Also known as: overbreadth · over-breadth principle · overbreadth principles · overbreadth doctrine
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A First Amendment doctrine under which a law regulating speech is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech when judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep. The challenger bears the burden of demonstrating that substantial overbreadth. A statute that is not substantially overbroad remains enforceable against unprotected conduct even if some hypothetical applications would reach protected speech.
Oscar Ortiz challenges a city ordinance banning all leafleting near government buildings after he is cited for distributing political pamphlets. He argues the rule sweeps in protected speech at public forums. The court rejects the facial claim because Ortiz cannot show that the ordinance prohibits a substantial volume of protected expression relative to its valid applications to littering and obstruction.
Oakley Osei, an online publisher, sues to enjoin enforcement of a federal statute criminalizing transmission of indecent material to minors. The statute reaches vast amounts of adult-to-adult communication with no feasible age-screening mechanism. The court holds the law facially invalid because its overbreadth chills far more protected speech than its legitimate applications justify.
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Opal Okoro, owner of an adult theater, attacks a municipal zoning rule limiting such businesses to certain industrial zones. She claims the rule burdens protected expression citywide. The court sustains the ordinance because its incidental restrictions on speech are not substantially overbroad when measured against the city's legitimate interest in preserving neighborhood character.
Orson Ochoa, a billboard company, challenges a city ban on all off-site commercial signs. The ordinance reaches some noncommercial messages as well. The court severs the unconstitutional applications rather than striking the entire rule because the overbreadth is not substantial relative to the city's traffic-safety objectives.
Oriana Oberman, a utility customer, attacks a state commission order barring promotional advertising by electric companies. She contends the rule suppresses protected commercial speech. The court upholds the order because its legitimate applications to energy conservation outweigh any marginal overbreadth in restricting truthful information.
Oswald Orozco, a political donor, challenges a federal limit on contributions by minors. He argues the rule reaches protected familial political expression. The court construes the provision to avoid substantial overbreadth, preserving its core anti-corruption applications while excising the unconstitutional reach to minor donors.
The challenger must demonstrate that the law prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech when judged against its plainly legitimate sweep. The burden rests on the party attacking the statute, not on the government.
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No. Litigants challenging commercial speech restrictions must show the law is unconstitutional as applied to their own speech rather than relying on facial overbreadth.
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Yes. The doctrine grants standing to challenge a law as substantially overbroad on its face even if the litigant's own expression is unprotected, to prevent chilling of others' protected speech.
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The statute remains enforceable against unprotected conduct even if some hypothetical applications would affect protected speech.
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…District Court in the present case, have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness or because of overbreadth and abridgment of rights. Abele v. Markle , 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56; Abele v. Markle , 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730;…