Also known as: intentional discriminations · intentionally discriminate · intentionally discriminating · intentionally discriminated · disparate treatment
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
Action by a government entity or employer taken because of a protected characteristic such as race or national origin. The presence of such a purpose distinguishes the conduct from neutral rules that produce unequal effects without regard to the actor's motive.
State officials in one covered jurisdiction enact a new voter identification law after decades of no recent findings of discrimination. A plaintiff from that state sues, arguing the coverage formula singles out the state without current evidence of intentional discrimination. The court invalidates the preclearance obligation because the formula relies on outdated data and treats states unequally without extraordinary justification.
Ismael Ibrahim, a store manager at Indigo Textiles, is passed over for a district supervisor role while similarly situated nonminority managers receive promotions. Internal records show the regional director repeatedly noted that Ibrahim's background would not fit the company's image. The court finds the decision constitutes intentional discrimination because the motive was tied directly to a protected characteristic rather than neutral performance criteria.
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Ines Ibarra, a Black defendant convicted of murder, presents statewide data showing Black defendants receive death sentences at significantly higher rates than white defendants with comparable aggravating factors. The prosecutor offers no evidence of race-neutral reasons for the charging decisions in her case. The court holds that the statistical pattern alone does not prove intentional discrimination by the specific decision makers.
Isaiah Ishikawa applies to a state university that considers race as a factor in admissions to achieve diversity. The university admits that its policy uses racial classifications without individualized findings of past intentional discrimination at the institution. The court subjects the policy to strict scrutiny because the use of race constitutes intentional discrimination requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.
Ian Iverson, a resident, posts a political sign in his yard that violates a city ordinance banning all residential signs except those for real estate sales. The city enforces the ban against Iverson but permits other noncommercial signs. The court finds the selective enforcement reflects intentional discrimination against the content of the message.
Ivy Investments seeks a permit to operate a group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities in a residential zone. City officials deny the permit after neighbors express concerns about property values and safety, while granting permits for similar facilities serving other populations. The court concludes the denial rests on intentional discrimination against the disabled residents rather than legitimate land-use concerns.
Intentional discrimination requires proof that the decision maker acted because of a protected characteristic. Disparate impact arises from a neutral policy that produces unequal results without regard to motive. Courts treat the two differently for remedies and burdens of proof.
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Statistical disparities can support an inference but do not by themselves establish that any particular decision maker acted with discriminatory purpose. A plaintiff must link the pattern to the specific actors or decisions at issue.
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Any explicit use of race triggers strict scrutiny because the classification itself is intentional discrimination. The university must show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. General diversity goals without individualized findings of past discrimination usually fail.
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Congress may not impose preclearance on some states but not others based on decades-old coverage formulas. Such disparate treatment of states requires extraordinary justification tied to current conditions under the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power.
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…her patient assistance in committing suicide. Today we hold that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the resulting disparate treatment of two classes of terminally ill people who may have the same interest in hastening death. I agree that the distinction between permitting death to ensue from an underlying fatal disease…