Also known as: policy determinations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factor used to identify nonjusticiable political questions under the political question doctrine. The factor is present when a court cannot resolve the dispute without making an initial policy choice that the Constitution reserves for nonjudicial discretion.
Pearl Porter and other urban residents sued the state apportionment commission alleging their district contained twice the population of suburban districts. The commission moved to dismiss on political question grounds. The court denied the motion after finding that equal protection supplied a manageable standard and that resolving the population disparity claim would not require an initial policy determination reserved for the legislature.
Paul Peterson challenged a congressional resolution that overrode an immigration ruling affecting his residency status. The government argued the case presented a political question. The court rejected the argument because deciding whether the resolution complied with bicameralism and presentment did not require the judiciary to make an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View casePamela Phillips sued a steel company in federal court under diversity jurisdiction after an injury. The defendant argued that state service rules integral to the statute of limitations controlled. The court held that applying the federal commencement rule would not require an initial policy determination because the state rule addressed distinct procedural concerns that could coexist with federal practice.
In August 1975, petitioner, a carpenter residing in Oklahoma, suffered permanent injury to his right eye when the head of a nail he was pounding into a cement wall shattered and struck him. Respondent Armco Steel Corp., a foreign corporation with its principal place of business outside Oklahoma, had manufactured the nail. Petitioner alleged that a defect in the nail, caused by respondent’s negligence in manufacture and design, led to the injury. On August 19, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, invoking diversity jurisdiction. Summons was issued the same day, but service of process on respondent’s authorized agent did not occur until December 1, 1977. Oklahoma's statute of limitations, Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 95 (1971), provided a two-year period from the date of injury. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on January 5, 1978, asserting that the action was barred because service had not been effected within the limitations period or the additional sixty days allowed under Oklahoma law when the complaint is filed timely. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals regarding the application of state law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 in diversity actions involving state statutes of limitations.
View casePerry Pratt faced drug conspiracy charges and objected to admission of a recorded statement by an alleged co-conspirator. The government offered the statement under the hearsay exception. The court admitted the evidence after determining that the preliminary factual finding on conspiracy membership rested on a preponderance standard and did not involve an initial policy determination reserved for nonjudicial bodies.
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.
View casePhoebe Park sued a state university alleging denial of employment because of her disability. The state defended on Eleventh Amendment grounds and argued that Congress lacked power to abrogate immunity. The court rejected the political question claim because evaluating the legislative record for a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination did not require the judiciary to make an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, served as Director of Nursing for OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. In 1994 she was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy that required substantial leave from work. Upon returning in July 1995, her supervisor informed her that she would have to relinquish the director position, leading Garrett to apply for and accept a transfer to a lower-paying nurse manager role. Milton Ash worked as a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. At the outset of his employment, Ash notified the department of his chronic asthma and, on his doctor's recommendation, requested modifications to minimize exposure to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. After later being diagnosed with sleep apnea, Ash sought reassignment to daytime shifts pursuant to medical advice. The department denied all requested accommodations. Shortly after Ash filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, his performance evaluations declined below previous levels. Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, each seeking money damages under Title I of the ADA against their state employers. The state defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the ADA exceeds Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In a single opinion, the district court granted the motions and dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed based on its prior decision in Kimel v. State Board of Regents holding that the ADA validly abrogates state immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding whether individuals may sue states for money damages in federal court under the ADA.
View casePhoenix Technologies challenged a state tax statute that imposed higher rates on out-of-state insurers. The state argued the claim required a nonjusticiable policy determination. The court held the case justiciable because applying equal protection standards to the tax classification involved no initial policy determination reserved for the political branches.
Since 1955 Alabama has maintained a domestic preference tax statute that taxes the gross premiums received by insurance companies on policies issued in the State. Foreign life insurance companies pay a tax at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. All domestic insurance companies pay at a rate of only one percent. The statute permits domestic insurers to exclude from taxable premium income all premiums received from policies issued in other States in which they are not licensed. Foreign insurers may reduce but never eliminate the tax differential by investing prescribed percentages of their worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. Appellants are a group of insurance companies incorporated outside Alabama. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. represents the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Co. represents the nonlife claimants. In 1981 appellants filed claims with the Alabama Department of Insurance seeking refunds of taxes paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. They contended that the domestic preference tax statute as applied to them violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Commissioner of Insurance denied all claims on July 8, 1981. Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The court consolidated the appeals and selected two lead cases. On cross-motions for summary judgment the court ruled on May 17, 1982 that the statute was constitutional. After the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the finding of legitimate state purposes but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on rational relationship, appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing. The Alabama Supreme Court ultimately entered judgment for the State and intervenors. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction in 1984. It consolidated the cases and heard argument on October 31, 1984.
View caseA case requires such a determination when the court would have to choose among competing visions of fairness or policy without a constitutional or legal standard to guide the choice. The Baker factors treat this as one of six independent grounds for finding a political question. Courts have found the factor absent in malapportionment cases because equal protection supplies an objective population benchmark.
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Yes. Partisan gerrymandering claims require courts to decide how much partisan advantage is too much, a choice among competing visions of political fairness that lacks a judicially manageable standard. The Supreme Court has held these claims nonjusticiable on that ground.
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The policy determination factor focuses on whether the court must make a substantive policy choice reserved for another branch. The manageable standards factor focuses on whether any legal rule exists to decide the case at all. Both can be present in the same case but each independently supports nonjusticiability.
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No. Population-based vote dilution claims are resolved by comparing district populations against the one-person-one-vote standard. That comparison uses an objective numerical benchmark and does not require the court to choose among competing policy visions.
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…of Baker for resolving the question presented by these cases. Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial "policy determinations" or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted, § 244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that statute is for this…