independent and adequate state grounds

In Florida, the State owns in trust for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, making the mean high-water line the ordinary boundary between private beachfront property and state-owned land. Littoral owners hold special rights with regard to the water and foreshore, including the right to receive accretions and relictions to their property. In 1961, Florida’s Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, which sets procedures for beach restoration and nourishment projects to deposit sand on eroded beaches. A local government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection for funds and permits, and when placing fill on the State’s submerged lands, authorization from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund is required. Once a beach restoration is determined to be undertaken, the Board sets an erosion control line that replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property and state property, after which the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion. In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes. The project would add about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line. The Department issued a notice of intent to award the permits, and the Board approved the erosion-control line. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., a nonprofit corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area, brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project. After the challenge proved unsuccessful and the Department approved the permits, the corporation challenged the action in state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court of Appeal for the First District set aside the Department’s final order and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and quashed the First District’s remand. Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the request for rehearing was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

On August 10, 2004, law enforcement officers in Tampa, Florida, entered an apartment rented by Kevin Dewayne Powell’s girlfriend. They were seeking to apprehend Powell in connection with a robbery investigation. After spotting Powell coming from a bedroom, the officers searched the room and discovered a loaded nine-millimeter handgun under the bed. The officers arrested Powell and transported him to the Tampa Police headquarters. Once there, and before asking Powell any questions, the officers read Powell the standard Tampa Police Department Consent and Release Form 310. The form stated that Powell had the right to remain silent. It also stated that anything he said could be used against him in court. The form advised that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of the officers’ questions. It further stated that if he could not afford a lawyer one would be appointed without cost and before any questioning. Finally, the form noted that he had the right to use any of these rights at any time during the interview. Powell signed the form acknowledging that he understood his rights and was willing to talk to the officers. Powell then admitted that he owned the handgun found in the apartment. He explained that he had purchased and carried the firearm for his protection despite knowing he was prohibited from possessing a gun due to a prior felony conviction. Powell was charged in state court with possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor in violation of Florida law. The trial court denied Powell’s motion to suppress his inculpatory statements. A jury convicted him of the gun-possession charge. On appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal held that the trial court should have suppressed Powell’s statements. The Miranda warnings did not adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present throughout the interrogation. The court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. The question asked whether the failure to provide express advice of the right to the presence of counsel during questioning vitiates Miranda warnings that advise of the right to talk to a lawyer before questioning. The question also asked about the right to use that right at any time during questioning. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and affirmed the reversal of Powell’s conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the case.

In 1975 respondent Dorothy Finley was convicted of second-degree murder in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and sentenced to life imprisonment. Her appointed trial counsel appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which unanimously affirmed in 1978. After the direct appeal failed, Finley filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., raising the same issues previously rejected. The trial court denied relief, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in 1981 and held that state law entitled her to appointed counsel for the postconviction proceedings. On remand the trial court appointed new counsel. That attorney reviewed the trial record, consulted with Finley, concluded there were no arguable bases for relief, and submitted a written no-merit letter to the court requesting permission to withdraw. The trial court conducted its own review of the record, agreed that no meritorious issues existed, and dismissed the petition. Finley obtained new appointed counsel and appealed the dismissal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. In 1984 that court, over a dissent, held that the postconviction counsel's conduct violated her rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, relying on procedures derived from Anders v. California. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1986.

In 1972 three individuals who had been convicted of felonies and had completed their terms of incarceration and parole sought to register to vote in California. Respondent Ramirez, convicted in Texas of robbery by assault, applied in San Luis Obispo County. Respondent Lee, convicted in California of heroin possession, applied in Monterey County. Respondent Gill, convicted in California of burglary and forgery, applied in Stanislaus County. Each was refused registration by the respective county clerk or registrar on the ground of their prior felony convictions. The three respondents filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California in May 1972, invoking that court's original jurisdiction. They brought the action on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felons similarly situated whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired. The petition named as defendants the three county election officials who had refused registration, individually and as representatives of the class of all county clerks and registrars, as well as the California Secretary of State. The three named county clerks did not contest the action and indicated they would register the named plaintiffs and similarly situated ex-felons. Petitioner Viola Richardson, County Clerk of Mendocino County, moved to intervene, alleging the suit was collusive and noting a pending lawsuit against her by an ex-felon in her county. The California Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene but added Richardson as a named defendant. The Secretary of State appeared and denied the essential claims. The California Supreme Court determined the case was not moot despite the relief afforded the named plaintiffs, exercised its original jurisdiction, and addressed the constitutional challenge. It denied the peremptory writ of mandate. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.