Also known as: ingressus · ingresses · ingressed · ingressing · right of entry · egress
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The right or privilege to enter land or premises. Consent of the possessor creates the privilege, which ends upon revocation known to the actor, expiration of any time limit, or occurrence of a restricting event.
Ike Ingram receives permission from the owner to enter a warehouse to inspect goods. After the owner learns of a dispute and tells Ike to leave, Ike continues inside. The owner sues for trespass. The court holds that the privilege of ingress terminated upon the known revocation, so Ike's continued presence constitutes a trespass.
Officers approach a home's front door to conduct a dog sniff. The resident had not invited them onto the porch. The Court determines that the implied license for ingress by visitors does not extend to this investigative activity, rendering the entry a search under the Fourth Amendment.
In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of respondent Joelis Jardines. One month later, the Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance team to Jardines' home. Detective Pedraja watched the home for fifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around the home, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn. Detective Pedraja then approached Jardines' home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, a trained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances through particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler. Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing in part to the dog's wild nature and tendency to dart around erratically while searching. As the dog approached Jardines' front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of that odor by tracking back and forth. After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor's strongest point. Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to his vehicle, informing Detective Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for narcotics. On the basis of what he had learned at the home, Detective Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. When the warrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged with trafficking in cannabis. At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search. The trial court granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed. On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and approved the trial court's decision to suppress. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
View caseA state law attempts to bar certain vessels from entering its ports. Congress asserts authority over the activity. The Court recognizes that the power to regulate commerce encompasses control over personal ingress and migration as a legitimate subject of federal legislation.
In 1798 the New York Legislature granted Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right for twenty years to navigate the waters within the jurisdiction of the state with boats moved by fire or steam, a privilege later renewed and extended in 1803 and 1807. The right was assigned first to John R. Livingston and then to Aaron Ogden, who thereby claimed authority to operate steamboats between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City. Thomas Gibbons, meanwhile, took possession of two steamboats, the Stoudinger and the Bellona, which he employed in the same waters while holding a license issued under the federal Act of February 18, 1793, for enrolling and licensing vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries. Gibbons filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New York against Ogden seeking an injunction to restrain Ogden from navigating those waters with steamboats. The bill recited the state grants and the assignment to Ogden, alleged that Ogden was violating the exclusive privilege, and prayed for injunctive relief. Gibbons answered that his vessels were duly enrolled and licensed under the 1793 federal statute and insisted on his right to navigate between Elizabethtown and New York notwithstanding the state legislation. The Chancellor awarded the injunction and, after hearing, perpetuated it on the ground that the New York acts were valid. The Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, the highest court of the state to which the cause could be carried, affirmed the decree. Gibbons then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseA state statute imposes a waiting period on new residents seeking welfare benefits after they move from another state. The Court examines whether the law burdens free interstate movement. It notes that the right of free ingress and regress between states is a necessary feature of the constitutional union.
California participates in the federal AFDC program under the Social Security Act. In 1992 California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. That statute limited the maximum AFDC benefits payable to any family that had resided in California for less than twelve months to the amount the family would have received in its state of prior residence. In one year the AFDC program served an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual state cost of $2.9 billion. The full monthly grant for a family of two was $456, compared with $275 in Arizona. Three California residents who had recently moved from Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado filed suit in the Eastern District of California. They alleged that their grants would be reduced from $641 or $504 to $190, $341, or $280 for the first year. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Anderson v. Green because the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not yet determined whether the statute complied with federal requirements. After the Secretary issued a waiver the case was dismissed. In 1996 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. That statute replaced AFDC with TANF and expressly authorized states to apply the benefit rules of a family’s prior state for the first twelve months of residence. California then announced that enforcement of section 11450.03 would begin April 1, 1997. On that date two new plaintiffs, one who had moved from Oklahoma and one from the District of Columbia, filed the present action in the Eastern District of California. They acted on behalf of a certified class of all present and future TANF applicants who would be denied full California benefits because they had not resided in the state for twelve consecutive months. The district court again issued a temporary restraining order and, after hearing evidence, a preliminary injunction. The evidence showed that California’s benefits ranked sixth highest in absolute terms but eighteenth when housing costs were considered. New residents from forty-three states would face higher living costs. The statute would save the state approximately $10.9 million annually. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction without finally deciding the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The All County Letter implementing the statute provided that even lifelong California residents who left the state for part of a year would have their benefits calculated under the law of the other state for that period. The lower benefit level applied regardless of whether the family had received welfare in the prior state or the motive for moving. Families arriving from another country were exempt. The district court noted that other programs such as homeless assistance and an extra food-stamp allowance partially offset the disparity. The state did not dispute that the statute created significant differences between newcomers and longer-term residents.
View caseA town enacts zoning rules that make construction of low-income housing practically impossible by restricting lot sizes and ingress routes. Minority plaintiffs challenge the ordinance. The Court considers whether the barriers to entry into the community violate equal protection principles.
A state statute sets maximum rates for grain storage facilities. Operators argue the law interferes with their right to conduct business. The Court upholds the regulation, recognizing the state's authority to control access and operations of businesses affecting the public interest.
In 1862 the defendants constructed a warehouse and elevator in Chicago on leased ground and began receiving and storing grain for hire at rates they set annually by agreement with other elevator owners and published each January. The structures held between 300,000 and 1,000,000 bushels, were divided into large bins, and received grain from the Northwest that was commingled so that the identity of individual lots was lost. Owners received negotiable receipts for quantities rather than specific parcels, and nine firms controlled nine of the fourteen elevators then operating in the city. In 1870 Illinois adopted a new constitution that declared elevators and storehouses where grain was stored for compensation to be public warehouses and directed the general assembly to pass laws regulating their charges. On April 13, 1871, the legislature enacted the statute at issue, which defined public warehouses in cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants, required operators to obtain a license from the circuit court and post a $10,000 bond, and fixed maximum storage rates at two cents per bushel for the first thirty days and one-half cent for each additional fifteen days. The defendants continued to operate without obtaining the required license and continued to charge the higher rates they had previously published. They were prosecuted for transacting business as public warehousemen without a license, convicted, and fined. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment. The United States Supreme Court granted review to address the federal constitutional challenges raised by the warehousemen.
View caseConsent ends when the possessor revokes it and the actor knows or has reason to know of the revocation, when a specified time limit expires, or when a restricting event occurs. The actor then loses the privilege to remain and must leave, subject only to reasonable egress.
Supporting sources
An easement for ingress and egress grants the holder the right to enter and cross the servient estate. The scope is fixed by the grant or prescription and may be adapted only to the extent reasonably necessary without causing unreasonable damage or interference.
Supporting sources
An implied license permits ordinary visitors to approach a home by the front path to knock and wait briefly. It does not authorize investigative entries such as a dog sniff on the porch when the resident has not consented.
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…contained in that instrument. The first clause of the 9th section, not only considers the right of controlling personal ingress or migration, as implied in the powers previously vested in Congress over commerce, but acknowledges it as a legitimate subject of revenue. And, although the leading object of this section…