outstanding warrant

On July 7, 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson of the Coffee County Sheriff's Department learned that Bennie Dean Herring had arrived at the department's impound lot to retrieve items from his truck. Anderson, familiar with Herring from prior encounters, directed the county warrant clerk, Sandy Pope, to check for outstanding arrest warrants. Finding none locally, Pope contacted Sharon Morgan, the warrant clerk in neighboring Dale County, whose database indicated an active warrant for Herring's failure to appear on a felony charge. Anderson and a deputy followed Herring as he left the lot, stopped his vehicle, and arrested him based on the reported warrant. A search incident to the arrest uncovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a pistol in his truck. Shortly thereafter, Morgan discovered that the warrant had actually been recalled five months earlier in February 2004, but the recall had not been entered into the Dale County database. She notified Pope, who alerted Anderson via radio, all within ten to fifteen minutes of the arrest. Herring was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. He faced charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the arrest was unlawful because the warrant had been rescinded. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the suppression motion, a recommendation adopted by the District Court in 451 F.Supp.2d 1290 (2005). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction in 492 F.3d 1212 (2007), concluding that the database error was merely negligent and attenuated from the arrest. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of the exclusionary rule in this context.

In 1998, Albert Florence was arrested in Essex County, New Jersey, after fleeing from police officers. He was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon. Florence entered a plea of guilty to two lesser offenses and was sentenced to pay a fine in monthly installments. In 2003, after he fell behind on his payments and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid the outstanding balance less than a week later, but the warrant remained in a statewide computer database. Two years later, in Burlington County, New Jersey, Florence and his wife were stopped in their automobile by a state trooper. Based on the outstanding warrant, the officer arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center, where he was held for six days before transfer to the Essex County Correctional Facility. Burlington County jail procedures required every arrestee to shower with a delousing agent. Officers would check arrestees for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband as they disrobed. Florence claims he was also instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals. The Essex County Correctional Facility admits more than 25,000 inmates each year. When Florence arrived, all arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and waited in a group holding cell. They were instructed to remove their clothing while an officer looked for body markings, wounds, and contraband. An officer looked at their ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings. Florence alleges he was required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the process. After a mandatory shower, during which his clothes were inspected, he was admitted to the facility. He was released the next day when the charges were dismissed. Florence sued the governmental entities that operated the jails, one of the wardens, and certain other defendants in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court certified a class of individuals charged with a nonindictable offense. Those individuals were processed at either jail and directed to strip naked even though an officer had not articulated any reasonable suspicion they were concealing contraband. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment on the unlawful search claim. A divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed.

In December 2006, an anonymous tipster contacted the South Salt Lake City police department's drug-tip line to report narcotics activity at a particular residence, specifying that the activity involved a white male and providing a physical description of the man and his car. Detective Douglas Fackrell was assigned to investigate the tip and conducted intermittent surveillance of the home over the course of about a week. During this period, Fackrell observed visitors who would frequently enter the residence and leave after short periods of time, a pattern consistent with drug dealing in his experience. One of the visitors was Edward Strieff. Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store. In the store's parking lot, Fackrell detained Strieff without reasonable suspicion, identified himself as a police officer, and asked what Strieff was doing at the residence. As part of the stop, Fackrell requested Strieff's identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification card. Fackrell relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Fackrell arrested Strieff pursuant to the warrant. When Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The State of Utah charged Strieff with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained by exploitation of an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. The Utah Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On August 25, 1999, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed responded to an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs by knocking on the front door and speaking with Rodney Gant, who identified himself and stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left and conducted a records check revealing that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. Gant arrived in his car, parked at the end of the driveway, and got out. Officer Griffith recognized the car, confirmed Gant's identity with a flashlight, called to him, and arrested him 10 to 12 feet from the vehicle before handcuffing him. Because the other arrestees occupied the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car. One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Gant was charged with two offenses of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment. After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant's car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.

Donald Curtis Samson was on state parole in California in September 2002 following his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. On September 6, 2002, Officer Alex Rohleder of the San Bruno Police Department observed Samson walking down a street with a woman and a child. The officer, aware from a prior contact that Samson was on parole and believing he faced an at-large warrant, stopped him and asked whether he had an outstanding parole warrant. Samson responded that there was no outstanding warrant and that he was in good standing with his parole agent. Officer Rohleder confirmed by radio dispatch that Samson was on parole and had no outstanding warrant. Pursuant to California Penal Code section 3067(a) and based solely on Samson's status as a parolee, the officer searched him and found a cigarette box in his left breast pocket containing a plastic baggie with methamphetamine. The State charged Samson with possession of methamphetamine under California Health and Safety Code section 11377(a). The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence after finding the search authorized by the statute and not arbitrary or capricious. A jury convicted Samson, and the trial court sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, relying on state precedent that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful if not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing, and concluding that the search here satisfied that standard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2005 to decide whether the suspicionless search violated the Constitution.