indeterminate

On December 22, 1994, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr., fired several .22-caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey. Apprendi was promptly arrested and, at 3:05 a.m., admitted that he was the shooter. After further questioning, at 6:04 a.m., he made a statement—which he later retracted—that even though he did not know the occupants of the house personally, "because they are black in color he does not want them in the neighborhood." A New Jersey grand jury returned a 23-count indictment charging Apprendi with four first-degree, eight second-degree, six third-degree, and five fourth-degree offenses. The charges alleged shootings on four different dates, as well as the unlawful possession of firearms and other weapons. None of the counts referred to the hate crime statute, and none alleged that Apprendi acted with a racially biased purpose. The parties entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which Apprendi pleaded guilty to two counts (3 and 18) of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4a (West 1995), and one count (22) of the third-degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb, § 2C:39-3a. The prosecutor dismissed the other 20 counts. As part of the plea agreement, the State reserved the right to request the court to impose a higher "enhanced" sentence on count 18 on the ground that that offense was committed with a biased purpose, as described in § 2C:44-3(e). Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground that it violates the United States Constitution. After the trial judge accepted the three guilty pleas, the prosecutor filed a formal motion for an extended term. The trial judge thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi's "purpose" for the shooting on December 22. Apprendi adduced evidence from a psychologist and from seven character witnesses who testified that he did not have a reputation for racial bias. He also took the stand himself, explaining that the incident was an unintended consequence of overindulgence in alcohol, denying that he was in any way biased against African-Americans, and denying that his statement to the police had been accurately described. The judge found the police officer's testimony credible and concluded that the evidence supported a finding "that the crime was motivated by racial bias." Having found "by a preponderance of the evidence" that Apprendi's actions were taken "with a purpose to intimidate" as provided by the statute, the trial judge held that the hate crime enhancement applied. The judge sentenced him to a 12-year term of imprisonment on count 18, and to shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts. Apprendi appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Over dissent, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld the enhanced sentence. A divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.

Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.

In March 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the murder of a hotel manager. After a prompt July 1976 trial, Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed that conviction in October 1977, holding that a bloodstained shirt purportedly belonging to Stevenson had been improperly admitted into evidence. Stevenson was retried, and the second trial ended in a mistrial on May 30, 1978, when a juror asked to be excused after trial had begun and no alternate was available. The third trial, which began June 6, 1978, also ended in a mistrial, apparently because a prospective juror had read about Stevenson's prior trials and had told other prospective jurors about the case before the retrial began. Stevenson was tried a fourth time beginning September 11, 1978. Present in the courtroom when the case was called were reporters Wheeler and McCarthy of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. Before the trial began, counsel for the defendant moved that it be closed to the public, explaining concern that persons in the audience would discuss testimony during recesses and thereby influence jurors. The trial judge, who had presided over two of the three previous trials, asked whether the prosecution objected to clearing the courtroom. The prosecutor stated he had no objection. The judge referenced Va. Code § 19.2-266 and announced that, under the statute and on the defendant's motion, the courtroom would be kept clear of all parties except the witnesses when they testified. The record does not show that any objections to the closure were made by anyone present at the time, including the reporters. Later that same day appellants sought a hearing to vacate the closure order. The judge granted the request and scheduled a hearing for after the day's proceedings. When the hearing began, the court treated it as part of the trial and again ordered the reporters to leave; they complied. At the closed hearing, counsel for appellants observed that no evidentiary findings had been made before entry of the closure order and that the court had not considered less drastic measures to ensure a fair trial. Counsel for defendant Stevenson emphasized that this was the fourth time he stood trial, referred to prior difficulties with juror information, and stated that he did not want information to leak out, be inaccurately published, and then be seen by jurors. The court denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial to continue the following morning with the press and public excluded. When the closed trial resumed the next day, the court's order of September 12, 1978, reflects that in the absence of the jury the defendant made a motion for a mistrial which was taken under advisement; at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, defense counsel moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence, that motion was sustained, and the court found the accused not guilty and allowed him to depart. On September 27, 1978, the trial court granted appellants' motion to intervene nunc pro tunc in the Stevenson case. Appellants then petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from the trial court's closure order. On July 9, 1979, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition petitions and, finding no reversible error, denied the petition for appeal. The Supreme Court postponed jurisdictional consideration to the merits and, treating the filed papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granted the petition. The criminal trial which appellants sought to attend has long since ended, and there is thus some suggestion that the case is moot.