluding that appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose. The defendants were indigent at the time of these requests. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.

In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.

In 1939 and 1940, petitioners Kotteakos, Lekacos, Regenbogen and other defendants obtained loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration by submitting applications through Simon Brown, president of the Brownie Lumber Company, that contained false statements about the purpose of the loans, property ownership, purchase prices, and financial details. Brown prepared the applications, received the loan proceeds from lending institutions, paid the sellers, and divided the difference with the defendants who had procured each application. Each petitioner or small group of defendants dealt exclusively with Brown on distinct transactions and had no knowledge of or connection to the activities of any other group. The indictment named thirty-two defendants and charged them with one conspiracy to defraud the United States by making false statements and representations to the Federal Housing Administration for the purpose of obtaining credit. Nineteen defendants were brought to trial, and the jury acquitted seven, disagreed as to four, and convicted the remaining twelve petitioners. The Government's evidence established at least eight separate and independent groups of defendants, each acting independently with Brown as the sole common link and without any agreement or communication among the groups. Brown pleaded guilty and testified at trial. No evidence showed that any defendant knew of or participated in the transactions of defendants outside his own group. The trial court instructed the jury that the indictment charged a single conspiracy, that the jury must find each defendant was a member of that conspiracy to convict, and that the acts or statements of any conspirator could be considered against all defendants once membership was established. The court did not instruct the jury that it could convict only upon finding the single conspiracy charged or that it must keep evidence of separate transactions separate. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, recognizing that the proof showed multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy alleged but concluding that the variance and instructional error were not prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.