Also known as: injury-in-fact
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
An invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. The invasion must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way and must be real rather than abstract.
Isla Ireland stood on a subway platform when a package fell and exploded. She suffered no physical contact from the blast but claimed emotional distress. Because a reasonable person would not have foreseen risk to someone in her position, the defendant owed her no duty even though she experienced actual harm.
Isabella Ingram received a credit-card receipt missing required truncation. She alleged no unauthorized charges or data misuse. The bare procedural violation alone did not create the concrete and particularized injury needed for standing.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Imani Idowu, a criminal defendant, challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes against jurors of her race. She demonstrated personal injury from the discriminatory practice sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for third-party standing.
Ingrid Innes planned specific trips to observe endangered species whose habitats were threatened by agency-funded projects abroad. The affidavits showed imminent, particularized injury to her aesthetic interests rather than a generalized grievance.
Ideal Solutions held royalty interests in oil and gas leases subject to a class settlement. It asserted its own concrete financial stake in the outcome rather than relying solely on the rights of absent class members.
Jagdish Rai Chadha faced an imminent deportation order after a legislative veto. He showed a personal stake in the constitutionality of the veto mechanism that satisfied the injury-in-fact element throughout the litigation.
No. Noneconomic harms such as aesthetic or environmental injury satisfy the requirement when they are concrete and particularized to the plaintiff.
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No. The plaintiff must show a concrete and particularized harm or a material risk of harm beyond the procedural violation itself.
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Generally no. The plaintiff must demonstrate personal injury in fact, though limited exceptions allow third-party standing when the plaintiff has suffered its own concrete injury and other criteria are met.
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The threatened injury must be certainly impending rather than merely possible or speculative.
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…late-created "special permit" procedure before his takings claim can be considered ripe. Lucas has properly alleged Article III injury in fact in this case, with respect to both the pre-1990 and post-1990 constraints placed on the use of his parcels by the Beachfront Management Act. That there is a discretionary "special permit"…