Also known as: nepotistic · favoritism · cronyism
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The practice of bestowing official favors on one's relatives, especially in hiring or appointments to public office. Statutes and charters commonly prohibit such appointments within specified degrees of relationship and render them void.
Nia Nkosi, a city council member, sponsored a flow-control ordinance directing all municipal waste to a public facility operated by her brother. The ordinance survived Dormant Commerce Clause challenge because it favored a government-owned provider performing a traditional public function rather than a private entity. Nia faced removal proceedings under the local anti-nepotism charter for the appointment-like benefit conferred on her relative.
Nestor Navarro, union president, enforced a long-standing requirement that new members be related by blood or marriage to existing members. The policy produced an all-white workforce traceable to prior intentional discrimination. Black applicants sued under Title VII, arguing the nepotism rule perpetuated exclusion even though facially neutral.
The United States brought an action in a Tennessee federal court against T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations. The complaint charged discriminatory hiring, assignment, and promotion policies against Negroes at its Nashville terminal. Almost three years later, the Government filed a second action in a Texas federal court against the company. It alleged a pattern and practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters was joined as a defendant. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the Northern District of Texas. The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers. They were thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and transfers. The complaint also challenged the seniority system established by the collective-bargaining agreements between the employer and the union. The Government sought a general injunctive remedy and specific make-whole relief for all individual discriminatees. The cases went to trial. The District Court found that the Government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court further found that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining contracts between the company and the union violated Title VII because it operated to impede the free transfer of minority groups into and within the company. With respect to individual relief the court accepted the Government's basic contention that the affected class of discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver operation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the basic conclusions of the District Court. It held, however, that the relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply its remedial principles. The Supreme Court granted both the company's and the union's petitions for certiorari.
View caseNathan Nguyen, plant manager, created an on-the-job training program open only to relatives of current employees. The program produced a workforce overwhelmingly composed of one racial group. Minority workers sued, alleging the nepotistic selection criterion violated Title VII despite the employer's claim of business necessity.
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View caseNaveen Nanda, fire department chief, discarded promotion test results after learning that his nephew would not advance. The city defended the decision as necessary to avoid disparate-impact liability. White firefighters who would have been promoted sued, claiming the action constituted intentional discrimination under Title VII.
In 2003, the City of New Haven hired Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. to develop and administer promotional examinations for lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement that required a written component weighted at 60 percent and an oral component weighted at 40 percent. IOS performed job analyses that deliberately oversampled minority firefighters to avoid unintentional bias favoring white candidates. The examinations were administered in November and December 2003. Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination. Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination. The results showed pass rates of 58.1 percent for white candidates, 31.6 percent for Hispanic candidates, and 31.6 percent for black candidates on the lieutenant exam. Pass rates on the captain exam were 64.3 percent for white candidates, 37.5 percent for Hispanic candidates, and 0 percent for black candidates. Under the rule of three, the top ten candidates eligible for lieutenant promotion were all white. The top nine candidates eligible for captain promotion were seven whites and two Hispanics. After the results were released, the City held five public hearings before its Civil Service Board between January and March 2004. At those hearings, IOS vice president Chad Legel described the test-development process. Testing consultant Christopher Hornick criticized the 60/40 weighting and recommended assessment centers. Retired fire captain Vincent Lewis reviewed the content. Boston College professor Janet Helms discussed possible cultural bias in the job-analysis questionnaires. City officials including corporation counsel Thomas Ude and human-resources director Tina Burgett urged non-certification on the ground that the statistical disparity would expose the City to liability. Several candidates who had passed the exams urged certification. The Board deadlocked 2-2 and declined to certify the results. Seventeen white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter who had passed the examinations sued the City, Mayor John DeStefano, and other officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNatalie Norris, human-resources director, implemented a layoff policy that retained only employees under a certain age, many of whom were her adult children and their spouses. Older workers sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The company argued the policy addressed economic concerns rather than age bias.
In 1997, General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the United Auto Workers that eliminated the company's obligation to provide health benefits to subsequently retired employees, except as to then-current workers at least 50 years old. Respondents, a group of employees collectively referred to as Cline, were at least 40 years old but under 50 at the time of the agreement, so they fell within the age range protected by federal statute yet received no promise of benefits under the new terms. Some respondents retired before the change to obtain the prior advantage, some retired afterward with no benefit, and some continued working while knowing the contract would provide them no health coverage upon retirement. The respondents filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming the agreement discriminated against them with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of their age. The Commission agreed with the charges and invited General Dynamics and the union to settle informally, but those efforts failed. The respondents then brought suit against General Dynamics in federal district court, combining claims under the federal age statute and state law. The District Court dismissed the federal claim, describing it as one of reverse age discrimination and relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that the statute does not protect the younger against the older. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
View caseNeville Norton, base commander, refused to allow an airman to wear a yarmulke because the airman's uncle served on the base advisory board. The airman sued under the Free Exercise Clause. The military defended the uniform regulation as necessary to maintain discipline and avoid any appearance of favoritism toward relatives of advisors.
S. Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, was commissioned as a captain in the United States Air Force in 1981 after completing his Ph.D. in clinical psychology through the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program. He was assigned to serve as a clinical psychologist at the mental health clinic on March Air Force Base in Riverside, California. Upon commissioning, Goldman received the uniform clothing allowance and purchased the three standard Air Force uniforms. He completed basic officers training and performed his duties satisfactorily at the base hospital while complying with all Air Force regulations until the events at issue. In 1973 Goldman had entered the scholarship program and remained on inactive reserve status during his studies at Loyola University of Chicago. After three years he entered active service to fulfill the program's service obligation. Until April 1981 Goldman wore his yarmulke on base without interference, remaining near his duty station indoors and covering it with his service cap when outdoors. In April 1981, after testifying as a defense witness at a court-martial while wearing his yarmulke but not his service cap, opposing counsel complained to Colonel Joseph Gregory, the Hospital Commander, that the practice violated Air Force Regulation 35-10. Colonel Gregory ordered Goldman not to wear the yarmulke while on duty or in uniform outside the hospital. Goldman refused the order. After his attorney protested to the Air Force General Counsel, Gregory revised the order to prohibit the yarmulke even inside the hospital. Goldman’s request to report for duty in civilian clothing was denied. The next day he received a formal letter of reprimand warning that continued violation could lead to court-martial, and Gregory withdrew a prior recommendation that Goldman’s application to extend his active service be approved. Goldman sued the Secretary of Defense and others in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that AFR 35-10 as applied to him infringed his First Amendment rights. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction and, after a full hearing, permanently enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the regulation against Goldman or penalizing him for wearing the yarmulke. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseMost anti-nepotism statutes render the appointment void. The appointing officer may also face loss of office and possible criminal penalties.
Yes. When a public official sues over a statement accusing her of steering grants to benefit a spouse, she must prove the defendant knew the allegation was false or acted with reckless disregard of its truth.
Supporting sources
Nepotism is a specific form of favoritism limited to relatives. When a union or employer adopts a nepotism rule that perpetuates prior racial exclusion, the facially neutral policy may still violate Title VII if it locks out protected groups.
Supporting sources
…have been the primary beneficiaries of this Court's pronouncements of absolute immunity gives support to this appearance of favoritism. : See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States , 446 U. S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou , 438 U. S. 478, 511 (1978). : I will not speculate on…